Justia Kentucky Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Dr. Daniel Bailey (Appellant) and his wife, Katherine, began divorce proceedings in 2008. Because the file included sensitive information, the trial court ordered that the file be sealed. In 2010, two of Appellant's former patients and their spouses (the Intervening Parties) filed medical negligence claims against Appellant. The Intervening Parties subsequently moved to intervene in the Baileys’ divorce action for the purpose of trying to unseal portions of the divorce record. The circuit court granted the motion to intervene and ordered the divorce record unsealed. Appellant filed a petition for writ of prohibition against the enforcement of the trial court’s order. The Court of Appeals denied the petition after noting that there was no adequate remedy by appeal and reaching the merits of the claimed error. The Supreme Court affirmed but on different ground, holding that the writ was correctly denied because Appellant had an adequate remedy by appeal, and therefore, the remedy of a writ was unavailable to him. View "Bailey v. Hon. Bertram" on Justia Law

Appellee, an at-will employee of Appellant, a government program focused on rural development, was fired for insubordination and other reasons following certain remarks she made at a staff meeting. Appellee filed suit under Ky. Rev. Stat. 61.102, the Kentucky whistleblower statute, claiming she was terminated for making a good faith report to local law enforcement officers and Appellant’s representatives regarding an actual or suspected violation of the law. The trial court granted summary judgment to Appellant, concluding that Appellee’s disclosure did not touch on a matter of public concern. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the unambiguous language of section 61.102 contains no requirement that reports under the statute must touch upon a matter of public concern. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) section 61.102 does not require an employee’s report or disclosure to touch on a matter of public concern; but (2) none of the reports and disclosures presented by the facts of this case fit within the protections afforded by the statute. View "Pennyrile Allied Cmty. Servs., Inc v. Rogers" on Justia Law

B. Todd Crutcher and his brother, James Donald Crutcher, owned and possessed thirty-six acres of land bordering a 500-acre tract of land owned by Harrod Concrete and Stone Co. While mining its property for limestone, Harrod trespassed and removed approximately 164,000 tons of limestone from 300 feet below the surface of the Crutchers’ land. A jury awarded the Crutchers $36,000 in compensatory damages and $902,000 in punitive damages. The trial court sustained the compensatory award but reduced the punitive damages to $144,000. The Court of Appeals partially reversed and vacated the circuit court’s decision. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals’ decision, vacated the jury verdict and damages, and remanded, holding (1) the jury instructions in this case contained errors that tainted the jury’s finding of recklessness and the amount of damages awarded as a result; (2) the Crutchers may recover damages under either an innocent trespass instruction or a willful trespass instruction, but not both; and (3) punitive damages are not afforded in mineral trespass cases. View "Harrod Concrete & Stone Co. v. Crutcher" on Justia Law

Appellant pleaded guilty to robbery, burglary, and tampering with physical evidence. Pursuant to the plea agreement, Appellant agreed to cooperate in the prosecution of her co-defendant. The co-defendant filed a motion for an in camera review of Appellant’s psychotherapy records from all previous health providers, arguing that the records were relevant as to Appellant’s credibility. The circuit court entered an order and an amended order requiring Appellant’s counsel to immediately disclose the contact information of every mental health professional that had provided mental health services to Appellant since January 1, 2000. Appellant petitioned the Court of Appeals for a writ to preclude enforcement of the two discovery orders. The Court of Appeals denied the petition. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals, granted the writ, and vacated the trial court’s discovery orders with the exception of the orders regarding records from two mental health services identified as having potentially exculpatory records, holding that the breadth of the trial court’s orders exceeded the bounds permitted by Commonwealth v. Barroso. View "White v. Hon. Barry Willett" on Justia Law

Paul R. Plante, Jr. brought a shareholder derivative suit against Appellants, directors of Arthrodynamic Technologies Animal Health Division, Inc. (ADT), alleging that Appellants had violated various provisions of ADT’s shareholder agreement with respect to sales of stock. The law firm Miller, Griffin & Marks, PSC (MGM) was retained to represent Appellants. Plante moved to disqualify MGM as the counsel for Appellants, alleging that MGM’s participation in the action created a conflict of interest or at least an appearance of impropriety due to MGM’s representation of two Appellants in another suit and its representation of the board of directors, which included Plante, in giving advice on other litigation. The trial court concluded that disqualification of MGM was required based on the appearance of impropriety. Appellants subsequently sought a writ of prohibition to bar enforcement of the trial court’s order. The Court of Appeals denied the writ because Appellants had not shown irreparable injury. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the trial court applied a disqualification standard that is no longer appropriate under the Rules of Professional Conduct; and (2) the trial court’s factual findings were insufficient to allow disqualification under the proper standard of a showing of actual conflict. View "Marcum v. Hon. Ernesto Scorsone" on Justia Law

On April 24, 2008, Defendant ran a stop sign and struck Plaintiff’s vehicle, causing significant physical injuries. Plaintiff received basic reparations/personal injury protection benefits (PIP) from her insurer, Cincinnati Insurance Company (CIC). On September 21, 2011, Plaintiff filed her complaint. The circuit court dismissed Plaintiff’s claims with prejudice. At issue on appeal was when the last payment was made by the CIC. The CIC issued a check to a physical therapist on March 17, 2009 that was either received or lost and then issued a replacement check on September 25, 2009. The Court of Appeals affirmed the circuit court, concluding that a replacement check does not constitute making payment. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the September 2009 check was the last “payment” of PIP. Remanded. View "Beaumont v. Zeru" on Justia Law

The home of Keith Conley was insured through an insurance policy issued by Kentucky Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company. Conley’s son fatally murdered his girlfriend, Jessica Newsome, in Conley’s home. Gregory and Loretta Newsome brought a wrongful death action against Conley for damages arising from Jessica’s death. Kentucky Farm Bureau provided a defense to Conley for the Newsomes’ claims against him and intervened in the action seeking a declaration that the policy did not provide coverage to Conley for the claims arising from Jessica’s murder. The trial court ruled that the homeowner’s policy provided coverage for Conley’s acts. Kentucky Farm Bureau subsequently filed a Ky. R. Civ. P. 59.05 motion asking the court to alter or amend its order. The trial court denied the motion. Kentucky Farm Bureau then filed a notice of appeal. The Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal, concluding that the Rule 59.05 motion was deficient due to a lack of “particularity” and therefore failed to toll the time for filing a notice of appeal. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, although Kentucky Farm Bureau’s Rule 59.05 motion did not strictly adhere to the particularity requirement of Ky. R. Civ. P. 7.02, the defect was not so serious that it should have been stricken. View "Ky. Farm Bureau Ins. Co. v. Conley" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, a group of Daymar College students, filed a lawsuit against Daymar, challenging the college’s admissions process as both procedurally and substantively unconscionable. Specifically, Plaintiffs challenged the incorporation of an arbitration provision on the reverse side of the Student Enrollment Agreement, claiming they were unaware of the arbitration provision’s existence, let alone its meaning. The trial court refused to compel arbitration, concluding that the arbitration agreement was both procedurally and substantively unconscionable. The Court of Appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Daymar’s attempted incorporation was unsuccessful, and therefore, Plaintiffs were not bound by the arbitration provision on the reverse side of the Agreement. View "Dixon v. Daymar Colleges Group, LLC" on Justia Law

Defendant was arrested and taken into custody as a suspect for the murder of his mother. The circuit court halted the allegedly improper questioning of Defendant until Defendant was allowed access to a public defender. Defendant’s father obtained the order from the circuit judge, ex parte, purportedly under the authority of Ky. R. Crim. P. 2.14(2). The Court of Appeals affirmed the circuit court’s issuance of the order. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Rule 2.14(2) does not provide the trial court with authority to appoint counsel and intercede in the interrogation of an individual in custody before commencement of prosecution where, as a general matter, courts are not vested with general jurisdiction over a criminal matter until the criminal matter becomes a criminal case upon commencement of prosecution; and (2) a motion to suppress is the appropriate means to attack an allegedly improper interrogation resulting from the denial of access to counsel. View "Commonwealth v. Terrell" on Justia Law

Dr. Mosen Khani, the owner and operator of Alliance Chiropractic, LLC (Alliance), filed an application for resolution of injury claim alleging that he suffered injuries while he was moving or assisting patients. Kentucky Employers’ Mutual Insurance (KEMI), which provided workers’ compensation insurance to Alliance, provided a defense on behalf of Alliance and presented a separate defense in its own name. Both KEMI and Alliance contested Dr. Khani’s claim, arguing that his conditions were preexisting and unrelated to the alleged work injuries. An administrative law judge (ALJ) found that Dr. Khani had not suffered a work-related injury and dismissed his claim. The Board affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Board, concluding that there was sufficient evidence to support the ALJ’s finding that Dr. Khani had not suffered a work-related injury. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the ALJ’s determination to treat Dr. Khani as a lay rather than an expert witness was not erroneous; (2) the ALJ’s finding that Dr. Khani had not suffered a work-related injury was supported by substantial evidence; and (3) there was no error in the ALJ’s failure to award temporary benefits. View "Khani v. Alliance Chiropractic" on Justia Law