Justia Kentucky Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Appellant was convicted of three counts of first-degree robbery, two counts of second-degree robbery, possession of a handgun by a convicted felon, and being a persistent felony offender. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Appellant was not entitled to a mistrial for alleged prosecutorial misconduct during closing argument because the Commonwealth’s improper closing argument statements did not result in manifest injustice; (2) the trial court did not err by striking a juror for cause; (3) the admission of prior offenses exceeding the scope of the truth-in-sentencing statute was not palpable error; and (4) the trial court did not err in this case by “trifurcating” the trial into two guilt phases and one consolidated penalty phase in lieu of separately trying the handgun charge before a different jury. View "Wallace v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was the apportionment of natural gas severance taxes for purposes of calculating royalties when a producer-lessee severs natural gas from the earth. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals certified a question to the Kentucky Supreme Court asking whether Kentucky’s at-the-well rule allows a natural gas processor to deduct all severance taxes paid at market prior to calculating a contractual royalty payment to a royalty owner-lessor based on the market price of gas at the well or whether the resource’s at-the-well price includes a proportionate share of the severance taxes owed such that a processor may deduct only that portion of the severance taxes attributable to accumulating, compressing, processing, and transporting the gas prior to calculating the appropriate royalty payment. The Supreme Court rejected the two options presented and concluded that, in the absence of a specific lease provision apportioning severance taxes, lessees may not deduct severance taxes or any portion thereof prior to calculating a royalty value. View "Appalachian Land Co. v. EQT Prod. Co." on Justia Law

In 2007, the circuit court entered a decree of dissolution dissolving the marriage of Lydia and Kevin Addison. The decree provided that Lydia have sole custody of the parties’ two children, with Kevin having reasonable parenting time. Kevin later filed a motion for sole custody and for Lydia’s parenting time to be supervised. After a hearing, the court ordered that custody be transferred to Kevin and that Lydia have supervised visitation. The court of appeals reversed, holding, inter alia, that the trial court (1) improperly placed a time restriction on the hearing without considering the admissibility or exclusion of the evidence, thereby denying Lydia the opportunity to present testimony, and (2) erred in not permitting the children to testify. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court (1) did not abuse its discretion in limiting the hearing to six hours; (2) did not err in refusing to permit the children to testify; (3) did not err in retaining jurisdiction; (4) properly applied the best interests of the child standard to each child; (5) properly ruled that each party was responsible for his or her own attorney’s fees; and (6) did not err in denying Lydia’s motion that Kevin participate in an evaluation with Lydia’s expert. View "Addison v. Addison" on Justia Law

In 2004, AT&T Corp. filed refund claims with the Finance and Administration Cabinet arguing that, under Ky. Rev. Stat. 139.505, AT&T was entitled to refunds for tax years 2002 and 2003. The Cabinet granted a partial refund for AT&T’s 2002 claim. In 2008, AT&T filed refund claims for tax years 2004 through 2008. In 2011, AT&T filed a declaration of rights action bringing administrative and as-applied constitutional challenges to the amendments to section 139.505. The circuit court dismissed the case, determining that AT&T’s challenges must be adjudicated by the Kentucky Board of Tax Appeals (KBTA) before the court would address AT&T’s facial constitutional challenges. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the facial constitutional issue was one that the KBTA could not decide, but that the other claims were properly dismissed. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals’ decision and reinstated the trial court’s order of dismissal, holding that there were several administrative issues that must be resolved prior to addressing the constitutional claims. View "Commonwealth v. AT&T Corp." on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of manufacturing methamphetamine, first-degree possession of a controlled substance, and of being a first-degree persistent felony offender (PFO). The Supreme Court (1) affirmed Defendant’s convictions for the offenses of manufacturing methamphetamine and first-degree possession of a controlled substance, holding that the trial court did not err in refusing to allow Defendant’s girlfriend to testify about certain out-of-court statements uttered to her by a declarant whose unavailability at trial was not shown; and (2) reversed the PFO conviction, holding that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the PFO verdict. View "Moore v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Plaintiff in the underlying medical malpractice action sought a writ of prohibition to prevent the trial court from enforcing its order permitting counsel for the defendant in the underlying action (Dr. Castro) to contact Plaintiff’s treating physicians ex parte. The Court of Appeals declined to issue a writ, finding (1) no Kentucky law prohibits the trial court from authorizing ex parte correspondence with nonexpert treating physicians, and (2) the trial court’s order did not violate any right Plaintiff had to privacy of her medical information because the order did not compel any disclosure. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) HIPAA does not prohibit ex parte interviews with treating physicians but does regulate the protected health information to be disclose in ex parte interviews; (2) Kentucky law places no restrictions on voluntary ex parte interviews with non expert treating physicians; and (3) the challenged order at issue in this case did not satisfy HIPPA procedural requirements for the disclosure of protected health information, but because the order expressly withheld the necessary authorization, a writ need not issue. View "Caldwell v. Hon. A.C. McKay Chauvin" on Justia Law

Appellant suffered a work-related injury and filed a claim for benefits. An administrative law judge (ALJ) concluded that Appellant was entitled to benefits. At issue before the Supreme Court was whether the ALJ properly excluded unemployment compensation benefits when calculating Appellant’s average weekly wage (AWW). The Workers’ Compensation Board affirmed the ALJ’s finding that unemployment benefits should not be included in the AWW calculation. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Board’s finding regarding unemployment benefits. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that unemployment benefits are not wages under Ky. Rev. Stat. 341.140(6). View "Jewell v. Ford Motor Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs were two death-row inmates who filed a complaint for a declaratory judgment seeking an order requiring the Governor and/or the Department of Corrections and/or the Kentucky Parole Board to adopt constitutionally adequate procedures regarding clemency petitions. Appellants further sought an order requiring the Parole Board to adopt administrative procedures governing the ways in which the Board must conduct clemency investigations. The trial court dismissed the complaint, concluding that because Section 77 of the Kentucky Constitution vests the power to grant pardons in the Governor it would violate the separation of powers for the courts to dictate to the Governor the procedures he should employ in considering pardons. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Plaintiffs’ petition failed to state a claim for relief. View "Foley v. Beshear" on Justia Law

In 2010, two miners died in a mining accident while employed by Webster County Coal, LLC. That same year, another miner died in a mining accident while employed by River View Coal, LLC. Both River View and Webster County were wholly owned subsidiaries of Alliance Coal LLC, the parent company. Alliance, which had obtained a self-insurance contract, guaranteed payment of benefits under the Workers’ Compensation Act in the event its subsidiaries failed to pay benefits. Webster County and River View accepted the workers’ compensation claims made on behalf of the surviving widows and children of the deceased miners, and Alliance paid the benefits. Appellants filed lawsuits against Alliance alleging that it had liability for the miners’ deaths. The trial court granted summary judgment for Alliance, concluding that it had immunity under the Act. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that a parent company that completely self-insures the liability of its subsidiary is a carrier and immune from tort liability. View "Falk v. Alliance Coal, LLC" on Justia Law

Appellant filed suit against her former manager and then amended her complaint to assert direct claims against Appellees, her employer and related corporate entities. The trial court entered a summary judgment dismissing the claims against Appellees as being time barred. The summary judgment left the manager as the sole remaining defendant but did not recite any of the finality language provided in CR 54.02(1). Appellant filed a notice of appeal from the summary judgment. The circuit court subsequently entered a nunc pro tunc order purporting to interject, retroactively, the necessary finality language into the summary judgment. The Court of Appeals ruled that the nunc pro tunc order could not have retroactively conferred finality upon an order that was not originally designated as final and that the “relation forward” doctrine of Johnson v. Smith did not apply. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the filing of a notice of appeal divested the circuit court of jurisdiction over this case and transferred that jurisdiction to the Court of Appeals, and therefore, the circuit court was without jurisdiction to enter the nunc pro tunc order, and its attempt to bestow finality upon the summary judgment was ineffective; and (2) the relation forward doctrine did not apply. View "Wright v. Ecolab, Inc." on Justia Law