Justia Kentucky Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In 2011, Appellant Tracey Cassetty was charged with felony theft by unlawful taking. He entered into a diversion agreement with several conditions, including his entering a guilty plea with a recommended sentence of five years, paying restitution that day, and remaining drug free and subject to random testing. The court also entered an order of referral to drug court. Although the court's orders did not state that completion of drug court was a condition of his diversion, the judge's statements during the entry of the plea made this condition clear. Cassetty's drug-court program was presided over by Judge Tyler Gill. As part of that program, Cassetty entered a rehabilitation facility. Unfortunately, he had difficulty with the facility and was released from it. He also failed at least one drug screen. As a result, he was discharged from drug court, setting in motion the process to revoke his diversion. Cassetty moved to recuse Judge Gill from the revocation proceeding, citing his presiding over the drug-court proceedings. Although the judge's previous practice had been to recuse in such cases, he denied the motion. He noted that the Judicial Ethics Committee had issued an opinion, JE-122, stating that it was not a breach of the judicial canons for a judge to preside over a defendant's drug-court program and a revocation hearing based on a violation of the terms of that program, unless the judge learned information outside the court process. In light of this opinion, the judge concluded that recusal would violate Canon 3B(1) (a "judge shall hear and decide matters assigned to the judge except those in which disqualification is required"). The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on whether the notice of appeal, naming only an order denying a recusal motion and not the final judgment, substantially complied with the requirements of the Civil Rules so as to invoke the Court of Appeals' jurisdiction and avoid dismissal of the appeal. The Supreme Court concluded that it did not. "Simply put, a notice of appeal naming only an order denying a motion to recuse, and not a final judgment, is fatally defective. Neither the rule of substantial compliance nor its subsidiary rule of relation forward can salvage such a notice of appeal. As such, such a notice of appeal fails to invoke the jurisdiction of the appellate court, and the attempted appeal should be dismissed." Therefore, the order of the Court of Appeals dismissing Cassetty's appeal was affirmed. View "Cassetty v. Kentucky" on Justia Law

The Commonwealth appealed a Court of Appeals judgment remanding this case back to the trial court for an evidentiary hearing on Appellee Douglas Rank's RCr 11.42 motion. Rank pled guilty to and was subsequently convicted of first degree assault for which he was serving a fifteen-year prison sentence when he moved pursuant to RCr 11.42 to vacate his conviction. Rank's motion included a request for an evidentiary hearing to establish that his guilty plea was not made knowingly, intelligently and voluntary and was, instead, the result of ineffective assistance of his trial counsel, Robert Gettys, and to lesser degree, attorney Pat Hickey. The circuit court denied Rank's motion without an evidentiary hearing. The Court of Appeals concluded that he had raised issues of fact that required an evidentiary hearing and remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing. After review, the Supreme Court found no reversible error in the Court of Appeals' judgment and affirmed. View "Kentucky v. Rank" on Justia Law

Stanley M. Chesley requested relief from the Court of Appeals under CR 65.07, which authorizes a party to request injunctive relief from the circuit court in the form of a restraining order, temporary injunction, or permanent injunction in a final judgment. In this case, the entry of a final judgment on the breach of fiduciary duty, which required Chesley to comply with an unpaid judgment, did not occur during the pendency of the case and therefore cannot be viewed as being a temporary injunction. Instead of being an injunction, the order was a post-judgment order in furtherance of respondents' efforts to collect on the outstanding judgment against Chesley. Because the order was not an injunction, it is not subject to review under CR 65.07. Accordingly, Chesley is not entitled to relief under CR 65.09. The court therefore denied Chelsey's motion for interlocutory relief. View "Chesley v. Abbott" on Justia Law

The Estate of Pratikshya Gurung filed a negligence action against Norton Hospital after Gurung was born with brain damage and quadriplegia. On appeal, Norton challenged the Court of Appeals' dismissal as moot of a writ action filed by Norton over a discovery dispute with the Estate. The court concluded that the Court of Appeals abused its discretion because its decision was not based on sound legal principles where Norton's writ action is not moot because relief can still be afforded. The court stated that it is true that the documents Norton alleges are privileged have now been provided to the Estate, but options remain. Accordingly, the court remanded for consideration of Norton's asserted privilege in light of the court's decision in Tibbs v. Bunnell. View "Norton Hosp. v. Hon. Barry L. Willett" on Justia Law

Jason Tudor claimed that he suffered work-related cumulative-trauma back injuries while employed by Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. Toyota’s third party administrator (the TPA) denied Tudor’s claim for workers’ compensation benefits based on the belief that Tudor’s condition was not work-related. Tudor then filed an application for adjustment of injury claim, alleging three cumulative-trauma injuries. An administrative law judge (ALJ) found that Tudor suffered a series of work-related injuries and awarded Tudor income benefits. The ALJ further found that Toyota had failed to meet its burden of proving that Tudor had not timely filed his claim. The Workers’ Compensation Board affirmed the ALJ. The court of appeals affirmed the ALJ’s award of benefits. The Supreme Court vacated the ALJ’s opinion and award and remanded, holding (1) the ALJ’s application of Toyota Motor Mfg., Kentucky, Inc. v. Czarnecki was based on a misunderstanding of the record; and (2) the ALJ’s finding that Tudor was entitled to temporary total disability benefits was made prior to the Supreme Court’s opinion in Trane Commercial Systems v. Tipton, and therefore, the case must be remanded for consideration of the factors set forth in Tipton. View "Toyota Motor Mfg., Kentucky, Inc. v. Tudor" on Justia Law

Appellant, a police officer, sustained a work-related injury and sought disability benefits. The Board of Trustees of the Lexington-Fayette Urban County Government Policemen’s and Firefighter’s Retirement Fund (Board) denied Appellant’s application. After exhausting his administrative remedies, Appellant filed a petition for judicial review of the Board’s decision but failed to sign or verify the petition. The Board moved to dismiss Appellant’s appeal, arguing that his petition failed to comply with the requirement of Ky. Rev. Stat. 67A.670(2) that a petition for review be “verified by the petitioner.” The circuit court denied the Board’s motion, finding that Appellant had cured the deficiency of his original pleading and therefore “substantially complied” with the statutory verification requirement. The Board filed a petition for a writ of prohibition to bar the circuit court from reviewing the Board’s decision, concluding that the deficiency in Appellant’s initial pleading deprived the circuit court of subject matter jurisdiction. The Supreme Court reversed and vacated the writ, holding that a first class, second class, or special writ was not available because the circuit court was not proceeding outside its jurisdiction, there was no showing that “great injustice and irreparable injury” would ensue, and the orderly administration of justice was not imperiled by the circuit court’s ruling. View "Spears v. Hon. Pamela Goodwine" on Justia Law

Appellant pled guilty to DUI, fourth offense, and driving on a DUI-suspended license, second offense. The trial court sentenced Defendant to an aggregate sentence of three years. The court probated Appellant’s three-year sentence for five years and imposed the mandatory-minimum sentence of 240 days. At the time he was sentenced, Appellant had committed to complete a minimum of eight months of in-patient alcohol treatment. Appellant urged the judge to allow him to serve the 240 days through home incarceration. The trial court preliminary ruled that Appellant did not qualify for home incarceration but stayed imposition of the 240-day sentence pending appeal. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s ruling that Appellant was ineligible for home incarceration. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Appellant was eligible for home incarceration at the discretion of the trial court. View "Rice v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of multiple counts of first-degree rape, first-degree sexual abuse, and being a first-degree persistent felony offender. Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court violated his right to confront witnesses against him by permitting the Commonwealth to introduce incriminating forensic test results at trial through the testimony of an expert witness under a hearsay exception. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment, holding that the trial court violated the Confrontation Clause by not allowing Defendant to confront the lab analyst who conducted the test. Remanded. View "Manery v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of two counts each of first-degree sodomy and first-degree sexual abuse. Defendant was sentenced to seventy years’ imprisonment. Defendant appealed, arguing (1) the trial court erred in allowing the Commonwealth to amend the indictment or, alternatively, in denying his motion for a continuance, and (2) the trial court submitted proper instructions to the jury. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the Commonwealth to amend the indictment; (2) the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to grant Defendant’s request for a continuance under the circumstances of this case; and (3) the trial court did not improperly instruct the jury to the level of reversible error. View "Herp v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of one count of criminal facilitation of first degree assault. The court of appeals reversed the conviction, in part because it found that the jury instructions were prejudicially flawed. Both parties filed motions for discretionary review. The Supreme Court reversed in part and affirmed in part, holding that the trial court (1) did not err in its instructions to the jury; (2) did not err when it overruled Defendant’s motions for a directed verdict; and (3) properly denied Defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence obtained from her cell phone. Remanded. View "Commonwealth v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law