Justia Kentucky Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Sarah Jackson and David Thomas retained Persels & Associates, LLC (Persels) to defend them in debt collection cases. Persels retained Kentucky attorneys K. David Bradley and Robert Gillispie to provide limited representation. The limited representation agreements provided that neither lawyer was required to sign pleadings, enter an appearance, or attend court proceedings. The circuit court subsequently ordered the attorneys to show cause why they should not be held in contempt for their failure to enter their appearances and sign documents filed with the court. Persels intervened as a third party. The trial court determined that Parsels and the two attorneys had violated Ky. R. Civ. P. 11 and fined each $1. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that limited-representation counsel is not required to sign the documents prepared as part of the limited representation, and therefore Rule 11 does not apply. Remanded to the trial court to determine whether the limited-representation agreements at issue were reasonable. View "Persels & Assocs., LLC v. Capital One Bank" on Justia Law

Delena Tipton was injured during the course of her employment with Trane Commercial Systems. Trane initially paid Tipton temporary total disability (TTD) income benefits but stopped paying TTD benefits when Tipton returned to work. An administrative law judge (ALJ) found that Tipton’s release and return to work justified termination of TTD benefits when Tipton returned to work. The Workers’ Compensation Board affirmed. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that Tipton’s return to work did not terminate her entitlement to TTD benefits because Tipton did not returned to the type of work she had performed when she was injured. The Supreme Court reversed and reinstated the ALJ’s opinion and award, holding that there was ample substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s denial of Tipton’s request for additional TTD benefits. View "Trane Commercial Sys. v. Tipton" on Justia Law

Laul Deng (“Aker”) sued his former employer, Norton Healthcare, Inc., for racial discrimination in terminating his employment. Specifically, Aker alleged that Norton’s failure to reinstate him after termination of his employment was retaliation for filing a pro se discrimination complaint. The trial court granted Norton summary judgment on all of Aker’s claims. Despite acknowledging that Aker never applied for any position with Norton, the court of appeals reversed, concluding that the futile-gesture doctrine excused the requirement that Aker show that he applied for a position in order to establish a prima facie claim for employment discrimination. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the court of appeals erred in invoking the futile-doctrine theory sua sponte; and (2) the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment to Norton as a matter of law. View "Norton Healthcare, Inc. v. Deng" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of two counts of murder for intentionally killing his parents and one count of tampering with physical evidence. Defendant was sentenced to a total of forty-five years’ imprisonment. At issue on appeal was whether the trial court erred in failing to suppress Defendant’s confession made during protracted interrogation by sheriff’s detectives. The Supreme Court reversed Defendant’s convictions, holding (1) Defendant’s confession was involuntarily extracted through interrogation techniques employed by law enforcement that were constitutionally unjustifiable; and (2) the trial court improperly excluded Defendant’s alternate perpetrator evidence at trial. View "Gray v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Appellant was charged with murder. A jury acquitted Appellant on the murder charge but convicted him of first-degree manslaughter. Appellant was sentenced to twenty years’ imprisonment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it rejected Appellant’s requested for a “no duty to retreat” jury instruction because Appellant was not entitled to such an instruction; (2) no palpable error occurred in the admission into evidence of Appellant’s prior juvenile adjudication in the penalty phase of trial; and (3) the comity previously accorded by the Supreme Court to Ky. Rev. Stat. 532.055(2)(a)(6) remains unchanged. View "Jackson v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Appellant was convicted of two counts of rape of a minor. The rape resulted in the birth of a child, and a DNA paternity test was used as evidence against Appellant. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court did not err in allowing the Commonwealth’s DNA expert to testify regarding a fifty percent prior probability of paternity in calculating the final probability of paternity, especially since the expert also testified about lesser prior probabilities; and (2) the expert did not invade the province of the jury by giving testimony that would assist the jury “to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.” View "Ivey v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of four crimes, including two counts of first-degree robbery. Defendant was sentenced as a second-degree persistent felony offender to a total sentence of twenty-five years. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Defendant’s belated motion for a continuance; (2) even if the prosecutor violated Moss v. Commonwealth, the violation did not amount to a palpable error; and (3) the penalty phase of trial was not tainted by evidence improperly detailing Defendant’s prior offenses. View "Parker v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Allen Lehmann, a former ordained pastor in the Assembly of God church, was indicted for multiple counts of first-degree sodomy and first-degree sexual abuse. Approximately one month after the indictment issued, the alleged victims filed a civil action against Lehmann and various Assembly of God entities based on essentially the same allegations covered by the indictment. The Commonwealth moved to intervene in the civil action and stay discovery. The trial court granted the Commonwealth’s motion, determining that a stay of civil discovery until the completion of Lehmann’s criminal trial would promote justice and fairness. Lehmann sought a writ of mandamus seeking to have the trial court’s order vacated the civil discovery resumed. The court of appeals declined to issue a writ, concluding that Lehmann failed to prove he was without an adequate appellate remedy and that there was no genuine exigency meriting use of the court’s writ authority. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that a writ in this instance was unnecessary, and therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in staying civil discovery pending the completion of Lehmann’s criminal trial. View "Lehmann v. Hon. Susan Gibson" on Justia Law

At issue in this certification request was the correct interpretation of Kentucky Code of Judicial Conduct Canons 5A(1)(a), 5A(1)(b), and 5B(1)(c), which were promulgated by the Supreme Court with the objective of complying with Section 117 of the Kentucky Constitution requiring that all justices of the Supreme Court and judges of the court of appeals, circuit and district court shall be elected from their respective districts or circuits on a nonpartisan basis. In response to questions of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky, the Supreme Court answered (1) under Canon 5A(1)(a), judicial candidates may affiliate themselves as members of a political party without restriction but may not portray themselves as the official nominee of a political party; (2) as applied to this case, hosting events for a political party would violate Canon 5A(1)(b); and (3) Canon 5B(1)(c) prohibits a judge who holds her office by way of a gubernatorial appointment from asserting that she seeks to be re-elected. View "Winter v. Hon. Stephen D. Wolnitzek" on Justia Law

The Council on Developmental Disabilities, Inc. filed a request with the Cabinet for Health and Family Services seeking information about the death of Gary Farris, a ward of the Commonwealth who was transferred from an institution to a community residence shortly before his death. The Cabinet denied the Council’s request, concluding that the records were confidential under Ky. Rev. Stat. 209.140 and that the Council did not qualify as an organization exempt from the confidentiality restrictions in that statute. The trial court upheld the denial. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Council was not entitled to the requested information under either the Kentucky Open Records Act or section 209.140(3). View "Council on Developmental Disabilities, Inc. v. Cabinet for Health & Human Servs." on Justia Law