Justia Kentucky Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In 2008, Dr. Daniel Bailey and Katherine Bailey began divorce proceedings. In 2010, two of Daniel’s former patients and their spouses (collectively, the Intervening Parties) filed medical negligence claims against Daniel. The Intervening Parties moved to intervene in the Baileys’ divorce action for the purpose of trying to unseal portions of the divorce record that had previously been sealed. The circuit court granted the motion to intervene and ordered the divorce record unsealed. Daniel filed a petition for a writ of prohibition against the enforcement of the trial court’s order. The court of appeals denied the petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that although intervention was improper, a writ of prohibition was unavailable in this case because Daniel had an adequate remedy by way of appeal. View "Bailey v. Hon. Bertram" on Justia Law

An Indiana court entered a decree dissolving the marriage of Mother and Father. The parties then entered into an agreed order signed by the Indiana court resolving property matters, including tax exemptions for the parties’ children, that had not previously been decided. Mother and the children subsequently moved to Kentucky, followed by Father. A Kentucky family court later altered the duration of the original child support order and modified the award made by the Indiana court of the federal dependent-child tax exemption. The Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding that the family court had authority to take these actions under the Uniform Instate Family Support Act. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the duration of a support award is not modifiable; and (2) awarding a tax exemption as part of a support order is modifiable, but further awards of the tax exemption require finding an actual nexus to support of the child, which the trial court did not do in this case. View "Adams-Smyrichinsky v. Smyrichinsky" on Justia Law

The trial court in this case ordered that Father get a dollar-for-dollar credit against his monthly child support obligation for any monies his dependent child received as a result of Father’s Social Security retirement benefits. In reaching this result, the court concluded that the Social Security retirement benefits should be treated no differently than disability benefits are treated under Ky. Rev. Stat. 403.211(15), which expressly allows a credit for disability payments but says nothing about retirement benefits. The court of appeals reversed, holding that Father was not entitled to a credit under section 403.211(15), and because he was not entitled to a credit, he was also not entitled to recoup any previous support payments. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and reinstated the order of the circuit court, holding that the trial court (1) did not abuse its discretion under the circumstances of this case in awarding Father a credit against his child-support obligation for Social Security retirement benefits paid to the child; and (2) did not violate the no-recoupment rule by ordering Mother to reimburse Father for support payments made during the period in which the child was eligible for Social Security benefits that were later paid as a lump sum. View "C.D.G. v. N.J.S." on Justia Law

Keith Randall Sparkman filed a complaint against CONSOL Energy, Inc. (CONSOL) and CONSOL of Kentucky, Inc. (CKI), as well as certain individuals, for breach of contract and tortious interference with contract. The jury found in favor of Sparkman and awarded damages. CONSOL/CKI appealed, and Sparkman cross-appealed. The court of appeals disposed of the matter sua sponte based on a perceived lack of jurisdiction. Because the contracts at issue in this dispute were entered into by In-Depth Sanitary Service Group (Group), a sole proprietorship not named in the complaint, and because the judgment was in favor of Group, a “non-party,” the court of appeals reversed and remanded the cause to the circuit court for further proceedings and any “appropriate corrective action.” The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the trial court’s judgment identified the correct party because the parties mutually consented to the amendment of the complaint to reflect Keith Randall Sparkman d/b/a In-Depth Sanitary Service Group; and (2) the naming of the parties in the notice of cross-appeal was sufficient to transfer jurisdiction to the court of appeals. View "Sparkman v. Consol Energy, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued Defendant, a medical doctor, claiming that Defendant failed to obtain her informed consent before operating on her. The jury returned a verdict for Defendant, and the trial court entered judgment accordingly. The court of appeals affirmed. Plaintiff appealed, arguing that the judgment should be set aside because the trial court’s instructions to the jury misstated the law regarding informed consent. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the instruction given in this case was in error because it failed to incorporate the law applicable to a medical provider’s duty to obtain informed consent; and (2) Plaintiff was prejudiced by the erroneous instruction. View "Sargent v. Shaffer" on Justia Law

Mary Banker filed a retaliatory discharge claim against the University of Louisville Athletic Association, Inc. (ULAA), alleging that ULAA discharged her for engaging in a protected activity under the Kentucky Civil Rights Act. A jury found in favor of Banker and awarded attorney fees. The court of appeals reversed and remanded for dismissal of Banker’s claim, holding that Banker had not met her burden of proof. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the court of appeals injected its interpretation of the facts and did not view the proof in light most favorable to Banker, and the evidence was sufficient to support a reasonable inference that ULAA’s stated reasons for discharging Banker were pretextual; (2) the trial court's award of lost wages was in error; and (3) the trial court’s attorney fee award was reasonable and a proper exercise of its discretion. Remanded. View "Banker v. Univ. of Louisville Athletic Ass’n, Inc." on Justia Law

Defendant was arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol and transported to a corrections facility for a court admissible breathalyzer test. Defendant submitted to the breathalyzer test, which registered a blood-alcohol content of more than twice the legal limit. Defendant filed a motion to suppress the results of his breathalyzer test, arguing that his statutory right to attempt to contact and communicate with an attorney was violated subsequent to his arrest. The district court denied the motion to suppress. The circuit court reversed, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the Commonwealth did violate Defendant’s statutory right to attempt to contact and communicate with an attorney under Ky. Rev. Stat. 189A.105(3); but (2) because of Kentucky’s implied consent law as set forth in Ky. Rev. Stat. 189A.103 and the potential penalties attendant thereto, suppression of Defendant’s breathalyzer test results was an inappropriate remedy in this case. Remanded. View "Commonwealth v. Bedway" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty but mentally ill of murdering Lisa Tackett and Alan Tackett and of the first-degree wanton endangerment of the victims’ four children. The Supreme Court reversed Defendant’s convictions and remanded the case for a new trial on all charges, holding (1) the trial court properly denied Defendant’s motion for a directed verdict on the four first-degree wanton endangerment counts; (2) the trial court erred in admitting very graphic and gruesome crime scene and autopsy photos of the victims, as the probative value in admitting the photographs was substantially outweighed by the undue prejudice created by the photographs; and (3) the trial court did not err in denying directed verdicts on the four charges of first-degree wanton endangerment. View "Hall v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Beverly Miller’s employment with the COJ (Court of Justice) ended when she was terminated in 2001. Miller filed suit, claiming that she was a tenured employee of the COJ and therefore, before she was terminated, she was entitled to the due process provided in the COJ Personnel Policies. Miller also filed a whistleblower claim under Ky. Rev. Stat. 61.102. The circuit court (1) granted summary judgment to Miller as to her claims based upon her being a tenured employee; and (2) granted summary judgment to the Administrative Office of the Courts on Miller’s claim under the Kentucky Whistleblower Statute. The Supreme Court (1) reversed as to Miller’s tenured employee claims, holding that, as a matter of law, Miller was not a tenured employee and was not entitled to termination due process under the COJ Personnel Policy; and (2) affirmed as to the dismissal of Miller’s claims under section 61.102, holding as a matter of law that Miller did not report or disclose previously concealed or non-public information that would entitle her to protection under the statute. View "Admin. Office of Courts v. Miller" on Justia Law

Julie Camps worked as a full time paramedic for the Garrard County Fiscal court and was concurrently employed as a paramedic with Clark County EMS. Camps later quit her job with Clark County, intending to obtain another paramedic job closer to her home. While working for Garrard County, Appellant suffered an acute ankle sprain requiring reconstructive surgery. Camps filed for workers’ compensation based on an average weekly wage (AWW) calculation including her wages from both counties. An administrative law judge concluded that Camps’s AWW was limited to the wages she earned working for Garrard County. The Workers’ Compensation Board affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed based on its interpretation of Ky. Rev. Stat. 342.140(5), concluding that Camps’s Clark County wages should be included in her AWW calculation because she worked for Clark County during the relevant look-back period. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, because Camps was no longer under a contract for hire with Clark County at the time of her injury, she was not entitled to claim both her Garrard County and Clark County wages in her AWW calculation. View "Garrard County Fiscal Court v. Camps" on Justia Law