Justia Kentucky Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Pursuant to a plea agreement, Defendant pleaded guilty to murder. Defendant made numerous unsuccessful attempts to contact his attorneys to request their assistance in withdrawing the plea, but defense counsel never acknowledged Defendant’s requests. Defendant orally asked to be allowed to withdraw his guilty plea, stating that he had entered the plea involuntarily as a result of the actions of his defense team. The court summarily denied the motion to withdraw. The Court of Appeals reversed Defendant’s convictions and ordered the case remanded for a new trial, concluding that Defendant was denied effective assistance of counsel when he sought to withdraw his guilty plea because his trial counsel refused or failed to file a motion to withdraw the plea on his behalf. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Court of Appeals did not err in concluding that Defendant’s request to withdraw his guilty plea was a critical stage of the proceedings; (2) Defendant was improperly denied the assistance of conflict-free counsel during that proceeding; and (3) Defendant’s remedy was the vacating of the judgment and remand for further proceedings as may be necessary. View "Commonwealth v. Tigue" on Justia Law

In 2010, Defendant was charged in the Warren District Court with driving under the influence (DUI) second offense. However, earlier in 2010, Defendant had twice been charged with DUI in the Barren District Court. Therefore, the Warren County Attorney requested that the Warren County charge be continued pending the outcome of the Barren County proceedings. After Defendant pled guilty to both of the Barren County Charges, the Commonwealth was given an indictment against Defendant in Warren County for DUI fourth offense, the two new Barren County convictions counting as Defendant’s second and third predicate convictions. The trial court concluded that Defendant could only be charged and convicted of DUI second offense. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Defendant’s two Barren County convictions were eligible predicate offenses because the convictions were entered prior to the resolution of the Warren County charge. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Defendant’s Barren County DUI charges were eligible as predicate offenses should the Warren County proceeding result in a conviction. Remanded. View "Ballinger v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Appellee was injured when a horse she was exercising at Gardens Glen Farm (Appellant) rolled over on her. Appellee negotiated a lump sum settlement with Appellant, which reflected a twenty-nine percent impairment rating and a return to work factor of 1.5509453. Appellee later moved to reopen, alleging that her occupations disability was worsening. The motion was sustained. An administrative law judge (ALJ) determined that Appellee showed a worsening of her condition and calculated credit for money paid to Appellee pursuant to the settlement. Appellant appealed, arguing that the ALJ erred by refusing to give it a dollar for dollar credit based on the lump sum settlement. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the ALJ did not err in calculating the credit owed to Appellant. View "Gardens Glen Farm v. Balderas" on Justia Law

Taylor Stumbo received an injury during the course of his employment with the City of Ashland. An administrative law judge (ALJ) determined that Stumbo was permanently and totally disabled. The City appealed to the Workers’ Compensation Board. The Board vacated the ALJ’s opinion and remanded for additional findings of fact regarding the extent and duration of Stumbo’s disability. The court of appeals affirmed the Board. Both parties appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) there was sufficient evidence to support the ALJ’s finding of permanent total disability; and (2) this matter must be remanded to the ALJ to make appropriate factual findings. View "City of Ashland v. Stumbo" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of first-degree unlawful transaction with a minor and first-degree sexual abuse. The trial court sentenced Defendant to a total of forty years’ imprisonment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not commit reversible error by (1) admitting into evidence Defendant’s statement to a detective that was translated by a translator who was not court certified and by admitting into evidence the detective’s testimony regarding that statement; (2) deciding to declare the jury deadlocked during the sentencing phase; and (3) denying Defendant’s motion to exclude prior bad acts evidence. View "Lopez v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Appellant was convicted of various sex offenses and sentenced to twenty years in prison. Appellant appealed, arguing, among other things, that his right to an impartial jury was violated when a probation and parole officer served on his jury. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Appellant’s acceptance of the juror at issue waived his right to appellate review of the trial court’s failure to strike the juror for cause; (2) Appellant’s ineffective assistance claim was premature; (3) the trial court did not err in refusing to hear additional character testimony at final sentencing; and (4) the trial court did not err in failing to note Defendant’s presentence custody credit on the final judgment of conviction and sentence. View "Caraway v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Dr. Daniel Bailey (Appellant) and his wife, Katherine, began divorce proceedings in 2008. Because the file included sensitive information, the trial court ordered that the file be sealed. In 2010, two of Appellant's former patients and their spouses (the Intervening Parties) filed medical negligence claims against Appellant. The Intervening Parties subsequently moved to intervene in the Baileys’ divorce action for the purpose of trying to unseal portions of the divorce record. The circuit court granted the motion to intervene and ordered the divorce record unsealed. Appellant filed a petition for writ of prohibition against the enforcement of the trial court’s order. The Court of Appeals denied the petition after noting that there was no adequate remedy by appeal and reaching the merits of the claimed error. The Supreme Court affirmed but on different ground, holding that the writ was correctly denied because Appellant had an adequate remedy by appeal, and therefore, the remedy of a writ was unavailable to him. View "Bailey v. Hon. Bertram" on Justia Law

Appellee, an at-will employee of Appellant, a government program focused on rural development, was fired for insubordination and other reasons following certain remarks she made at a staff meeting. Appellee filed suit under Ky. Rev. Stat. 61.102, the Kentucky whistleblower statute, claiming she was terminated for making a good faith report to local law enforcement officers and Appellant’s representatives regarding an actual or suspected violation of the law. The trial court granted summary judgment to Appellant, concluding that Appellee’s disclosure did not touch on a matter of public concern. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the unambiguous language of section 61.102 contains no requirement that reports under the statute must touch upon a matter of public concern. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) section 61.102 does not require an employee’s report or disclosure to touch on a matter of public concern; but (2) none of the reports and disclosures presented by the facts of this case fit within the protections afforded by the statute. View "Pennyrile Allied Cmty. Servs., Inc v. Rogers" on Justia Law

B. Todd Crutcher and his brother, James Donald Crutcher, owned and possessed thirty-six acres of land bordering a 500-acre tract of land owned by Harrod Concrete and Stone Co. While mining its property for limestone, Harrod trespassed and removed approximately 164,000 tons of limestone from 300 feet below the surface of the Crutchers’ land. A jury awarded the Crutchers $36,000 in compensatory damages and $902,000 in punitive damages. The trial court sustained the compensatory award but reduced the punitive damages to $144,000. The Court of Appeals partially reversed and vacated the circuit court’s decision. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals’ decision, vacated the jury verdict and damages, and remanded, holding (1) the jury instructions in this case contained errors that tainted the jury’s finding of recklessness and the amount of damages awarded as a result; (2) the Crutchers may recover damages under either an innocent trespass instruction or a willful trespass instruction, but not both; and (3) punitive damages are not afforded in mineral trespass cases. View "Harrod Concrete & Stone Co. v. Crutcher" on Justia Law

Appellant pleaded guilty to robbery, burglary, and tampering with physical evidence. Pursuant to the plea agreement, Appellant agreed to cooperate in the prosecution of her co-defendant. The co-defendant filed a motion for an in camera review of Appellant’s psychotherapy records from all previous health providers, arguing that the records were relevant as to Appellant’s credibility. The circuit court entered an order and an amended order requiring Appellant’s counsel to immediately disclose the contact information of every mental health professional that had provided mental health services to Appellant since January 1, 2000. Appellant petitioned the Court of Appeals for a writ to preclude enforcement of the two discovery orders. The Court of Appeals denied the petition. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals, granted the writ, and vacated the trial court’s discovery orders with the exception of the orders regarding records from two mental health services identified as having potentially exculpatory records, holding that the breadth of the trial court’s orders exceeded the bounds permitted by Commonwealth v. Barroso. View "White v. Hon. Barry Willett" on Justia Law