Justia Kentucky Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Appellant, who was fifteen years old at the time, was charged with third-degree sexual abuse. Appellant was released from detention on a conditional order of release. The district court ordered that Appellant’s case be “informally adjusted” on the condition that Appellant move out of state to Oklahoma to live with his father. The existing order of release with its conditions was then terminated. Appellant and his mother were forced to comply with the order to avoid formal juvenile prosecution. When Appellant returned to Kentucky with his mother, the district court re-docketed the charges. The trial court eventually removed Appellant from his home and committed him to the Department of Juvenile Justice as a juvenile sexual offender for placement in an “appropriate facility.” The Supreme Court vacated the district court’s adjudication and disposition in this case, holding that the trial court erred when it changed the case from an informal adjustment to formal proceedings because once a case has been determined to be appropriate for an informal adjustment, the case cannot be returned to formal proceedings. View "Q.M. v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Appellant, a member of a fraternity at the University of Kentucky, leased a room at the fraternity house. When a police detective learned that Appellant was selling marijuana at the fraternity house, he and two other detectives entered the fraternity house without a warrant. Upon knocking on the door to Appellant’s room, the officers were greeted by the strong smell of marijuana. Appellant was charged with one count of trafficking in a controlled substance within 1,000 yards of a school and other drug-related charges. Appellant moved to suppress the evidence discovered in his bedroom, arguing that the detectives unlawfully entered and searched the house in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The trial court denied the motion to suppress. Appellant subsequently pled guilty to the trafficking charge. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s denial of Appellant’s motion to suppress. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and vacated Appellant’s guilty plea, holding that the detective were not welcome to enter the fraternity house at their own discretion, and therefore, the officers’ entry was unlawful. View "Milam v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Randy Ellington owned and operated R&J Cabinets as a sole proprietorship. When Ellington received a work-related injury, R&J had no employees. Kentucky Employers’ Mutual Insurance (KEMI) had previously issued a workers’ compensation policy to Ellington and R&J as “insureds.” At the same time, the policy included a specific exclusion from coverage of Ellington as the sole proprietor. KEMI denied Ellington’s claim for benefits, arguing that it was not covered because of the sole-proprietor exclusion endorsement. An administrative law judge concluded that Ellington was not covered by the policy. The Court of Appeals reversed, finding the policy was ambiguous and construing it in Ellington’s favor to provide coverage for his injuries. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the policy, as issued, is not a personal policy but rather a business policy purchased by a sole proprietor, and Ellington, as the sole proprietor, was not entitled to benefits under the policy. View "Ky. Employers Mut. Ins. v. Ellington" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with driving under the influence (DUI) of alcohol, third offense. Defendant moved to dismiss the DUI charge, claiming that the arresting officer violated Kentucky’s implied consent law by denying him a breathalyzer test and instead ordering a blood test. The district court denied the motion to dismiss, concluding that the officer had the option as to which test may be given in a DUI case. The circuit court affirmed and Court of Appeals affirmed. Defendant petitioned for reconsideration in light of the U.S. Supreme Court’s recent decision in Missouri v. McNeely. The Court of Appeals granted the petition, withdrew its earlier opinion, and reversed the circuit court’s holding. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that when a law enforcement officer has reasonable grounds to believe that a driver is operating a motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol, that officer may request that the driver submit to a blood test in order to determine the driver’s blood alcohol concentration level, and the officer is not required to administer a breathalyzer test prior to the administration of the blood test. View "Commonwealth v. Duncan" on Justia Law

Pursuant to a plea agreement, Defendant pleaded guilty to murder. Defendant made numerous unsuccessful attempts to contact his attorneys to request their assistance in withdrawing the plea, but defense counsel never acknowledged Defendant’s requests. Defendant orally asked to be allowed to withdraw his guilty plea, stating that he had entered the plea involuntarily as a result of the actions of his defense team. The court summarily denied the motion to withdraw. The Court of Appeals reversed Defendant’s convictions and ordered the case remanded for a new trial, concluding that Defendant was denied effective assistance of counsel when he sought to withdraw his guilty plea because his trial counsel refused or failed to file a motion to withdraw the plea on his behalf. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Court of Appeals did not err in concluding that Defendant’s request to withdraw his guilty plea was a critical stage of the proceedings; (2) Defendant was improperly denied the assistance of conflict-free counsel during that proceeding; and (3) Defendant’s remedy was the vacating of the judgment and remand for further proceedings as may be necessary. View "Commonwealth v. Tigue" on Justia Law

In 2010, Defendant was charged in the Warren District Court with driving under the influence (DUI) second offense. However, earlier in 2010, Defendant had twice been charged with DUI in the Barren District Court. Therefore, the Warren County Attorney requested that the Warren County charge be continued pending the outcome of the Barren County proceedings. After Defendant pled guilty to both of the Barren County Charges, the Commonwealth was given an indictment against Defendant in Warren County for DUI fourth offense, the two new Barren County convictions counting as Defendant’s second and third predicate convictions. The trial court concluded that Defendant could only be charged and convicted of DUI second offense. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Defendant’s two Barren County convictions were eligible predicate offenses because the convictions were entered prior to the resolution of the Warren County charge. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Defendant’s Barren County DUI charges were eligible as predicate offenses should the Warren County proceeding result in a conviction. Remanded. View "Ballinger v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Appellee was injured when a horse she was exercising at Gardens Glen Farm (Appellant) rolled over on her. Appellee negotiated a lump sum settlement with Appellant, which reflected a twenty-nine percent impairment rating and a return to work factor of 1.5509453. Appellee later moved to reopen, alleging that her occupations disability was worsening. The motion was sustained. An administrative law judge (ALJ) determined that Appellee showed a worsening of her condition and calculated credit for money paid to Appellee pursuant to the settlement. Appellant appealed, arguing that the ALJ erred by refusing to give it a dollar for dollar credit based on the lump sum settlement. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the ALJ did not err in calculating the credit owed to Appellant. View "Gardens Glen Farm v. Balderas" on Justia Law

Taylor Stumbo received an injury during the course of his employment with the City of Ashland. An administrative law judge (ALJ) determined that Stumbo was permanently and totally disabled. The City appealed to the Workers’ Compensation Board. The Board vacated the ALJ’s opinion and remanded for additional findings of fact regarding the extent and duration of Stumbo’s disability. The court of appeals affirmed the Board. Both parties appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) there was sufficient evidence to support the ALJ’s finding of permanent total disability; and (2) this matter must be remanded to the ALJ to make appropriate factual findings. View "City of Ashland v. Stumbo" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of first-degree unlawful transaction with a minor and first-degree sexual abuse. The trial court sentenced Defendant to a total of forty years’ imprisonment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not commit reversible error by (1) admitting into evidence Defendant’s statement to a detective that was translated by a translator who was not court certified and by admitting into evidence the detective’s testimony regarding that statement; (2) deciding to declare the jury deadlocked during the sentencing phase; and (3) denying Defendant’s motion to exclude prior bad acts evidence. View "Lopez v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Appellant was convicted of various sex offenses and sentenced to twenty years in prison. Appellant appealed, arguing, among other things, that his right to an impartial jury was violated when a probation and parole officer served on his jury. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Appellant’s acceptance of the juror at issue waived his right to appellate review of the trial court’s failure to strike the juror for cause; (2) Appellant’s ineffective assistance claim was premature; (3) the trial court did not err in refusing to hear additional character testimony at final sentencing; and (4) the trial court did not err in failing to note Defendant’s presentence custody credit on the final judgment of conviction and sentence. View "Caraway v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law