Justia Kentucky Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Appellant was convicted of murder, first-degree wanton endangerment and second-degree unlawful imprisonment, among other crimes. Appellant was sentenced to life imprisonment. The Supreme Court affirmed the convictions, holding that the trial court (1) did not err in denying Appellant’s motion to sever the murder charge from the other charges; (2) erred by admitting propensity evidence in rebuttal to Appellant’s interjection of character, but the error was harmless; (3) erred in by admitting a detective’s testimony on Appellant’s truthfulness during post-arrest interview, but the error was harmless; and (4) did not err in allowing the Commonwealth to introduce a crime-scene photograph of the victim’s body showing the fatal gunshot wound. View "Cherry v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Defendants were arrested and charged with drug-related and firearm-related offenses and booked into the county jail. A district judge ordered that the men were not to be released without the posting of a bail bond, and arraignments were scheduled for the next day. The next morning, however, a different district judge ordered that Defendants be released on their own recognizance and postponed their arraignments for four days. The Commonwealth moved to have second judge’s order set aside and the original bond order for Defendants reinstated, asserting that recorded jail telephone conversations indicated that someone “pulled strings” to bring about Defendants’ release and that the release of the two men was improper. The judge to whom the case was assigned denied the Commonwealth’s motion to reinstate the cash bonds set in the original order. The Supreme Court denied the Commonwealth’s request to certify the law but employed its discretionary authority to issue a general writ of prohibition to “exercise control of the Court of Justice,” holding that judges are prohibited from engaging in ex parte communications to change the conditions of a defendant’s release after the initial fixing of bail. View "Commonwealth v. Carman" on Justia Law

Virgin Mobile USA (Virgin) began doing business in Kentucky as a commercial mobile radio service (CMRS) provider in 2002. In 2006, Virgin asked the Commercial Mobile Radio Emergency Service Telecommunications Board (the Board) to refund $286,807 it claimed it had overpaid before the CMRS service charge statutes were amended in July 2006. The Board did not promptly respond and so Virgin made no CMRS payment to the Board until it had recaptured from post-July 2006 collections the $286,807 it claimed it had erroneously overpaid. In 2008, the Board filed suit to recover the disputed amount. The circuit court entered summary judgment against Virgin for $547,945. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s conclusion that as a “CMRS provider,” Virgin had a statutory duty to collect the CMRS service charge from its customers during the pre-July 2006 time frame and remit them to the Board. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) Virgin was indebted to the Board in the sum of $286,807, not $547,945; and (2) the Board was entitled to attorneys fees. View "Virgin Mobile U.S.A., L.P. v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

In two separate incidents, Appellant’s dog, Franklin, attacked other dogs. In the second incident, Franklin attacked another dog while under the supervision of Appellant’s mother. The district court found Appellant was not liable for the first incident. With regard to the second incident, the court found Appellant guilty of a Class A misdemeanor for “failing to restrain a dangerous dog” in violation of Chapter 91 of the Louisville Metro County Code of Ordinances. The trial court ordered Appellant to pay a fine and serve a jail sentence that was conditionally discharged, and provided animal services with the discretion to euthanize Franklin. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Ky. Rev. Stat. 83A.065(2) is unconstitutional and invalid to the extent that it authorizes Chapter 91 of the Ordinances or similar ordinances which provide for a penalty of incarceration, and Chapter 91 of the Ordinances was invalid to the extent it provides such a penalty; and (2) section 83A.065(2) is valid only to the extent that it vests local governments with the authority to enact penal violations that impose monetary fines. View "Johnson v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Andrea Schrecker was injured when she crossed a street where there was no crosswalk and was struck by a car. Schrecker had decided to skip her lunch break due to an absence of a co-employee that day and was going to get something to eat from a fast food restaurant across the street during her afternoon break when she was injured. An administrative law judge (ALJ) concluded that Schrecker’s injury occurred while she was within the course and scope of her employment and awarded her medical expense benefits and income benefits. The Workers’ Compensation Board concluded that the ALJ did not err in finding that Schrecker’s injury occurred in the course and scope of her employment. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Schrecker was not in the course and scope of her employment when injured because she undertook a route to seek personal comfort that exposed her to a hazard completely removed from normal going and coming activity and which was expressly prohibited by the Commonwealth and impliedly forbidden by her employer. Remanded for entry of an order dismissing Schrecker’s claim. View "US Bank Home Mortgage v. Schrecker" on Justia Law

At issue in these two cases was the applicable scope of Ky. Rev. Stat. 15.520, which sets forth specific procedural rights for police officers who are accused of misconduct and face the disciplinary processes administratively conducted by the police agency that employs them. Appellants in both cases were police officers who were subjected to administrative disciplinary actions that were initiated as a result of allegations that arose from within the police department itself. Both officers requested an administrative review procedure consistent with section 15.520. The requests were denied. Each Appellant sought review of the disciplinary actions in circuit court. The circuit courts concluded that the officers were not entitled to an administrative hearing subject to the due process provisions of section 15.520. The appeals courts affirmed, determining that section 15.520 applies only when the disciplinary action was initiated by a “citizens complaint.” The Supreme Court reversed, holding that section 15.520 applies to both disciplinary proceedings generated by citizen complaints and those initiated by intra-departmental actions. Remanded. View "Pearce v. Univ. of Louisville" on Justia Law

In 1994, C. Barr and Joann Schuler subdivided their property, thereby creating the Woodlawn Springs Subdivision. Each phase of development was subject to a Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (Declarations). The Schulers also incorporated the Woodlawn Springs Homeowners Association, Inc. (Association). The Schulers borrowed money from Your Community Bank, Inc. (Bank) to finance the construction. After the Schulers died, First Bankers Trust Company (First Trust) executed a deed in lieu of foreclosure conveying fifty subdivision lots to the Bank and a written Assignment and Assumption of Developer Rights (Assignment) in favor of the Bank. In 2011, the Association demanded that the Bank pay $15,000 in Association fees on the subdivision lots it acquired. The Bank refused to pay the fees and filed a declaration of rights action. The circuit court granted summary judgment for the Bank. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, pursuant to the deed in lieu of foreclosure and the Assignment, the Bank had succeeded to all of the Developer’s rights under the Declarations, and therefore, was exempt from paying the Association fees. View "Your Cmty. Bank, Inc. v. Woodlawn Springs Homeowners Ass’n, Inc." on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to unlawful possession of a methamphetamine precursor, second offense. Defendant was sentenced to a ten-year prison term and placed on supervised probation for a period of five years. While on probation, Defendant was given a drug test that revealed a positive result for the use of methamphetamine. The trial court subsequently revoked his probation pursuant to Ky. Rev. Stat. 439.3106(1). The court of appeals reversed, concluding that section 439.3106 required the trial court to make specific findings regarding the risk posed to prior victims or the community and whether Defendant could be managed in the community. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) section 439.3106 requires trial courts, before revoking a probationer’s probation, to find that the probationer’s failure to abide by a condition of supervision constitutes a significant risk to prior victims or the community and that the probationer cannot be managed in the community; and (2) the trial court exercised its discretion consistent with statutory criteria in revoking Defendant’s probation in this case. View "Commonwealth v. Andrews" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of murder, assault in the first degree, two counts of assault in the fourth degree, driving under the influence of intoxicants, and tampering with physical evidence. Appellant was sentenced to life in prison for the murder conviction. During jury selection, fifty jurors were excused for cause. On Appellant’s appeal, the Supreme Court remanded the case to the trial court to determine whether Appellant was entitled to a new trial because of possible interaction between jurors and the murder victim’s mother. On remand, the trial court concluded that Appellant was not entitled to a new trial on this issue. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court erred in failing to strike one of the jurors for cause because she had three associations with Appellant, and there were reasonable grounds to believe that the juror could not render a fair and impartial verdict. View "Sluss v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Joseph Toler, who had been employed with Sud-Chemie, Inc. for approximately twenty-five years, was discharged after co-workers reported that Toler made racist comments in the workplace. Toler filed a complaint for defamation against Sud-Chemie and his coworkers, arguing that the employees had fabricated the allegations resulting in his termination. The trial court directed a verdict for Sud-Chemie and one of the coworkers, citing a qualified privilege to defamation. The jury then returned a verdict for the remaining coworkers because either the statements made about Toler were true or they were not made with malice. The court of appeals (1) affirmed the jury’s verdict, but (2) reversed the directed verdict, concluding that a plaintiff is only required to present a prima facie defamation case to defeat a qualified-privilege defendant’s directed-verdict motion. The Supreme Court reversed in part and affirmed in part, holding (1) directed verdict in favor of Sud-Chemie was appropriate, as a plaintiff in a defamation action opposing a qualified-privilege defendant’s directed-verdict motion must produce some evidence of the defendant’s actual malice to survive a directed verdict; and (2) the jury’s verdict was sound. View "Toler v. Sud-Chemie, Inc." on Justia Law