Justia Kentucky Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Brent Horn, who was not an employee of B&B Contracting, LLC and did not receive compensation for his work, volunteered to drive one of the company’s trucks on a day that B&B was short-staffed. While Horn was driving a B&B truck, Bradley Stafford, a B&B employee, fell from Horn’s truck and was killed. The administratrix of Stafford’s estate brought a wrongful death action against Horn. Horn responded that the liability policy issued by Tower Insurance Company of New York insuring B&B’s trucks covered the claim against him. Tower then filed an intervening complaint seeking a declaration of rights regarding its obligation to defend and indemnify Horn. The circuit court denied coverage to Horn, concluding (1) Horn was a permissive user of B&B’s truck and thus was an insured under Tower’s policy; but (2) an employee exclusion in the policy precluded coverage for Stafford’s death because Stafford was an employee of B&B. The court of appeals reversed, finding that the policy’s severability clause rendered the employee exclusion ineffective as to Horn, who was not Stafford’s employer. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the injured employee policy exclusion did not bar coverage of Horn, a permissive user. View "Tower Ins. Co. of New York v. Horn" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was found guilty of murder and was sentenced to forty years in prison. The Supreme Court affirmed Appellant’s conviction, holding (1) Appellant’s responses to the police’s questions at the scene were not properly admitted, but the error was harmless; (2) the introduction of hearsay content of the testimony of one of Appellant’s cellmates that Appellant allegedly had with another cellmate was error, but the error was not reversible; (3) the prosecutor, by introducing his own interaction with the cellmate in an attempt to impeach that witness, was error, but the error was not palpable; (4) the trial court erred in allowing the victim’s niece to repeat the victim’s statement of why she not longer had a gun, but the error was harmless; and (5) statements about the victim’s plan to move to Indiana were properly admitted. View "Dillon v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

David McCarty, the employee of an independent contractor, was killed during the installation of a garage door on a building at a coal mine site operated by Covol Fuels. McCarty’s estate brought a wrongful death action against Covol, alleging that Covol was negligent per se for violating certain coal mine safety statutes and regulations. A federal district court granted summary judgment for Covol on all claims, concluding that McCarty was not within the class of persons protected by Kentucky’s mine safety laws and that his death did not occur under the circumstances that Kentucky’s mine safety laws were intended to prevent. The Estate appealed. The Supreme Court subsequently granted the request of the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit to certify the law in regards to whether the statutes and regulations relied upon by the Estate were intended to protect individuals in McCarty's situation and to prevent the type of accident that caused McCarty’s death. The Supreme Court concluded that a subcontractor injured while installing a garage door on an unfinished building at a mine site may not maintain a wrongful death action against the mine operator under a negligence per se theory for alleged violations of Kentucky mining statutes and regulations. View "McCarty v. Covol Fuels No. 2, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, Keith Randall Sparkman and In-Depth Sanitary Service, Inc., filed a complaint against Defendants, CONSOL Energy Inc. and CONSOL of Kentucky, Inc. for breach of contract and tortious interference with contract. The contracts at issue in this dispute were entered into by In-Depth Sanitary Service Group, which was not named in the complaint. The jury found in favor of “Keith Randall Sparkman d/b/a In-Depth Service Group." Defendants appealed, and Plaintiffs cross-appealed. The Court of Appeals disposed of the matter sua sponte based on a perceived lack of jurisdiction, concluding that the wrong parties had filed suit, and the trial court’s judgment awarded damages to a “non-party.” The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the judgment of the trial court identified the correct party because the parties mutually consented to the amendment of the complaint to reflect Keith Randall Sparkman d/b/a In-Depth Sanitary Service Group; and (2) the naming of the parties in the notice of cross-appeal was sufficient to transfer jurisdiction to the court of appeals. View "Sparkman v. Consol Energy of Kentucky, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against William Shaffer, M.D., an orthopedic surgeon, alleging that Dr. Shaffer failed to obtain her informed consent before operating on her. The jury returned verdicts in favor of Dr. Shaffer, and the trial court entered judgment accordingly. Plaintiff appealed, arguing that the judgment should be set aside because the trial court’s jury instructions misstated the law regarding informed consent. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the instruction given in this case was erroneous because it failed to incorporate the law applicable to a medical provider’s duty to obtain informed consent. Remanded for further proceedings. View "Sargent v. Shaffer" on Justia Law

Amanda Maddox and her then-husband, Dwyane Maddox, where traveling in their 2001 Nissan Pathfinder when their vehicle was hit by a drunk driver. Amanda sustained serious injuries in the accident. Amanda filed suit against the drunk driver’s estate, Nissan Motor Company, Ltd and Nissan North American, Inc. (collectively, Nissan) alleging that her injuries were caused by Nissan’s defectively designed restraint system and failure to warn her about the system’s limitations. A jury ruled in favor of Amanda and assessed thirty percent of the fault to the drunk driver and seventy percent of the fault to Nissan. The jury found Nissan responsible for $2.6 million in compensatory damages and $2.5 million in punitive damages. The court of appeals affirmed. At issue before the Supreme Court was whether a punitive damages jury instruction was proper. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals on that issue and vacated the trial court’s judgment assessing punitive damages against Nissan, holding that an instruction authorizing punitive damages against Nissan was inappropriate. View "Nissan Motor Co. v. Maddox" on Justia Law

William Bennett was indicted for first-degree assault and first-degree wanton endangerment. Bennett moved for dismissal of his indictment contending that he acted in self-defense. Bennett also requested a hearing so that the trial judge could view a videotape of the encounter that led to the criminal charges. A senior judge denied the motion to dismiss. On reconsideration and without viewing the videotape or other evidence, Hon. Audra J. Eckerle (Respondent) set aside the senior judge’s order and scheduled an evidentiary hearing on immunity at which witnesses, including the victims, were to appear and testify. The Commonwealth sought a writ. The Supreme Court granted a writ, holding (1) Respondent erred in not considering the evidence of record to determine if there was probable cause to believe the force Bennett used was unlawful; and (2) a writ was appropriate under the circumstances of this case. View "Commonwealth v. Eckerle" on Justia Law

In a prosecution under the 2000 version of Ky. Rev. Stat. 508.032, Defendant entered a conditional guilty plea to fourth-degree assault, third or subsequent offense within five years. On appeal, Defendant argued that the trial court erred when it ruled that evidence of his prior assault convictions was admissible in the guilt phase of his trial. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that prior fourth-degree-assault convictions are not admissible in the Commonwealth’s case-in-chief in the prosecution of fourth-degree assault under section 508.032. View "Brewer v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Appellant sued Appellee, the operator of a hotel, for injuries he suffered in a fall on ice on the hotel property, alleging negligence in Appellee’s entryway of the hotel during or after a severe snow storm. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Appellee, concluding that the icy patch on which Appellant fell was a naturally occurring open-and-obvious hazard for which there can be no liability under Standard Oil Co. v. Manis. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Manis rule is no longer viable, and instead, all open and obvious hazard cases, including obvious natural outdoor hazard cases, are subject to the comparative fault doctrine. Remanded. View "Carter v. Bullitt Host, LLC" on Justia Law

In a joint trial, Defendants Jared Futrell and Kayla Lord were each convicted of wanton murder for having participated in the killing of Lord’s seventeen-month-old son. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) in both cases, the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to remove two unqualified jurors for cause, and in accord with Gabbard v. Commonwealth, at least one of the trial court’s two erroneous failures to remove for cause was prejudicial; (2) the jury instructions raised certain unanimous verdict concerns; (3) the trial court erred by allowing Defendants too few peremptory juror challenges; and (4) the trial court erred by disallowing diversion-agreement impeachment cross-examination. Remanded for further proceedings. View "Futrell v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law