Justia Kentucky Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Appellant was convicted of the murder of her husband and of tampering with physical evidence for hiding the gun used in the shooting. The Supreme Court reversed Appellant’s convictions, holding (1) the trial court erred by preventing Appellant from testifying that her husband had a prior felony conviction and abused its discretion by not allowing Appellant to testify about “threatening, commanding, and questioning” statements allegedly made by her husband just before, during, and after the shooting; and (2) these errors infringed on Appellant’s right to due process of law and were not harmless. View "Daughtery v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of complicity to first-degree trafficking in a controlled substance and of being a second-degree persistent felony offender. The court of appeals reversed and remanded for a new trial, concluding that the trial court abused its discretion by permitting the jurors, during deliberations, to use the Commonwealth’s attorney’s laptop computer to review an audio recording of a controlled buy. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the trial court did not err in permitting the jury to review the recording at issue using the Commonwealth’s laptop; (2) the trial court did not err when it denied Defendant’s motion for directed verdict; (3) the admission of portions of a law enforcement officer’s testimony interpreting and narrating the recording was improper, but the admission of that testimony did not amount to palpable error; (4) the admission of the officer’s testimony concerning the confidential informant in this case amounted to improper character evidence, but the admission of the testimony did not amount to palpable error; and (5) the trial court did not err in admitting the confidential informant’s testimony regarding Defendant’s guilt and mental state. View "Commonwealth v. Wright" on Justia Law

Appellant injured his left shoulder while working for Appellee. Appellant underwent three shoulder surgeries and returned to work on light duty between the surgeries. After Appellant returned to work without restrictions, Appellee terminated his employment for bumping into a pole while operating a forklift. An administrative law judge (ALJ) denied Appellant’s request for temporary total disability (TTD) benefits while Appellant was on light duty and declined to award the two multiplier under Ky. Rev. Stat. 342.730(1)(c)(2) and Chrysalis House, Inc. v. Tackett after finding that Appellant was not terminated due to his disabling shoulder injury. The Workers’ Compensation Board and the Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the denial of TTD benefits, as the evidence did not compel a contrary finding; and (2) reversed and remanded with respect to the two multiplier, as the circumstances in this case led the Court to reconsider its holding in Chrysalis House and its construction of section 342.730(1)(c)(2). View "Livingood v. Transfreight, LLC" on Justia Law

After a trial, Appellant was found guilty of manufacturing methamphetamine. The Department of Corrections (DOC) originally classified Appellant as a non-violent offender but later reclassified Appellant as a violent offender, which changed Appellant’s parole eligibility and sentence expiration dates. The DOC modified Appellant’s status based on the 2006 amendment to Ky. Rev. Stat. 439.3401. Appellant filed a declaration of rights petition in the circuit court arguing that the 2006 amendment to Ky. Rev. Stat. 439.3401 constitutes an ex post facto violation. Appellant also moved to vacate, set aside or correct the judgment pursuant to Ky. R. Crim. P. 11.42 or, in the alternative, Ky. R. Crim. P. 60.02. The trial court denied relief. The court of appeals reversed the trial court’s order denying Appellant’s Rule 11.42 motion and otherwise affirmed. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the dismissal of Appellant’s petition for declaration of rights, holding that the 2006 amendment to section 439.3401 does not constitute an ex post facto law; but (2) reversed the denial of Appellant’s Rule 60.02(f) motion, holding that Appellant was denied due process of law when he proceeded with a jury trial under the false pretense that, if convicted, he would be treated as a non-violent offender. Remanded. View "Pate v. Dep’t of Corr." on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of first-degree robbery and first-degree assault. Defendant was sentenced to consecutive terms of ten years for the former offense and eighteen years for the latter offense. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court did not commit reversible error by instructing the jury with respect to both offenses; (2) Defendant’s sentences for both assault and robbery did not violate constitutional and statutory provisions against double jeopardy, as Defendant was not punished twice for the same offense; and (3) Defendant’s trial was not rendered unfair when a police officer referred to an unauthenticated phone company record in violation of the rule against hearsay because any such violation was harmless and was not a ground for relief. View "McNeil v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was found guilty of wanton murder and sentenced to twenty years’ imprisonment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not commit reversible error by (1) instructing the jury on the charge of wanton murder or, alternatively, failing to direct a verdict on the wanton murder charge, as the evidence was sufficient to support the charge of wanton murder; (2) declining to elaborate on the meaning of the word “wantonly” as used in the jury instructions; (3) excluding evidence of the victim’s previous participation in a robbery; (4) instructing the jury on the issue of self-protection; and (5) denying Appellant’s request for a first-degree manslaughter instruction based upon extreme emotional disturbance. View "Holland v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of second-degree escape and of being a first-degree persistent felony offender. Defendant’s sentence was enhanced from five years in prison on the escape conviction to twenty years in prison as a persistent felony offender. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court (1) did not err in denying Defendant’s motion for directed verdict on second-degree escape; and (2) did not err in refusing the instruct the jury on third-degree escape, a lesser-included offense of second-degree escape, as there was no evidence that would support such an instruction. View "Lackey v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, the administrate of the estate of Lula Belle Gordon, filed suit against several nursing home entities (collectively, “Kindred”), alleging that Kindred violated several provisions of Ky. Rev. Stat. 216.515 in its treatment and care of Gordon, resulting in her injury and death. The trial court entered judgment in favor of Plaintiff. The Court of Appeals reversed and ordered the dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims, concluding that Plaintiff’s claims were incident to a common law personal injury action and therefore subject to the one-year limitations period provided by Ky. Rev. Stat. 413.140. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Plaintiff’s claim under section 216.515(6) did not assert a claim for relief based upon a liability created by the statute because the claim simply represented a codification in the nursing home context of the common law personal injury cause of action and was, therefore, subject to a the one-year limitation period otherwise provided for personal injury actions; and (2) other causes of action based upon provisions of section 216.515, for which Plaintiff sought redress, were subject to the five-year limitations period established by section 413.120, but those causes of action must be brought during the lifetime of the resident by the resident or her guardian. View "Overstreet v. Kindred Nursing Ctrs. Ltd. P’ship" on Justia Law

Two sets of landowners brought suit seeking damages and a declaration of their rights under oil and gas leases executed with with predecessor to an oil and gas producer. Additionally, the landowners sought a declaration that the lessee production companies had miscalculated and underpaid royalties due under the leases. Specifically, the landowners claimed that the lease provision basing their royalty on “one-eighth the market price at the well” should be understand to contemplate the sale of gas made “marketable” and then “sold at the well.” The trial court rejected these claims and dismissed the landowners’ complaint. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that the trial court did not err in ruling that given royalty provisions such as those in the leases at issue here, Kentucky law does not embrace the “marketable product” approach to royalty calculation. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, for the purposes of gas lease royalty valuation under standard “market price (value) at the well” royalty clauses, the lessee is solely responsible for the costs of production, but post-production costs may be deducted from gross receipts before the calculation of the royalty share. View "Baker v. Magnum Hunter Prod., Inc." on Justia Law

In 2011, Appellant pleaded guilty to one felony count of receiving stolen property. In exchange for Appellant’s guilty plea, the prosecutor promised not to pursue revocation of Appellant’s conditional discharge from his 2008 sex offense. The Parole Board, however, ordered Appellant to serve out the discharge period, concluding that, notwithstanding the plea bargain, Appellant’s new conviction provided probable cause for the revocation of his discharge. In 2012, Appellant filed a motion for habeas corpus relief from the 2011 judgment, alleging that defense counsel had rendered ineffective assistance in advising him to plead guilty on a promise that the prosecutor was not authorized to make. The trial court granted the petition. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that habeas corpus was not an appropriate remedy under the circumstances. While Appellant’s appeal was pending, his sentence expired, rending his case moot. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellant failed to establish the inadequacy of more usual forms of relief, and thus his resort to habeas corpus was properly denied. Due to the mootness of Appellant’s claim, this conclusion had no practical effect for Appellant, but this Opinion will provide guidance as to the proper mode of challenging an an alleged plea-bargain breach by the Commonwealth. View "Muhammad v. Ky. Parole Bd." on Justia Law