Justia Kentucky Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of first-degree murder and first-degree arson. After finding as a statutory aggravator that Defendant murdered the victim in the commission of first-degree robbery, the jury sentenced Defendant to life imprisonment without the possibility of probation or parole. The Supreme Court reversed Defendant’s first-degree arson conviction and sentence but affirmed his first-degree murder conviction and his sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of probation or parole, holding (1) the Commonwealth failed to present sufficient evidence indicating that the victim was alive before the start of the fire, and therefore, Defendant was entitled to a directed verdict on the first-degree arson charge; and (2) any remaining allegations of error committed by the trial court were either without merit or did not warrant reversal. View "Luna v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of complicity to murder, two counts of criminal attempt to commit murder, two counts of first-degree wanton endangerment, and one count of tampering with physical evidence. Defendant was sentenced to a total sentence of twenty-four years’ imprisonment. The Supreme Court affirmed the convictions and sentence, holding (1) the trial court did not err when it admitted the testimony of a gang expert; and (2) during the penalty phase of trial, the jury was properly informed of the law governing the case. View "Smith v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was found guilty of murder and sodomy in the first degree. The Supreme Court affirmed the convictions, holding (1) the trial court did not err by denying Appellant’s motion to suppress a statement he gave to law enforcement officers; (2) the trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to permit Appellant to play his entire statement for the jury; and (3) the trial court did not err by not denying Appellant’s motion for a directed verdict as to the sodomy charge, as there was sufficient corroborating proof to support Appellant’s confession to that crime. View "Bond v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of three counts of murder and sentenced to death. After Appellant’s convictions were affirmed, he filed a motion to obtain DNA testing and analysis of certain evidentiary items. The circuit court denied the motion. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the matter for an evidentiary hearing. At the hearing, the court was informed that two of the items of evidence had been subjected to DNA testing but that one item was not subjected to DNA testing because police officers had discarded the evidence immediately following Appellant’s trial. Appellant moved for a new trial on the grounds that the officers had acted in bad faith in destroying the evidence, thus violating his due process rights. The trial court denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Appellant previously abandoned his request to have the evidence tested by DNA analysis and therefore waived any complaint he may have had about their unavailability for DNA testing; and (2) Appellant failed to establish that the officers acted in bad faith when they destroyed the evidence. View "Garland v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Appellant was convicted of murder, first-degree wanton endangerment and second-degree unlawful imprisonment, among other crimes. Appellant was sentenced to life imprisonment. The Supreme Court affirmed the convictions, holding that the trial court (1) did not err in denying Appellant’s motion to sever the murder charge from the other charges; (2) erred by admitting propensity evidence in rebuttal to Appellant’s interjection of character, but the error was harmless; (3) erred in by admitting a detective’s testimony on Appellant’s truthfulness during post-arrest interview, but the error was harmless; and (4) did not err in allowing the Commonwealth to introduce a crime-scene photograph of the victim’s body showing the fatal gunshot wound. View "Cherry v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Defendants were arrested and charged with drug-related and firearm-related offenses and booked into the county jail. A district judge ordered that the men were not to be released without the posting of a bail bond, and arraignments were scheduled for the next day. The next morning, however, a different district judge ordered that Defendants be released on their own recognizance and postponed their arraignments for four days. The Commonwealth moved to have second judge’s order set aside and the original bond order for Defendants reinstated, asserting that recorded jail telephone conversations indicated that someone “pulled strings” to bring about Defendants’ release and that the release of the two men was improper. The judge to whom the case was assigned denied the Commonwealth’s motion to reinstate the cash bonds set in the original order. The Supreme Court denied the Commonwealth’s request to certify the law but employed its discretionary authority to issue a general writ of prohibition to “exercise control of the Court of Justice,” holding that judges are prohibited from engaging in ex parte communications to change the conditions of a defendant’s release after the initial fixing of bail. View "Commonwealth v. Carman" on Justia Law

Virgin Mobile USA (Virgin) began doing business in Kentucky as a commercial mobile radio service (CMRS) provider in 2002. In 2006, Virgin asked the Commercial Mobile Radio Emergency Service Telecommunications Board (the Board) to refund $286,807 it claimed it had overpaid before the CMRS service charge statutes were amended in July 2006. The Board did not promptly respond and so Virgin made no CMRS payment to the Board until it had recaptured from post-July 2006 collections the $286,807 it claimed it had erroneously overpaid. In 2008, the Board filed suit to recover the disputed amount. The circuit court entered summary judgment against Virgin for $547,945. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s conclusion that as a “CMRS provider,” Virgin had a statutory duty to collect the CMRS service charge from its customers during the pre-July 2006 time frame and remit them to the Board. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) Virgin was indebted to the Board in the sum of $286,807, not $547,945; and (2) the Board was entitled to attorneys fees. View "Virgin Mobile U.S.A., L.P. v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

In two separate incidents, Appellant’s dog, Franklin, attacked other dogs. In the second incident, Franklin attacked another dog while under the supervision of Appellant’s mother. The district court found Appellant was not liable for the first incident. With regard to the second incident, the court found Appellant guilty of a Class A misdemeanor for “failing to restrain a dangerous dog” in violation of Chapter 91 of the Louisville Metro County Code of Ordinances. The trial court ordered Appellant to pay a fine and serve a jail sentence that was conditionally discharged, and provided animal services with the discretion to euthanize Franklin. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Ky. Rev. Stat. 83A.065(2) is unconstitutional and invalid to the extent that it authorizes Chapter 91 of the Ordinances or similar ordinances which provide for a penalty of incarceration, and Chapter 91 of the Ordinances was invalid to the extent it provides such a penalty; and (2) section 83A.065(2) is valid only to the extent that it vests local governments with the authority to enact penal violations that impose monetary fines. View "Johnson v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Andrea Schrecker was injured when she crossed a street where there was no crosswalk and was struck by a car. Schrecker had decided to skip her lunch break due to an absence of a co-employee that day and was going to get something to eat from a fast food restaurant across the street during her afternoon break when she was injured. An administrative law judge (ALJ) concluded that Schrecker’s injury occurred while she was within the course and scope of her employment and awarded her medical expense benefits and income benefits. The Workers’ Compensation Board concluded that the ALJ did not err in finding that Schrecker’s injury occurred in the course and scope of her employment. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Schrecker was not in the course and scope of her employment when injured because she undertook a route to seek personal comfort that exposed her to a hazard completely removed from normal going and coming activity and which was expressly prohibited by the Commonwealth and impliedly forbidden by her employer. Remanded for entry of an order dismissing Schrecker’s claim. View "US Bank Home Mortgage v. Schrecker" on Justia Law

At issue in these two cases was the applicable scope of Ky. Rev. Stat. 15.520, which sets forth specific procedural rights for police officers who are accused of misconduct and face the disciplinary processes administratively conducted by the police agency that employs them. Appellants in both cases were police officers who were subjected to administrative disciplinary actions that were initiated as a result of allegations that arose from within the police department itself. Both officers requested an administrative review procedure consistent with section 15.520. The requests were denied. Each Appellant sought review of the disciplinary actions in circuit court. The circuit courts concluded that the officers were not entitled to an administrative hearing subject to the due process provisions of section 15.520. The appeals courts affirmed, determining that section 15.520 applies only when the disciplinary action was initiated by a “citizens complaint.” The Supreme Court reversed, holding that section 15.520 applies to both disciplinary proceedings generated by citizen complaints and those initiated by intra-departmental actions. Remanded. View "Pearce v. Univ. of Louisville" on Justia Law