Justia Kentucky Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In 1994, C. Barr and Joann Schuler subdivided their property, thereby creating the Woodlawn Springs Subdivision. Each phase of development was subject to a Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (Declarations). The Schulers also incorporated the Woodlawn Springs Homeowners Association, Inc. (Association). The Schulers borrowed money from Your Community Bank, Inc. (Bank) to finance the construction. After the Schulers died, First Bankers Trust Company (First Trust) executed a deed in lieu of foreclosure conveying fifty subdivision lots to the Bank and a written Assignment and Assumption of Developer Rights (Assignment) in favor of the Bank. In 2011, the Association demanded that the Bank pay $15,000 in Association fees on the subdivision lots it acquired. The Bank refused to pay the fees and filed a declaration of rights action. The circuit court granted summary judgment for the Bank. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, pursuant to the deed in lieu of foreclosure and the Assignment, the Bank had succeeded to all of the Developer’s rights under the Declarations, and therefore, was exempt from paying the Association fees. View "Your Cmty. Bank, Inc. v. Woodlawn Springs Homeowners Ass’n, Inc." on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to unlawful possession of a methamphetamine precursor, second offense. Defendant was sentenced to a ten-year prison term and placed on supervised probation for a period of five years. While on probation, Defendant was given a drug test that revealed a positive result for the use of methamphetamine. The trial court subsequently revoked his probation pursuant to Ky. Rev. Stat. 439.3106(1). The court of appeals reversed, concluding that section 439.3106 required the trial court to make specific findings regarding the risk posed to prior victims or the community and whether Defendant could be managed in the community. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) section 439.3106 requires trial courts, before revoking a probationer’s probation, to find that the probationer’s failure to abide by a condition of supervision constitutes a significant risk to prior victims or the community and that the probationer cannot be managed in the community; and (2) the trial court exercised its discretion consistent with statutory criteria in revoking Defendant’s probation in this case. View "Commonwealth v. Andrews" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of murder, assault in the first degree, two counts of assault in the fourth degree, driving under the influence of intoxicants, and tampering with physical evidence. Appellant was sentenced to life in prison for the murder conviction. During jury selection, fifty jurors were excused for cause. On Appellant’s appeal, the Supreme Court remanded the case to the trial court to determine whether Appellant was entitled to a new trial because of possible interaction between jurors and the murder victim’s mother. On remand, the trial court concluded that Appellant was not entitled to a new trial on this issue. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court erred in failing to strike one of the jurors for cause because she had three associations with Appellant, and there were reasonable grounds to believe that the juror could not render a fair and impartial verdict. View "Sluss v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Joseph Toler, who had been employed with Sud-Chemie, Inc. for approximately twenty-five years, was discharged after co-workers reported that Toler made racist comments in the workplace. Toler filed a complaint for defamation against Sud-Chemie and his coworkers, arguing that the employees had fabricated the allegations resulting in his termination. The trial court directed a verdict for Sud-Chemie and one of the coworkers, citing a qualified privilege to defamation. The jury then returned a verdict for the remaining coworkers because either the statements made about Toler were true or they were not made with malice. The court of appeals (1) affirmed the jury’s verdict, but (2) reversed the directed verdict, concluding that a plaintiff is only required to present a prima facie defamation case to defeat a qualified-privilege defendant’s directed-verdict motion. The Supreme Court reversed in part and affirmed in part, holding (1) directed verdict in favor of Sud-Chemie was appropriate, as a plaintiff in a defamation action opposing a qualified-privilege defendant’s directed-verdict motion must produce some evidence of the defendant’s actual malice to survive a directed verdict; and (2) the jury’s verdict was sound. View "Toler v. Sud-Chemie, Inc." on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of sixty-seven counts of possession of matter portraying a sexual performance by a minor. The convictions arose from the discovery upon a forensic examination of partially downloaded child-pornography videos on Appellant’s personal computer and still images in an inaccessible cache on the computer. The court of appeals affirmed the convictions. The Supreme Court reversed in part and affirmed in part, holding (1) the evidence related to the still images found in the thumbcache of Appellant’s computer was insufficient to sustain those convictions; but (2) Appellant was not entitled to a directed verdict on the charges related to the videos. View "Crabtree v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of first-degree rape, first-degree sexual abuse, and being a first-degree persistent felony offender. Appellant was sentenced to life without the possibility of probation or parole for twenty-five years. The Supreme Court affirmed Appellant’s convictions and sentences, holding that the trial court (1) did not abuse its discretion in excluding evidence that the victim had been previously exposed to allegedly pornographic material on the internet; and (2) did not abuse its discretion in granting the Commonwealth’s motion to strike a juror for cause over defense objection. View "Basham v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

A New York Supreme Court awarded Inverultra, S.A., a Panamanian company, a $1.8 million judgment against three Honduran companies, including Parque Industrial Bufalo, S.A. de C.V. (ZIP Bufalo). Inverultra registered its New York judgment in the Warren Circuit Court, the home of Union Underwear, Inc. (Union). Union was the parent corporation of a company that leased commercial property from ZIP Bufalo. Inverultra filed in the Warren Circuit Court an affidavit for a writ of garnishment against Union seeking an order of garnishment requiring Union to hold any funds due to ZIP Bufalo. Inverulta then sought discovery from Union and Zip Bufalo. The trial court granted Union’s request for a protective order and denied Inverulta’s motion to compel discovery from ZIP Bufalo. Inverulta brought this action under Ky. R. Civ. P. 81 seeking a writ in the nature of mandamus to lift the prohibitions against discovery on Union and ZIP Bufalo. The court of appeals denied relief. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Inverulta did not meet any of the conditions requisite for Rule 81 relief and was thus not eligible for a writ of mandamus or prohibition. View "Inverultra, S.A. v. Hon. Steven A. Wilson" on Justia Law

William Goble suffered a work-related back injury and timely filed a claim and an amended claim asserting that he suffered a low-back injury and that he also suffered a psychological injury. An administrative law judge (ALJ) found that Goble suffered low-back and psychological injuries and related permanent impairment ratings and awarded Goble permanent partial disability income and medical expense benefits. The Workers’ Compensation Board and the Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that there was substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s finding that Goble had a permanent psychological impairment rating. View "Martin County Coal Co. v. Goble" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of two counts of murder and sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) any error in the admission of a state police detective’s testimony regarding Appellant’s invocation of his right to an attorney was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt; (2) the trial court did not err by refusing to allow Appellant’s forensic expert witness to sit with defense counsel during the testimony of the Commonwealth’s expert witnesses; (3) the trial court did not err by denying Appellant’s request for an instruction on first-degree manslaughter based upon extreme emotional disturbance; and (4) Appellant was not entitled to a new penalty phase trial even though the sentencing protocols as provided for in Ky. Rev. Stat. 532.025(3) were not followed in this case, as this deviation from the statutory procedure did not affect the ultimate sentence or jeopardize Appellant’s right to due process of law. View "Spears v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

After Peggy Branham was involved in an accident, she was transported to the University of Kentucky Medical Center, where she was examined and treated by several physicians (Physicians). Two and one half hours after arriving in the emergency room, Branham was discharged. Branham died thirty-six hours later due to a ruptured aorta related to blunt force trauma to her chest. One year later, Branham’s estate (Estate) brought suit against the Physicians, the Medical Center, and University Hospital of the Albert B. Chandler Medical Center, Inc. (the Hospital Corporation). The trial court dismissed the claims against the Medical Center and the Hospital Corporation on grounds of sovereign immunity, and the jury found in favor of the Physicians. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court (1) did not err in excluding evidence of one physician’s licensure problems and another physician’s failure to pass his medical board examination; (2) did not abuse its discretion in permitting the Physicians to call multiple expert witnesses; (3) properly instructed the jury regarding the standard of care; and (4) correctly concluded that the Hospital Corporation and the Medical Center had immunity. View "Branham v. Rock" on Justia Law