Justia Kentucky Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Scotty Hedgespeth and Linda Cundiff (together, Hedgespeth) filed suit against the Taylor County Fiscal Court alleging ownership of land where a new bridge would be constructed and requesting that the trial court issue a temporary injunction to prevent the construction of the new bridge. The trial court denied the request. Thereafter, Hedgespeth requested that the Court of Appeals grant him interlocutory relief from the order pursuant to Ky. R. Civ. P. 65.07. The Court of Appeals denied the motion. Hedgespeth subsequently requested that the Supreme Court grant him interlocutory relief from the Court of Appeals’ decision pursuant to Rule 65.09. The Supreme Court denied Plaintiff’s motion for interlocutory relief, holding that Plaintiff failed to show “extraordinary cause.” View "Hedgespeth v. Taylor County Fiscal Court" on Justia Law

Ian was removed from his mother shortly after his birth, and neither parent was closely involved in Ian’s life. Ian currently resides with Larry Massie, his paternal uncle, and Larry's wife, Christina Massie. Deborah Navy, Ian’s maternal grandmother, instituted a grandparent visitation action. The circuit court denied Deborah’s request for visitation rights. The Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that the circuit court did not consider all of the necessary factors required under Kentucky law. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Deborah failed to preserve her argument that the trial court erred in applying the heightened clear and convincing evidence standard under Walker v. Blair; and (2) the trial court’s factual findings were not clearly erroneous, nor was its application of those facts to the relevant law. View "Massie v. Navy" on Justia Law

Janet Owen, a former University of Kentucky (UK) employee, filed a claim for discriminatory employment practices based on a physical disability with the Kentucky Commission on Human Rights (KCHR). The KCHR dually filed Owen’s claim with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). The KCHR later dismissed Owen’s claim. The EEOC likewise issued a dismissal and notice of rights, adopting the KCHR’s findings and informing Owen that she had the right to sue under federal law. Rather than seeking judicial review of the KCHR final order or pursuing the EEOC’s federal claim, Owen filed an original action in circuit court under the Kentucky Civil Rights Act (KCRA). The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of UK, concluding that because Owen elected to pursue her claim through the administrative process, the trial court had no jurisdiction over the claim. The Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding that Ky. Rev. Stat. 344.270 acts as an election of remedies. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that due to a 1996 amendment to the KCRA, there is nothing remaining in the statute to bar claims filed in circuit court despite final and appealable order dismissing the exact same claim filed in the administrative agency. View "Owen v. University of Kentucky" on Justia Law

Appellant was charged with two counts of first degree sexual abuse. Appellant filed a motion to suppress statements he made to police during a custodial interrogation in the absence of his appointed counsel. The trial court initially granted Appellant’s motion to suppress. The trial court reversed itself, however, and denied the motion after the United States Supreme Court rendered its opinion in Montejo v. Louisiana, which overturned long-standing Sixth Amendment precedent. Appellant entered a conditional Alford plea to two counts of first-degree sexual abuse. Appellant appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed after declining to apply the Montejo rationale in the context of state right-to-counsel law, holding that the rationale of Linehan v. Commonwealth is the correct manifestation of the right to counsel under Section 11 of the Kentucky Constitution. View "Keysor v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Mother and Father were not married when Mother gave birth to their daughter in 2010. In 2012, Mother filed a motion for child support. After an evidentiary hearing in 2013, the trial court established joint custody and directed Father to pay $4,250 a month in child support. The order made the monthly amount retroactive to 2012 and calculated back child support to be $24,100. The Court of Appeals vacated and remanded the trial court’s award of child support, concluding that the trial court abused its discretion by not basing its award on the child’s reasonable needs as set out in the court’s “specific supporting findings” and that some of Mother’s requests for support were speculative. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and reinstated the circuit court’s orders, holding (1) the Court of Appeals imposed an overly burdensome standard; (2) child support in the amount of $4,250 is reasonable and in the child’s best interest; and (3) the trial court did not err in making the order retroactive. View "McCarty v. Faried" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of “Engaging in Organized Crime: Criminal Syndicate by managing, supervising, and/or directing individuals to acquire retail merchandise including cell phones, by deception and/or fraud, with the intent to resell it.” The conviction arose from Defendant’s wholesale enlistment of homeless men as tools in a scheme to defraud cell-phone companies. Defendant appealed, arguing that he was entitled to a directed verdict. The court of appeals reversed Defendant’s conviction, concluding that there was insufficient evidence that Defendant and his co-conspirators collaborated under the “continuing basis” necessary to sustain an organized-crime conviction. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Commonwealth presented sufficient evidence for a jury to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant engaged in a continuing criminal operation, and therefore, Defendant was not entitled to a directed verdict. View "Commonwealth v. Jones" on Justia Law

After a retrial, Defendant was convicted of wanton murder and fourth-degree assault following a car accident in which he was highly intoxicated. Defendant was sentenced to twenty-five years in prison. Defendant challenged his convictions under Ky. R. Crim. P. 11.42, arguing that his trial counsel had provided ineffective assistance. The trial court denied the motion. The Court of Appeals vacated Defendant’s convictions and remanded for another trial, concluding that Defendant’s counsel had been ineffective in failing to conduct his own investigation into the accident scene and in failing to object to the introduction of an emergency medical report. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) in finding reversible ineffective assistance of defense counsel, the Court of Appeals applied the Strickland v. Washington standard incorrectly; and (2) Defendant failed to show a reasonable probability of a different result absent his counsel’s purported errors. View "Commonwealth v. McKee" on Justia Law

Craig Smith, who suffered injuries in a motor vehicle accident, submitted an underinsured motorist coverage (UIM) claim to his insurer, Allstate Insurance Company. Allstate denied the claim because Smith’s policy did not provide for UIM coverage. Smith sued Allstate for breach of contract and a declaration of rights as to UIM coverage. The trial court granted summary judgment for Allstate because Smith had not paid a premium for UIM or requested UIM coverage. The court of appeals reversed, finding that Allstate had a duty under the Kentucky Motor Vehicle Reparations Act (MVRA) to advise Smith of possible UIM coverage. The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals and reinstated the trial court’s judgment, holding that Allstate had no affirmative duty under the MVRA to notify or counsel Smith on the availability of UIM coverage. View "Allstate Ins. Co. v. Smith" on Justia Law

One year after their son was born with Down Syndrome and other serious health issues Lance Carver filed for divorce from Michelle Carver. The parties settled the division of their property and custody, support and visitation, but neither the decree nor the property settlement agreement stated a specific amount of child support. Michelle later asked the court to set a specific amount according to the statutory guidelines. The Boyd County Domestic Relations Commissioner (DRC) deviated from the guidelines and set Lance’s child support obligation at $60 per month based on his living expenses. The circuit court and court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the court of appeals’ conclusion that a deviation from the guidelines was appropriate under the facts of this case; but (2) reversed of portion of the opinion holding that the DRC did not abuse her discretion in setting Lance’s child support at $60 per month based on Lance’s living expenses, as the trial court should first ascertain what is a reasonable amount of support for the child and then determine how much of that support should be the responsibility of each parent. Remanded. View "Carver v. Carver" on Justia Law

Appellant was convicted of first-degree burglary, receiving stolen property in excess of $500, and of being a second-degree persistent felony offender. Appellant was sentenced to twenty years in prison. The Supreme Court reversed the conviction for first-degree burglary and otherwise affirmed, holding (1) there was insufficient evidence to sustain the burglary conviction, and therefore, Appellant was entitled to a directed verdict on that charge; and (2) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in prohibiting defense counsel from arguing that Appellant’s possession of an opened bar of soap showed he did not intend to commit a crime in the building. View "McGruder v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law