Justia Kentucky Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Appellant suffered a work-related injury and filed a claim for benefits. An administrative law judge (ALJ) concluded that Appellant was entitled to benefits. At issue before the Supreme Court was whether the ALJ properly excluded unemployment compensation benefits when calculating Appellant’s average weekly wage (AWW). The Workers’ Compensation Board affirmed the ALJ’s finding that unemployment benefits should not be included in the AWW calculation. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Board’s finding regarding unemployment benefits. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that unemployment benefits are not wages under Ky. Rev. Stat. 341.140(6). View "Jewell v. Ford Motor Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs were two death-row inmates who filed a complaint for a declaratory judgment seeking an order requiring the Governor and/or the Department of Corrections and/or the Kentucky Parole Board to adopt constitutionally adequate procedures regarding clemency petitions. Appellants further sought an order requiring the Parole Board to adopt administrative procedures governing the ways in which the Board must conduct clemency investigations. The trial court dismissed the complaint, concluding that because Section 77 of the Kentucky Constitution vests the power to grant pardons in the Governor it would violate the separation of powers for the courts to dictate to the Governor the procedures he should employ in considering pardons. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Plaintiffs’ petition failed to state a claim for relief. View "Foley v. Beshear" on Justia Law

In 2010, two miners died in a mining accident while employed by Webster County Coal, LLC. That same year, another miner died in a mining accident while employed by River View Coal, LLC. Both River View and Webster County were wholly owned subsidiaries of Alliance Coal LLC, the parent company. Alliance, which had obtained a self-insurance contract, guaranteed payment of benefits under the Workers’ Compensation Act in the event its subsidiaries failed to pay benefits. Webster County and River View accepted the workers’ compensation claims made on behalf of the surviving widows and children of the deceased miners, and Alliance paid the benefits. Appellants filed lawsuits against Alliance alleging that it had liability for the miners’ deaths. The trial court granted summary judgment for Alliance, concluding that it had immunity under the Act. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that a parent company that completely self-insures the liability of its subsidiary is a carrier and immune from tort liability. View "Falk v. Alliance Coal, LLC" on Justia Law

Appellant filed suit against her former manager and then amended her complaint to assert direct claims against Appellees, her employer and related corporate entities. The trial court entered a summary judgment dismissing the claims against Appellees as being time barred. The summary judgment left the manager as the sole remaining defendant but did not recite any of the finality language provided in CR 54.02(1). Appellant filed a notice of appeal from the summary judgment. The circuit court subsequently entered a nunc pro tunc order purporting to interject, retroactively, the necessary finality language into the summary judgment. The Court of Appeals ruled that the nunc pro tunc order could not have retroactively conferred finality upon an order that was not originally designated as final and that the “relation forward” doctrine of Johnson v. Smith did not apply. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the filing of a notice of appeal divested the circuit court of jurisdiction over this case and transferred that jurisdiction to the Court of Appeals, and therefore, the circuit court was without jurisdiction to enter the nunc pro tunc order, and its attempt to bestow finality upon the summary judgment was ineffective; and (2) the relation forward doctrine did not apply. View "Wright v. Ecolab, Inc." on Justia Law

Keith Justin Conley (Conley) was convicted of murder his girlfriend, Jessica Newsome, whom he fatally shot in the home of his father. At the time of the shooting, Conley’s father’s home was insured through a homeowner’s insurance policy issued by Kentucky Farm Bureau (Kentucky Farm). Jessica’s parents brought a wrongful death cause of action against Conley. Kentucky Farm intervened in the action seeking a declaration that the homeowner’s policy at issue did not provide coverage to Conley for the Newsomes’ claims. The trial court ruled that the homeowner’s insurance policy provided coverage for Conley’s acts. Kentucky Farm then filed a motion under Ky. R. Civ. P. 59.05 asking the court to alter or amend its order. The trial court denied the motion. Kentucky Farm subsequently filed its notice of appeal. The Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal as untimely, concluding that the Rule 59.05 motion failed to conform with Ky. R. Civ. P. 7.02, and therefore, the Rule 59.05 motion did not toll the thirty-day period in which notice was to be filed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Rule 59.05 motion, while failing to strictly comply with the requirements of Rule 7.02, was nevertheless timely, and therefore, the motion tolled the time for filing the notice of appeal. View "Ky. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Conley" on Justia Law

Employer discharged Plaintiff after coworkers reported that Plaintiff made racist comments in the workplace. Plaintiff sued Employer and the coworkers for defamation. The trial court directed a verdict for Employer and one of the coworkers, citing a qualified privilege to defamation. The jury returned a verdict in the remaining coworkers’ favor, finding that either the statements made about Plaintiff were true or that they were not made with malice. The Court of Appeals affirmed the jury’s verdict but reversed the directed verdict, concluding that Employer was entitled to the protection of a qualified privilege but that a plaintiff is only required to present a prima facie defamation case to overcome the qualified privilege and survive a motion for directed verdict. The Supreme Court reversed in part and affirmed in part, holding (1) a plaintiff in a defamation action opposing a directed-verdict motion made by a defendant claiming a qualified privilege must produce some evidence of the defendant’s actual malice to survive a directed verdict; (2) the directed verdict in favor of Employer was appropriate, as Plaintiff failed to prove any degree of malice; and (3) the jury’s verdict was sound. View "Toler v. Sud-Chemie, Inc." on Justia Law

Kentucky Spirit Health Care Plan, Inc. brought a declaratory judgment action seeking a ruling that it had a right to terminate its Medicaid managed care contract with the Finance and Administration Cabinet prior to the expiration of the contract without penalty. The trial court entered partial summary judgment in favor of the Cabinet. Both parties appealed. While the appeals were pending, the circuit court stayed Kentucky Spirit’s pre-trial discovery efforts relating to its rights under the Medicaid contract until resolution of the partial summary judgment appeals. The Court of Appeals granted Kentucky Spirit’s petition for a writ of prohibition against the circuit court judge prohibiting the judge from enforcing the order imposing the stay of discovery. The Supreme Court vacated the writ and remanded for entry of an order denying Kentucky Spirit’s petition for a writ of prohibition, holding that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion by temporarily staying discovery, as a stay of discovery was appropriate pending resolution of the threshold issues currently on appeal. View "Commonwealth v. Hon. Wingate" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of first-degree sexual abuse and first-degree sodomy. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the circuit court and remanded for a new trial, holding (1) flawed jury instructions denied Appellant his constitutional right to a unanimous verdict, and the error required reversal of Appellant’s conviction; (2) a certain out-of-court statement was not subject to the hearsay rule and, therefore, was not admitted improperly; and (3) the Commonwealth did not improperly elicit testimony from a police officer that bolstered the credibility of the victim. Remanded for a new trial. View "Ruiz v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of first-degree trafficking in a controlled substance and possession of drug paraphernalia. The trial court sentenced Appellant to twenty years’ imprisonment for the trafficking charge and assessed a $500 fine for the drug paraphernalia charge. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the Commonwealth impermissibly introduced an incriminating oral statement that had not been disclosed to Appellant in violation of Ky. R. Crim. P. 7.24(1), and the error required reversal; and (2) the trial court erred when it allowed testimony commenting on Appellant’s pre-arrest silence. Remanded. View "Trigg v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Coppage Construction Company, Inc. filed a third-party complaint raising a number of contract, tort, and statutory claims against Sanitation District No. 1 (SD1), a public sewer utility serving three Northern Kentucky counties. SD1 moved to dismiss the third-party complaint on the grounds that it was entitled to sovereign immunity. The circuit court converted the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment and granted the motion, concluding that SD1 was entitled to sovereign immunity because SD1’s “parent” entities - the three counties - were immune entities, and SD1 performed a function integral to state government. The Court of Appeals affirmed, describing SD1 as an “arm” of the three counties. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and vacated the summary judgment order of the circuit court, holding that SD1 was not entitled to sovereign immunity because it was not created by the state or a county and does not carry out a function integral to state government. View "Coppage Constr. Co., Inc. v. Sanitation Dist. No. 1" on Justia Law