Justia Kentucky Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of second-degree escape and of being a first-degree persistent felony offender. Defendant’s sentence was enhanced from five years in prison on the escape conviction to twenty years in prison as a persistent felony offender. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court (1) did not err in denying Defendant’s motion for directed verdict on second-degree escape; and (2) did not err in refusing the instruct the jury on third-degree escape, a lesser-included offense of second-degree escape, as there was no evidence that would support such an instruction. View "Lackey v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, the administrate of the estate of Lula Belle Gordon, filed suit against several nursing home entities (collectively, “Kindred”), alleging that Kindred violated several provisions of Ky. Rev. Stat. 216.515 in its treatment and care of Gordon, resulting in her injury and death. The trial court entered judgment in favor of Plaintiff. The Court of Appeals reversed and ordered the dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims, concluding that Plaintiff’s claims were incident to a common law personal injury action and therefore subject to the one-year limitations period provided by Ky. Rev. Stat. 413.140. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Plaintiff’s claim under section 216.515(6) did not assert a claim for relief based upon a liability created by the statute because the claim simply represented a codification in the nursing home context of the common law personal injury cause of action and was, therefore, subject to a the one-year limitation period otherwise provided for personal injury actions; and (2) other causes of action based upon provisions of section 216.515, for which Plaintiff sought redress, were subject to the five-year limitations period established by section 413.120, but those causes of action must be brought during the lifetime of the resident by the resident or her guardian. View "Overstreet v. Kindred Nursing Ctrs. Ltd. P’ship" on Justia Law

Two sets of landowners brought suit seeking damages and a declaration of their rights under oil and gas leases executed with with predecessor to an oil and gas producer. Additionally, the landowners sought a declaration that the lessee production companies had miscalculated and underpaid royalties due under the leases. Specifically, the landowners claimed that the lease provision basing their royalty on “one-eighth the market price at the well” should be understand to contemplate the sale of gas made “marketable” and then “sold at the well.” The trial court rejected these claims and dismissed the landowners’ complaint. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that the trial court did not err in ruling that given royalty provisions such as those in the leases at issue here, Kentucky law does not embrace the “marketable product” approach to royalty calculation. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, for the purposes of gas lease royalty valuation under standard “market price (value) at the well” royalty clauses, the lessee is solely responsible for the costs of production, but post-production costs may be deducted from gross receipts before the calculation of the royalty share. View "Baker v. Magnum Hunter Prod., Inc." on Justia Law

In 2011, Appellant pleaded guilty to one felony count of receiving stolen property. In exchange for Appellant’s guilty plea, the prosecutor promised not to pursue revocation of Appellant’s conditional discharge from his 2008 sex offense. The Parole Board, however, ordered Appellant to serve out the discharge period, concluding that, notwithstanding the plea bargain, Appellant’s new conviction provided probable cause for the revocation of his discharge. In 2012, Appellant filed a motion for habeas corpus relief from the 2011 judgment, alleging that defense counsel had rendered ineffective assistance in advising him to plead guilty on a promise that the prosecutor was not authorized to make. The trial court granted the petition. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that habeas corpus was not an appropriate remedy under the circumstances. While Appellant’s appeal was pending, his sentence expired, rending his case moot. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellant failed to establish the inadequacy of more usual forms of relief, and thus his resort to habeas corpus was properly denied. Due to the mootness of Appellant’s claim, this conclusion had no practical effect for Appellant, but this Opinion will provide guidance as to the proper mode of challenging an an alleged plea-bargain breach by the Commonwealth. View "Muhammad v. Ky. Parole Bd." on Justia Law

Appellant was convicted of three counts of first-degree robbery, two counts of second-degree robbery, possession of a handgun by a convicted felon, and being a persistent felony offender. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Appellant was not entitled to a mistrial for alleged prosecutorial misconduct during closing argument because the Commonwealth’s improper closing argument statements did not result in manifest injustice; (2) the trial court did not err by striking a juror for cause; (3) the admission of prior offenses exceeding the scope of the truth-in-sentencing statute was not palpable error; and (4) the trial court did not err in this case by “trifurcating” the trial into two guilt phases and one consolidated penalty phase in lieu of separately trying the handgun charge before a different jury. View "Wallace v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was the apportionment of natural gas severance taxes for purposes of calculating royalties when a producer-lessee severs natural gas from the earth. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals certified a question to the Kentucky Supreme Court asking whether Kentucky’s at-the-well rule allows a natural gas processor to deduct all severance taxes paid at market prior to calculating a contractual royalty payment to a royalty owner-lessor based on the market price of gas at the well or whether the resource’s at-the-well price includes a proportionate share of the severance taxes owed such that a processor may deduct only that portion of the severance taxes attributable to accumulating, compressing, processing, and transporting the gas prior to calculating the appropriate royalty payment. The Supreme Court rejected the two options presented and concluded that, in the absence of a specific lease provision apportioning severance taxes, lessees may not deduct severance taxes or any portion thereof prior to calculating a royalty value. View "Appalachian Land Co. v. EQT Prod. Co." on Justia Law

In 2007, the circuit court entered a decree of dissolution dissolving the marriage of Lydia and Kevin Addison. The decree provided that Lydia have sole custody of the parties’ two children, with Kevin having reasonable parenting time. Kevin later filed a motion for sole custody and for Lydia’s parenting time to be supervised. After a hearing, the court ordered that custody be transferred to Kevin and that Lydia have supervised visitation. The court of appeals reversed, holding, inter alia, that the trial court (1) improperly placed a time restriction on the hearing without considering the admissibility or exclusion of the evidence, thereby denying Lydia the opportunity to present testimony, and (2) erred in not permitting the children to testify. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court (1) did not abuse its discretion in limiting the hearing to six hours; (2) did not err in refusing to permit the children to testify; (3) did not err in retaining jurisdiction; (4) properly applied the best interests of the child standard to each child; (5) properly ruled that each party was responsible for his or her own attorney’s fees; and (6) did not err in denying Lydia’s motion that Kevin participate in an evaluation with Lydia’s expert. View "Addison v. Addison" on Justia Law

In 2004, AT&T Corp. filed refund claims with the Finance and Administration Cabinet arguing that, under Ky. Rev. Stat. 139.505, AT&T was entitled to refunds for tax years 2002 and 2003. The Cabinet granted a partial refund for AT&T’s 2002 claim. In 2008, AT&T filed refund claims for tax years 2004 through 2008. In 2011, AT&T filed a declaration of rights action bringing administrative and as-applied constitutional challenges to the amendments to section 139.505. The circuit court dismissed the case, determining that AT&T’s challenges must be adjudicated by the Kentucky Board of Tax Appeals (KBTA) before the court would address AT&T’s facial constitutional challenges. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the facial constitutional issue was one that the KBTA could not decide, but that the other claims were properly dismissed. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals’ decision and reinstated the trial court’s order of dismissal, holding that there were several administrative issues that must be resolved prior to addressing the constitutional claims. View "Commonwealth v. AT&T Corp." on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of manufacturing methamphetamine, first-degree possession of a controlled substance, and of being a first-degree persistent felony offender (PFO). The Supreme Court (1) affirmed Defendant’s convictions for the offenses of manufacturing methamphetamine and first-degree possession of a controlled substance, holding that the trial court did not err in refusing to allow Defendant’s girlfriend to testify about certain out-of-court statements uttered to her by a declarant whose unavailability at trial was not shown; and (2) reversed the PFO conviction, holding that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the PFO verdict. View "Moore v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Plaintiff in the underlying medical malpractice action sought a writ of prohibition to prevent the trial court from enforcing its order permitting counsel for the defendant in the underlying action (Dr. Castro) to contact Plaintiff’s treating physicians ex parte. The Court of Appeals declined to issue a writ, finding (1) no Kentucky law prohibits the trial court from authorizing ex parte correspondence with nonexpert treating physicians, and (2) the trial court’s order did not violate any right Plaintiff had to privacy of her medical information because the order did not compel any disclosure. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) HIPAA does not prohibit ex parte interviews with treating physicians but does regulate the protected health information to be disclose in ex parte interviews; (2) Kentucky law places no restrictions on voluntary ex parte interviews with non expert treating physicians; and (3) the challenged order at issue in this case did not satisfy HIPPA procedural requirements for the disclosure of protected health information, but because the order expressly withheld the necessary authorization, a writ need not issue. View "Caldwell v. Hon. A.C. McKay Chauvin" on Justia Law