Justia Kentucky Supreme Court Opinion Summaries
Commonwealth v. Bedway
Defendant was arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol and transported to a corrections facility for a court admissible breathalyzer test. Defendant submitted to the breathalyzer test, which registered a blood-alcohol content of more than twice the legal limit. Defendant filed a motion to suppress the results of his breathalyzer test, arguing that his statutory right to attempt to contact and communicate with an attorney was violated subsequent to his arrest. The district court denied the motion to suppress. The circuit court reversed, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the Commonwealth did violate Defendant’s statutory right to attempt to contact and communicate with an attorney under Ky. Rev. Stat. 189A.105(3); but (2) because of Kentucky’s implied consent law as set forth in Ky. Rev. Stat. 189A.103 and the potential penalties attendant thereto, suppression of Defendant’s breathalyzer test results was an inappropriate remedy in this case. Remanded. View "Commonwealth v. Bedway" on Justia Law
Hall v. Commonwealth
After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty but mentally ill of murdering Lisa Tackett and Alan Tackett and of the first-degree wanton endangerment of the victims’ four children. The Supreme Court reversed Defendant’s convictions and remanded the case for a new trial on all charges, holding (1) the trial court properly denied Defendant’s motion for a directed verdict on the four first-degree wanton endangerment counts; (2) the trial court erred in admitting very graphic and gruesome crime scene and autopsy photos of the victims, as the probative value in admitting the photographs was substantially outweighed by the undue prejudice created by the photographs; and (3) the trial court did not err in denying directed verdicts on the four charges of first-degree wanton endangerment. View "Hall v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Criminal Law
Admin. Office of Courts v. Miller
Beverly Miller’s employment with the COJ (Court of Justice) ended when she was terminated in 2001. Miller filed suit, claiming that she was a tenured employee of the COJ and therefore, before she was terminated, she was entitled to the due process provided in the COJ Personnel Policies. Miller also filed a whistleblower claim under Ky. Rev. Stat. 61.102. The circuit court (1) granted summary judgment to Miller as to her claims based upon her being a tenured employee; and (2) granted summary judgment to the Administrative Office of the Courts on Miller’s claim under the Kentucky Whistleblower Statute. The Supreme Court (1) reversed as to Miller’s tenured employee claims, holding that, as a matter of law, Miller was not a tenured employee and was not entitled to termination due process under the COJ Personnel Policy; and (2) affirmed as to the dismissal of Miller’s claims under section 61.102, holding as a matter of law that Miller did not report or disclose previously concealed or non-public information that would entitle her to protection under the statute. View "Admin. Office of Courts v. Miller" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Labor & Employment Law
Garrard County Fiscal Court v. Camps
Julie Camps worked as a full time paramedic for the Garrard County Fiscal court and was concurrently employed as a paramedic with Clark County EMS. Camps later quit her job with Clark County, intending to obtain another paramedic job closer to her home. While working for Garrard County, Appellant suffered an acute ankle sprain requiring reconstructive surgery. Camps filed for workers’ compensation based on an average weekly wage (AWW) calculation including her wages from both counties. An administrative law judge concluded that Camps’s AWW was limited to the wages she earned working for Garrard County. The Workers’ Compensation Board affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed based on its interpretation of Ky. Rev. Stat. 342.140(5), concluding that Camps’s Clark County wages should be included in her AWW calculation because she worked for Clark County during the relevant look-back period. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, because Camps was no longer under a contract for hire with Clark County at the time of her injury, she was not entitled to claim both her Garrard County and Clark County wages in her AWW calculation. View "Garrard County Fiscal Court v. Camps" on Justia Law
Daughtery v. Commonwealth
Appellant was convicted of the murder of her husband and of tampering with physical evidence for hiding the gun used in the shooting. The Supreme Court reversed Appellant’s convictions, holding (1) the trial court erred by preventing Appellant from testifying that her husband had a prior felony conviction and abused its discretion by not allowing Appellant to testify about “threatening, commanding, and questioning” statements allegedly made by her husband just before, during, and after the shooting; and (2) these errors infringed on Appellant’s right to due process of law and were not harmless. View "Daughtery v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Criminal Law
Commonwealth v. Wright
After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of complicity to first-degree trafficking in a controlled substance and of being a second-degree persistent felony offender. The court of appeals reversed and remanded for a new trial, concluding that the trial court abused its discretion by permitting the jurors, during deliberations, to use the Commonwealth’s attorney’s laptop computer to review an audio recording of a controlled buy. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the trial court did not err in permitting the jury to review the recording at issue using the Commonwealth’s laptop; (2) the trial court did not err when it denied Defendant’s motion for directed verdict; (3) the admission of portions of a law enforcement officer’s testimony interpreting and narrating the recording was improper, but the admission of that testimony did not amount to palpable error; (4) the admission of the officer’s testimony concerning the confidential informant in this case amounted to improper character evidence, but the admission of the testimony did not amount to palpable error; and (5) the trial court did not err in admitting the confidential informant’s testimony regarding Defendant’s guilt and mental state. View "Commonwealth v. Wright" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Criminal Law
Livingood v. Transfreight, LLC
Appellant injured his left shoulder while working for Appellee. Appellant underwent three shoulder surgeries and returned to work on light duty between the surgeries. After Appellant returned to work without restrictions, Appellee terminated his employment for bumping into a pole while operating a forklift. An administrative law judge (ALJ) denied Appellant’s request for temporary total disability (TTD) benefits while Appellant was on light duty and declined to award the two multiplier under Ky. Rev. Stat. 342.730(1)(c)(2) and Chrysalis House, Inc. v. Tackett after finding that Appellant was not terminated due to his disabling shoulder injury. The Workers’ Compensation Board and the Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the denial of TTD benefits, as the evidence did not compel a contrary finding; and (2) reversed and remanded with respect to the two multiplier, as the circumstances in this case led the Court to reconsider its holding in Chrysalis House and its construction of section 342.730(1)(c)(2). View "Livingood v. Transfreight, LLC" on Justia Law
Pate v. Dep’t of Corr.
After a trial, Appellant was found guilty of manufacturing methamphetamine. The Department of Corrections (DOC) originally classified Appellant as a non-violent offender but later reclassified Appellant as a violent offender, which changed Appellant’s parole eligibility and sentence expiration dates. The DOC modified Appellant’s status based on the 2006 amendment to Ky. Rev. Stat. 439.3401. Appellant filed a declaration of rights petition in the circuit court arguing that the 2006 amendment to Ky. Rev. Stat. 439.3401 constitutes an ex post facto violation. Appellant also moved to vacate, set aside or correct the judgment pursuant to Ky. R. Crim. P. 11.42 or, in the alternative, Ky. R. Crim. P. 60.02. The trial court denied relief. The court of appeals reversed the trial court’s order denying Appellant’s Rule 11.42 motion and otherwise affirmed. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the dismissal of Appellant’s petition for declaration of rights, holding that the 2006 amendment to section 439.3401 does not constitute an ex post facto law; but (2) reversed the denial of Appellant’s Rule 60.02(f) motion, holding that Appellant was denied due process of law when he proceeded with a jury trial under the false pretense that, if convicted, he would be treated as a non-violent offender. Remanded. View "Pate v. Dep’t of Corr." on Justia Law
Posted in:
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
McNeil v. Commonwealth
After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of first-degree robbery and first-degree assault. Defendant was sentenced to consecutive terms of ten years for the former offense and eighteen years for the latter offense. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court did not commit reversible error by instructing the jury with respect to both offenses; (2) Defendant’s sentences for both assault and robbery did not violate constitutional and statutory provisions against double jeopardy, as Defendant was not punished twice for the same offense; and (3) Defendant’s trial was not rendered unfair when a police officer referred to an unauthenticated phone company record in violation of the rule against hearsay because any such violation was harmless and was not a ground for relief. View "McNeil v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Criminal Law
Holland v. Commonwealth
After a jury trial, Appellant was found guilty of wanton murder and sentenced to twenty years’ imprisonment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not commit reversible error by (1) instructing the jury on the charge of wanton murder or, alternatively, failing to direct a verdict on the wanton murder charge, as the evidence was sufficient to support the charge of wanton murder; (2) declining to elaborate on the meaning of the word “wantonly” as used in the jury instructions; (3) excluding evidence of the victim’s previous participation in a robbery; (4) instructing the jury on the issue of self-protection; and (5) denying Appellant’s request for a first-degree manslaughter instruction based upon extreme emotional disturbance. View "Holland v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Criminal Law