Justia Kentucky Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Appellant was arrested and charged with trafficking in marijuana. Based on information given by Appellant’s son, Cody, a law enforcement officer completed an affidavit for a search warrant and presented it to the district judge, who issued the search warrant. The search of Appellant’s home led to his being charged with trafficking in marijuana in an amount greater than five pounds and related drug-related offenses. Appellant moved to suppress the evidence claiming that the affidavit violated Henson v. Commonwealth because it did not state when Cody had observed his father’s illegal activity. The trial court denied the motion to suppress. The court of appeals affirmed. Both courts declined to apply the bright-line rule of Henson and instead found that the affidavit was sufficient to support issuance of a warrant under the totality of the circumstances test. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the validity of a search warrant affidavit and resulting warrant is determined under the totality of the circumstances and is not controlled by Henson’s bright-line rule; and (2) the trial court did not err in overruling Appellant’s motion to suppress because the search warrant was adequately supported by probable cause. View "Abney v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sought workers’ compensation benefits from Defendant, a medical center, for injuries she allegedly sustained during the course of a pre-employment physical examination. Defendant denied Plaintiff’s claim on the ground that she was not an employee at the time of her injury. An administrative law judge and the Workers’ Compensation Board affirmed. The court of appeals also affirmed, agreeing that Plaintiff was not Defendant’s employee when she submitted for physical examination. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Kentucky’s Workers’ Compensation Act does not cover an injury sustained during a physical examination performed as a condition precedent to employment. View "Rahla v. Med. Ctr. at Bowling Green" on Justia Law

Deborah Powell, the former women’s basketball coach at Asbury University, filed suit against the University, asserting claims of defamation, gender discrimination, and retaliation. The jury returned a verdict in the University’s favor on the defamation and discrimination claims but in Powell’s favor on the retaliation claim. The trial court awarded Powell damages and attorney's fees and costs. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) a claim of unlawful employer retaliation under Ky. Rev. Stat. 344.280(1) does not require an underlying violation of the Kentucky Civil Rights Act; (2) there was sufficient evidence to find unlawful retaliation; (3) the admission of opinion testimony by a former employee of the university that Powell’s conduct had been “wholly innocent” was harmless; (4) the University was not entitled to an employment-at-will jury instruction; (5) the University was not entitled to a new trial for alleged defects in the jury’s damages verdict; and (6) the award of attorneys’ fees and costs was not unreasonable. View "Asbury University v. Powell" on Justia Law

Stephen Patton, an eighth-grader at Allen Central Middle School, committed suicide allegedly because he was bullied at school. Patton’s estate filed suit against various teachers and administrators alleging that the administrators failed to implement sound policies and that the teachers failed to know Patton was being bullied and mistreated under their watch. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the teachers and administrators, concluding (1) these defendants were entitled to qualified official immunity from suit, and (2) Patton’s suicide was an intervening cause interrupting potential liability by the teachers and administrators. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court erred when it ruled that the teachers were entitled to the protection of qualified official immunity from this suit but did not err in ruling that the administrators were protected by qualified immunity; and (2) the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment to the teachers where the Estate presented no credible evidence that Patton was bullied because the teachers were negligent either in their duty to handle bullying reports or to appropriately supervise their pupils. View "Patton v. Bickford" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with multiple drug-related criminal offenses. Defendant filed a motion to suppress all the evidence collected from his trailer, arguing that law enforcement officers unlawfully exceeded the scope of a warrantless knock and talk by entering the protected curtilage of his residence. The trial court denied the suppression motion. Defendant subsequently entered a conditional guilty plea to complicity to manufacture methamphetamine, complicity to possess marijuana, and complicity to possess drug paraphernalia. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the officers did not have the right to venture away from the front of Defendant’s house pursuant to a knock and talk and to invade the curtilage of Defendant’s residence. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, based on the totality of the factors set forth in United States v. Dunn, as well as the officers’ uncontroverted testimony, neither officer unlawfully encroached on the trailer’s curtilage. View "Commonwealth v. Dixon" on Justia Law

In 1992, Defendant was convicted of two counts of murder and sentenced to death. In 1996, Defendant was convicted of attempted murder and sentenced to twenty years’ imprisonment, with that sentence being served concurrently with 1992 sentence. The judgment in the 1996 case failed to award Defendant substantial jail-time credit to which he was entitled. Had Defendant been granted the credit, he would have served out the 1996 sentence in 2009. Nevertheless, the Department of Corrections treated that sentence as though it had been served out at that time. In 2012, Defendant filed in federal district court a petition for habeas corpus challenging his 1996 conviction. Unable to determine whether Defendant was “in custody” under the challenged conviction, the district court certified two questions to the Supreme Court to resolve the question. The Supreme Court answered (1) the Department of Corrections may award an inmate jail-time credit that was mistakenly left of the judgment of conviction and sentence; and (2) whether Corrections properly did so in this case, and thus did not have Defendant in custody on that charge at the time he filed his habeas petition, requires additional fact-finding. View "Bowling v. White" on Justia Law

Appellant suffered a work-related accident while employed by Appellee. Appellant filed for workers’ compensation, but before his claim could be resolved, he was fired for “performance-related issues.” An administrative law judge (ALJ) awarded workers’ compensation but declined to apply a multiplier to Appellant’s award, finding that there was no evidence that Appellant’s cessation of employment was the result of his injury. The Workers’ Compensation Board ultimately concluded that Appellant was not entitled to enhancement by the two multiplier at the time of the ALJ’s decision and that the evidence did not compel a finding that Appellant’s work-related injury led to his termination. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, as no finding had been made as to whether Appellant’s conduct at work satisfied the new standard set forth in Chrysalis House, Inc. v. Tackett regarding when the two multiplier may be awarded so as to justify the denial of the application of the two multiplier. View "Fuertes v. Ford Motor Co." on Justia Law

Amy and Melissa, a same-sex couple, had a child together through artificial insemination. After the couple separated, Melissa married Wesley. Wesley filed a petition for step-parent adoption of the child in the Kenton County Family Court. Amy, in turn, filed a petition for shared custody and visitation in Hamilton County, Ohio. Amy moved to intervene in the Kenton County case and moved to have the adoption action dismissed in light of her pending custody petition. The trial court granted the motion to intervene and dismissed the adoption action. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that Amy did not have standing to seek adoption. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court’s decision granting Amy’s motion to intervene in the step-parent adoption proceeding was not clearly erroneous. View "A.H. v. W.R.L." on Justia Law

Glenn Hampton suffered a work-related injury during his employment with Flav-O-Rich. An administrative law judge (ALJ) found Hampton to be permanently totally disabled and awarded him permanent total disability benefits. The Workers' Compensation Board vacated the ALJ’s opinion and remanded, finding that the ALJ’s summary of the evidence and findings of fact were not sufficient to permit meaningful appellate review. Hampton filed a petition for review with the court of appeals. The court dismissed the petition as prematurely filed from a non-final Board opinion, concluding that because the Board’s opinion did not divest Hampton of a vested right and did not direct or authorize the ALJ to enter a different award on remand, it was not final and appealable. The Supreme Court reversed, holding under the test from Davis v. Island Creek Coal Co., the Board’s opinion was final and appealable. View "Hampton v. Flav-O-Rich Dairies" on Justia Law

Linda Davis and Matthew Davis executed a property settlement agreement prior to their divorce providing that Matthew maintain his life insurance policy and keep Linda as the beneficiary. The decree of dissolution entered by the circuit court failed to incorporate the agreement. The omission went unnoticed until after Matthew died. Prior to his death, Matthew changed the beneficiary on his life insurance policy to Karen Davis, his then-wife. Linda, upon learning of Matthew’s death, filed a proof of claim against his estate, alleging breach of the agreement. Karen, as executrix of Matthew’s estate, denied the claim. Karen then filed this action seeking the policy proceeds. Linda intervened as a third party plaintiff. The circuit court ruled against Linda. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that Ky. Rev. Stat. 403.180(4) essentially voided the agreement. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that a settlement agreement involving property division that was not incorporated or referenced in the final decree of dissolution may be enforced through an independent contract action. View "Davis v. Davis" on Justia Law