Justia Kentucky Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

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After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of first-degree robbery. Finding Defendant to be a persistent felony offender, the jury recommended a sentence of thirty years’ imprisonment. The trial court sentenced Defendant accordingly. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court was correct in denying Defendant’s request for the Kentucky State Police laboratory to test two bandanas for Defendant’s DNA; (2) the trial court did not abuse its discretion by excluding Defendant’s proffered alternate perpetrator testimony; (3) the trial court did not err by denying Defendant the opportunity to impeach a witness for an alleged inconsistent statement; and (4) the testimony of a parole officer regarding good-time credit did not rise to the level of palpable error. View "Geary v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
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After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of first-degree sexual abuse and first-degree sodomy. The jury recommended a sentence of thirty years’ imprisonment, and the trial court entered judgment accordingly. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court did not err in refusing to disqualify the entire Commonwealth’s attorney’s office after Defendant’s former counsel withdrew from his representation before trial and took a job as an assistant prosecutor in the same attorney’s office; and (2) the trial court did not err in refusing to admonish the jury on a series of questions posed by the Commonwealth in cross examination of a defense witness. View "Calhoun v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
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Kentucky Shakespeare Festival, Inc. (KSF) and Brantley Dunaway entered into an employment agreement. Two years later, KSF terminated Dunaway’s employment. When KSF informed Dunaway that he was not entitled to a bonus for the 2013 fiscal year, Dunaway filed an action for breach of contract. Nearly one year later, KSF filed a motion for partial summary judgment and declaratory relief, arguing that KSF’s determination that Dunaway was not entitled to a bonus was a binding “arbitration award” issued by an independent accounting firm. The circuit court denied relief, concluding that the employment agreement did not contain an agreement to forgo litigation and arbitrate any bonus dispute. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that no arbitration agreement existed between KSF and Dunaway, and because no arbitration proceeding occurred, there was no arbitration award to be confirmed. View "Kentucky Shakespeare Festival, Inc. v. Dunaway" on Justia Law

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Appellant, a juvenile, was charged with misdemeanor sexual misconduct and felony possession of matter portraying a sexual performance by a minor based on his sexual conduct with his also-underage girlfriend. Appellant entered an unconditional admission to amended charges. The district court subsequently entered an adjudication finding that Appellant committed the alleged conduct. The circuit court affirmed. The Court of Appeals denied Appellant’s motion for discretionary review. The Supreme Court initially granted discretionary review to address Appellant’s constitutional claims. However, because Appellant entered what amounts to an unconditional guilty plea, the Supreme Court remanded the matter with directions that the appeal be dismissed, holding that Appellant waived his right to an appeal in this case. View "B.H. v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

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The vehicle in which Plaintiff was riding was hit by a drunk driver. Plaintiff was wearing her seatbelt, and the airbags deployed properly, but Plaintiff sustained serious injuries. Plaintiff filed suit against Nissan Motor Company, Ltd. and Nissan North America, Inc. (collectively, Nissan) alleging that her injuries were caused by Nissan’s defectively designed restraint system and failure to warn her about the system’s limitations. The jury ruled in Plaintiff’s favor and found Nissan responsible for approximately $2.6 million in compensatory damages and $2.5 million in punitive damages. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals on the issue of punitive damages, holding that an instruction permitting assessment of punitive damage against Nissan was inappropriate in this case. View "Nissan Motor Co., Ltd. v. Maddox" on Justia Law

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Biological parents Michael and Janie Young decided to look for a potential adoptional placement for their fifth child. When it was discovered that the Youngs accepted living expenses from two different sets of prospective adoptive parents, the Youngs were charged with theft by deception over $10,000. The Youngs entered into conditional guilty pleas to the charges. They then appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in denying their motion to dismiss the indictment for failure to state a crime and that the amounts paid by the two set of prospective adoptive parents could not be combined to elevate the theft above the $10,000 threshold to make it a Class C felony. The Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that no crime had been committed. The Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded, holding (1) the Youngs were properly charged with theft by deception in the indictment; and (2) thefts from different victims give rise to separate offenses and cannot be combined to elevate the level of the offense, and this error amounted to palpable error in this case. View "Commonwealth v. Young" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
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Scotty Hedgespeth and Linda Cundiff (together, Hedgespeth) filed suit against the Taylor County Fiscal Court alleging ownership of land where a new bridge would be constructed and requesting that the trial court issue a temporary injunction to prevent the construction of the new bridge. The trial court denied the request. Thereafter, Hedgespeth requested that the Court of Appeals grant him interlocutory relief from the order pursuant to Ky. R. Civ. P. 65.07. The Court of Appeals denied the motion. Hedgespeth subsequently requested that the Supreme Court grant him interlocutory relief from the Court of Appeals’ decision pursuant to Rule 65.09. The Supreme Court denied Plaintiff’s motion for interlocutory relief, holding that Plaintiff failed to show “extraordinary cause.” View "Hedgespeth v. Taylor County Fiscal Court" on Justia Law

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Ian was removed from his mother shortly after his birth, and neither parent was closely involved in Ian’s life. Ian currently resides with Larry Massie, his paternal uncle, and Larry's wife, Christina Massie. Deborah Navy, Ian’s maternal grandmother, instituted a grandparent visitation action. The circuit court denied Deborah’s request for visitation rights. The Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that the circuit court did not consider all of the necessary factors required under Kentucky law. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Deborah failed to preserve her argument that the trial court erred in applying the heightened clear and convincing evidence standard under Walker v. Blair; and (2) the trial court’s factual findings were not clearly erroneous, nor was its application of those facts to the relevant law. View "Massie v. Navy" on Justia Law

Posted in: Family Law
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Janet Owen, a former University of Kentucky (UK) employee, filed a claim for discriminatory employment practices based on a physical disability with the Kentucky Commission on Human Rights (KCHR). The KCHR dually filed Owen’s claim with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). The KCHR later dismissed Owen’s claim. The EEOC likewise issued a dismissal and notice of rights, adopting the KCHR’s findings and informing Owen that she had the right to sue under federal law. Rather than seeking judicial review of the KCHR final order or pursuing the EEOC’s federal claim, Owen filed an original action in circuit court under the Kentucky Civil Rights Act (KCRA). The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of UK, concluding that because Owen elected to pursue her claim through the administrative process, the trial court had no jurisdiction over the claim. The Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding that Ky. Rev. Stat. 344.270 acts as an election of remedies. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that due to a 1996 amendment to the KCRA, there is nothing remaining in the statute to bar claims filed in circuit court despite final and appealable order dismissing the exact same claim filed in the administrative agency. View "Owen v. University of Kentucky" on Justia Law

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Appellant was charged with two counts of first degree sexual abuse. Appellant filed a motion to suppress statements he made to police during a custodial interrogation in the absence of his appointed counsel. The trial court initially granted Appellant’s motion to suppress. The trial court reversed itself, however, and denied the motion after the United States Supreme Court rendered its opinion in Montejo v. Louisiana, which overturned long-standing Sixth Amendment precedent. Appellant entered a conditional Alford plea to two counts of first-degree sexual abuse. Appellant appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed after declining to apply the Montejo rationale in the context of state right-to-counsel law, holding that the rationale of Linehan v. Commonwealth is the correct manifestation of the right to counsel under Section 11 of the Kentucky Constitution. View "Keysor v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law