Justia Kentucky Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

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In 1980, Appellant was convicted by a jury of three counts of capital murder and sentenced to death on each of the murders. The Supreme Court affirmed. In 2004, Appellant filed a post-conviction motion to set aside his death sentences on the grounds that he is intellectually disabled. The circuit court judge ordered the Finance and Administration Cabinet to pay up to $5,000 for a mental health evaluation by a private psychologist. The Supreme Court remanded the case for a showing that use of a state facility was impractical. On remand, the circuit court determined that the Kentucky Correctional Psychiatric Center (KCPC) was capable of conducting the necessary evaluations and ordered that any failure to cooperate would constitute a waiver of Appellant’s intellectual disability claim. After Appellant indicated that he would refuse evaluation by KCPC, the trial court determined that he had waived his intellectual disability claim and ordered that his case be dismissed. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the judgment of the circuit court finding that Appellant was not entitled to public funds for an expert of his choosing; and (2) reversed the judgment on the issue of waiver, holding that Appellant’s continued failure to submit to KCPC’s custody did not constitute waiver. Remanded. View "White v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
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In 2001, John Bays and Carole Kiphart, who were married, executed reciprocal wills. Carole also obtained two life-insurance policies with the benefits payable to John and their minor son. In 2007, after Carole was diagnosed with cancer, she executed a new will that largely disinherited John. Carole then created two trusts, removed John as a beneficiary on the life-insurance policies, and named the trusts as the beneficiaries. After Carole died, John renounced the will, elected to take his spousal share, and sought to recover the portion of his spousal share that may have been delivered to various legatees under the will and to the beneficiaries of the life insurance policies. John’s theory was that there was fraud on his statutory spousal interest because the beneficiaries of the insurance policies had been changed and the trusts established without his knowledge or consent. The circuit court found in John’s favor with respect to the claimed fraud on his statutory spousal interest. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that where a dying spouse exercises her right to change the beneficiary on her life-insurance policy and instead names a trust for the benefit of the minor child of the marriage, the surviving spouse cannot claim fraud on his statutory spousal interest. View "Bays v. Kiphart" on Justia Law

Posted in: Trusts & Estates
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After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of murder, first-degree burglary, and tampering with physical evidence. Defendant was sentenced to life in prison with possibility of parole after twenty-five years. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) sufficient evidence supported the burglary and tampering with physical evidence convictions; (2) the trial court did not err in admitting incriminating hearsay testimony; (3) Defendant’s right to present a defense was not denied when the Commonwealth did not conduct requested DNA testing; and (4) the trial court’s admission of hearsay evidence was not palpable error. View "Williams v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
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Appellant filed a wrongful discrimination claim and a wrongful retaliation claim against his employer (Appellee), alleging that Appellee discriminated against him in an employee disciplinary matter because of his national origin and then retaliated against him when he filed a complaint with the Kentucky Commission on Human Rights. The trial court granted Appellee’s motion for summary judgment on the discrimination and retaliation claims. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court properly granted summary judgment upon Appellee’s motion with regard to Appellant’s discrimination and retaliation claims. View "Charalambakis v. Asbury Univ." on Justia Law

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Plaintiff, a California resident and leading owner of thoroughbred race horses, claimed a bay filly in a claiming race at Churchill Downs in Louisville, Kentucky. Plaintiff filed a complaint seeking a declaration that certain Kentucky thoroughbred racing regulations that restrict the transfer and racing of claimed thoroughbreds (Article 6 restrictions) violate the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution. The trial court entered summary judgment in favor of the Kentucky Horse Racing Commission. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Plaintiff had a sufficient case or controversy to sustain this action; but (2) Article 6 restrictions survive the strict scrutiny applicable to laws that appear facially discriminatory. View "Jamogotchian v. Ky. Horse Racing Comm’n" on Justia Law

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The executor of the estate of James Gray and Gray’s statutory survivors (collectively, the Estate) filed a complaint against Saint Joseph Hospital alleging that the Hospital had engaged in medical negligence in its treatment of Gray following two visits to the Hospital’s emergency room. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the Estate. The circuit court awarded $1.45 million in punitive damages, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the evidence was sufficient to support an award of punitive damages; (2) the evidence established that the Hospital ratified its staff’s misconduct so as to authorize an award of punitive damages against it; (3) the jury was properly instructed regarding the Hospital’s liability based upon tortious conduct of the independent contractor physicians engaged to provide emergency room services; (4) the punitive damage award did not violate the Due Process provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment; and (5) the trial court did not abuse its discretion by not dismissing an alleged sleeping juror. View "Saint Joseph Healthcare, Inc. v. Thomas" on Justia Law

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Appellant, a juvenile, entered an unconditional admission to amended charges of public offenses based on his sexual conduct with his also-underage girlfriend. The district court entered an adjudication finding that Appellant committed the alleged conduct. The circuit court affirmed on appeal. The court of appeals denied Appellant’s motion for discretionary review. The Supreme Court granted the motion for discretionary review and vacated the decision of the circuit court, holding that because Appellant entered into his admission unconditionally, he waived his right to appeal, and therefore, the lower court should not have considered his claims. View "B.H. v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Posted in: Juvenile Law
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After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of murder, first-degree burglary, and defacing a firearm. Defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and sentence on appeal. Defendant subsequently filed a Ky. R. Crim. P. (RCr) 11.42 motion and a Ky. R. Civ. P. (CR) 60.02 motion as an alternative to his RCr 11.42 motion. Both motions were joined into a single action. The circuit court denied Defendant’s post-conviction motions. The court of appeals reversed and remanded for a new trial, concluding that Defendant was denied effective assistance of counsel. The Supreme Court reversed in part and affirmed in part, holding (1) there was no error based on trial counsel’s failure to request a renewed competency motion during trial or in trial counsel’s waiving Defendant’s presence during trial; (2) the trial court correctly denied Defendant’s claims that were conclusively disproved through an examination of the record; (3) there was no error in pre-trial counsel’s strategy to permit Defendant to be interviewed by law enforcement; and (4) the circuit court should have conducted an evidentiary hearing concerning Defendant’s claim of error based on pre-trial counsel’s failure to convey a twenty-year plea offer to him. Remanded. View "Commonwealth v. McGorman" on Justia Law

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Pratikshya Gurung (“the Estate”) was born with brain damage and quadriplegia. The Estate filed in the circuit court a medical negligence action against Norton Hospital. During the course of discovery, the Estate requested production from Norton of various hospital documents relating to patient safety. Norton argued that the documents were not discoverable. The trial court compelled the production of the disputed documents and denied Norton’s privileged claim. Norton filed a petition in the court of appeals for a writ of prohibition and a request for an order staying execution of the trial court’s discovery order. The Estate, in turn, received an emergency hearing with the trial court. Before the hearing on Norton’s emergency motion in the court of appeals and after the Estate’s emergency hearing with the trial court, the trial court handed the copies of the disputed documents directly to counsel for the Estate. The court of appeals subsequently dismissed Norton’s writ petition as moot. The Supreme Court reversed the dismissal, holding that the court of appeals abused its discretion because its decision was not based on sound legal principles. Remanded for consideration of Norton’s asserted privilege. View "Norton Hospitals, Inc. v. Hon. Barry Willett" on Justia Law

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Appellant was charged with seven counts of first-degree sodomy. All seven counts of the indictment read identically. Appellant was acquitted on two counts and convicted of the other five. Later, the court of appeals vacated Appellant’s convictions and remanded for a new trial, concluding that Appellant’s counsel had been ineffective. On remand, Appellant moved to dismiss the indictment, claiming his re-prosecution was barred by double jeopardy. The trial court denied the motion. Appellant then filed a petition for a writ of prohibition in the court of appeals claiming again that the prohibition on double jeopardy would be violated by retrial. The court of appeals denied the writ. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that a new trial in this case raised a substantial risk that Appellant will be tried for crimes for which he has already been acquitted in violation of his double-jeopardy right against successive prosecution. Remanded. View "Dunn v. Hon. Beth Maze" on Justia Law