Justia Kentucky Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

When a mentally disabled man who had been in the care of the Cabinet for Health and Family Services died, the Council on Developmental Disabilities, Inc. filed a request with the Cabinet under the Kentucky Open Records Act seeking information about the man’s death. The Cabinet denied the Council’s request on the grounds that the records were confidential under Ky. Rev. Stat. 209.140 and that the Council, a nonprofit corporation that advocates generally for “children and adults with mental retardation and their families and other interested persons in the community,” did not qualify as an organization exempt from the confidentiality restrictions in that statute. The Council filed suit in circuit court seeking an order requiring the Cabinet to disclose the requested records. The trial court denied the request, concluding that the Council had failed to demonstrate that it had a legitimate interest in the records sought. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Council was not entitled to the information requested under the Act or section 209.140(3). View "Council on Dev. Disabilities, Inc. v. Cabinet for Health & Family Servs." on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of first-degree stalking, violation of a protective order, and being a first-degree persistent felony offender. Relying upon post-trial comments attributed to jurors implying that the jury had not agreed unanimously on all of the statutory elements of the crime of first-degree stalking, Defendant filed a motion for judgment of acquittal notwithstanding the verdict or a new trial. The trial court denied the motion, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the record in this case did not warrant departure from the historic rule prohibiting the use of post-trial juror statements to impeach a facially valid verdict. View "Maras v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Ronnie Lee Bowling, who is currently on Kentucky’s death row for two murder convictions obtained in 1992, was also convicted in 1996 of attempted murder. Bowling was sentenced to a twenty year term for the attempted murder conviction, to be served concurrently with the earlier sentence. The 1996 judgment failed to award Bowling his entitled jail-time credit that would mean he had served out that sentence in 2009. The Department of Corrections (DOC), however, treated the twenty-year sentence as though it had been served out at that time. In 2012, Bowling filed a petition for habeas corpus in a federal district court challenging his 1996 conviction. Before the federal court could exercise jurisdiction, it had to determine whether Bowling was “in custody” under the challenged conviction. The Supreme Court accepted certified questions from the federal court regarding the issue and answered (1) the DOC may award an inmate jail-time credit that was mistakenly left off the judgment of conviction and sentence entered when the trial court was statutorily commanded to award appropriate credit; and (2) whether the DOC properly did so in this case required fact-finding to be done by the district court. View "Bowling v. White" on Justia Law

Each of these three cases originated with actions asserting claims against nursing homes for personal injuries suffered by nursing home residents and for wrongful death of the residents. In each case, an attorney-in-fact for the resident executed a written document upon the resident’s admission to the nursing home providing that claims or disputes would be submitted to arbitration rather than adjudication in the courts. In each case, the defendant nursing home facility filed a motion to dismiss the action and compel the parties to submit the claims to a formal arbitration proceeding. The circuit court denied the motions on the grounds that the arbitration agreements were not validly formed between the respective nursing home facility and the resident whose interests were thereby affected. By way of motions for interlocutory relief, several nursing home entities sought relief from orders refusing to compel arbitration of the disputes. The Supreme Court denied the motions for interlocutory relief, holding that because the power-of-attorney instruments involved in these cases provided no manifestation of the principal’s intent to delegate to his agent the power to waive a trial by jury, the principal’s assent to the waiver was never validly obtained. View "Extendicare Homes, Inc. v. Whisman" on Justia Law

In 2008, Dr. Daniel Bailey and Katherine Bailey began divorce proceedings. In 2010, two of Daniel’s former patients and their spouses (collectively, the Intervening Parties) filed medical negligence claims against Daniel. The Intervening Parties moved to intervene in the Baileys’ divorce action for the purpose of trying to unseal portions of the divorce record that had previously been sealed. The circuit court granted the motion to intervene and ordered the divorce record unsealed. Daniel filed a petition for a writ of prohibition against the enforcement of the trial court’s order. The court of appeals denied the petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that although intervention was improper, a writ of prohibition was unavailable in this case because Daniel had an adequate remedy by way of appeal. View "Bailey v. Hon. Bertram" on Justia Law

An Indiana court entered a decree dissolving the marriage of Mother and Father. The parties then entered into an agreed order signed by the Indiana court resolving property matters, including tax exemptions for the parties’ children, that had not previously been decided. Mother and the children subsequently moved to Kentucky, followed by Father. A Kentucky family court later altered the duration of the original child support order and modified the award made by the Indiana court of the federal dependent-child tax exemption. The Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding that the family court had authority to take these actions under the Uniform Instate Family Support Act. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the duration of a support award is not modifiable; and (2) awarding a tax exemption as part of a support order is modifiable, but further awards of the tax exemption require finding an actual nexus to support of the child, which the trial court did not do in this case. View "Adams-Smyrichinsky v. Smyrichinsky" on Justia Law

The trial court in this case ordered that Father get a dollar-for-dollar credit against his monthly child support obligation for any monies his dependent child received as a result of Father’s Social Security retirement benefits. In reaching this result, the court concluded that the Social Security retirement benefits should be treated no differently than disability benefits are treated under Ky. Rev. Stat. 403.211(15), which expressly allows a credit for disability payments but says nothing about retirement benefits. The court of appeals reversed, holding that Father was not entitled to a credit under section 403.211(15), and because he was not entitled to a credit, he was also not entitled to recoup any previous support payments. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and reinstated the order of the circuit court, holding that the trial court (1) did not abuse its discretion under the circumstances of this case in awarding Father a credit against his child-support obligation for Social Security retirement benefits paid to the child; and (2) did not violate the no-recoupment rule by ordering Mother to reimburse Father for support payments made during the period in which the child was eligible for Social Security benefits that were later paid as a lump sum. View "C.D.G. v. N.J.S." on Justia Law

Keith Randall Sparkman filed a complaint against CONSOL Energy, Inc. (CONSOL) and CONSOL of Kentucky, Inc. (CKI), as well as certain individuals, for breach of contract and tortious interference with contract. The jury found in favor of Sparkman and awarded damages. CONSOL/CKI appealed, and Sparkman cross-appealed. The court of appeals disposed of the matter sua sponte based on a perceived lack of jurisdiction. Because the contracts at issue in this dispute were entered into by In-Depth Sanitary Service Group (Group), a sole proprietorship not named in the complaint, and because the judgment was in favor of Group, a “non-party,” the court of appeals reversed and remanded the cause to the circuit court for further proceedings and any “appropriate corrective action.” The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the trial court’s judgment identified the correct party because the parties mutually consented to the amendment of the complaint to reflect Keith Randall Sparkman d/b/a In-Depth Sanitary Service Group; and (2) the naming of the parties in the notice of cross-appeal was sufficient to transfer jurisdiction to the court of appeals. View "Sparkman v. Consol Energy, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued Defendant, a medical doctor, claiming that Defendant failed to obtain her informed consent before operating on her. The jury returned a verdict for Defendant, and the trial court entered judgment accordingly. The court of appeals affirmed. Plaintiff appealed, arguing that the judgment should be set aside because the trial court’s instructions to the jury misstated the law regarding informed consent. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the instruction given in this case was in error because it failed to incorporate the law applicable to a medical provider’s duty to obtain informed consent; and (2) Plaintiff was prejudiced by the erroneous instruction. View "Sargent v. Shaffer" on Justia Law

Mary Banker filed a retaliatory discharge claim against the University of Louisville Athletic Association, Inc. (ULAA), alleging that ULAA discharged her for engaging in a protected activity under the Kentucky Civil Rights Act. A jury found in favor of Banker and awarded attorney fees. The court of appeals reversed and remanded for dismissal of Banker’s claim, holding that Banker had not met her burden of proof. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the court of appeals injected its interpretation of the facts and did not view the proof in light most favorable to Banker, and the evidence was sufficient to support a reasonable inference that ULAA’s stated reasons for discharging Banker were pretextual; (2) the trial court's award of lost wages was in error; and (3) the trial court’s attorney fee award was reasonable and a proper exercise of its discretion. Remanded. View "Banker v. Univ. of Louisville Athletic Ass’n, Inc." on Justia Law