Justia Kentucky Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

On February 10, 2014, Landlord Bobby Turner provided his tenant, Lesley Shinkle, with written notice to vacate the premises. Eight days later, Turner filed a forcible detainer complaint against Shinkle. When the matter came before the district court on February 27, 2014, for the "inquisition" required by KRS 383.220, Shinkle moved to dismiss the complaint because Turner had failed to provide the one month's notice required by KRS 383.195 for terminating the tenancy. In recognition of the statutory deficiency, the district court deferred its consideration of Shinkle's motion and continued the inquisition until March 13, thus allowing one month to elapse from the date Shinkle first received the written notice to vacate. In the interim, Shinkle filed a formal written motion to dismiss arguing that Turner had no statutory right to commence a forcible detainer action prior to the expiration of the one-month statutory notice provision. At the March 13 inquisition, the district court denied Shinkle's motion to dismiss, reasoning that the one month statutory notice period had by then been satisfied. The court entered its verdict and judgment finding Shinkle guilty of forcible detainer. Shinkle appealed and the Circuit Court affirmed. The Court of Appeals denied Shinkle's motion for discretionary review. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, finding that by filing his forcible detainer complaint only eight days after giving Shinkle notice to vacate, Turner was claiming a right to immediate possession that he did not lawfully have. The statutory elements of a forcible detainer were not yet met since Turner had, at that time, no presently enforceable right of possession. "As required by KRS 383.195, a landlord must give the tenant at least one month's written notice to vacate, and until that period expires, no forcible detainer is being committed." The complaint filed prior to the existence of the cause of action should have been dismissed pursuant to the motion properly raising the issue. View "Shinkle v. Turner" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was the apportionment of damages between two insurance companies who provided underinsured motorist (UM) coverave to a passenger injured in an automobile accident in Bowling Green. The Circuit Court ordered the companies to share the damages pro rata in proportion to their respective policy limits. Countryway Insurance appealed that decision to the Court of Appeals, contending that the damages should not have been divided at all, but should have been apportioned entirely to United Financial, the insurer of the accident vehicle. To Countryway's dismay, the Court of Appeals panel decided that that argument was "half right:" the Court agreed that the damages should not have been divided, but in its view Countryway, the insurer of the injured passenger, bore full responsibility for the passenger's UM claim. The Supreme Court concluded the Court of Appeals erred in its analysis of the controlling case-law applicable to this matter, reversed and remanded to the Circuit Court for entry of an appropriate order in favor of Countryway. View "Countryway Ins. Co. v. United Financial Casualty Ins. Co." on Justia Law

The Magoffin County Board of Elections (the Board) and its members in their official capacities (Carson Montgomery, Susie Salyer, and Justin Williams, and Magoffin County Clerk Renee Arnett-Shepherd), and Democratic candidate for judge executive Charles Hardin, appealed a Court of Appeals decision to affirmed the setting aside the results of the November 4, 2014 election for Magoffin County judge executive and declaring the office vacant. The officially-tabulated vote count revealed that Republican candidate, Appellee John Montgomery, lost the election to Hardin by a mere twenty-eight votes. Montgomery filed this action to challenge the election results. Appellants contended: (1) that the trial court and the Court of Appeals nullified the election on grounds that were not set forth in Montgomery's petition to challenge the election, and thus deprived them of fair notice of such grounds; (2) that contrary to the trial court's conclusions, the election was conducted in substantial compliance with the applicable election laws; (3) that any violations of applicable election laws that occurred in the election were de minimus and had no impact on the result of the election; and (3) that Montgomery's evidence was insufficient to prove the illegalities he alleged and insufficient to prove that the result of the election was affected by any irregularities and improprieties which may have occurred. After review, the Kentucky Supreme Court concluded that Appellant Hardin was entitled to occupy the office of Magoffin County judge executive in accordance with the tabulated results of the November 4, 2014 election. View "Hardin v. Montgomery" on Justia Law

Appellant Donald Howard entered an open guilty plea to five counts of first-degree trafficking in a controlled substance, second offense. He was sentenced to ten years' imprisonment with a $1,000 fine on each count with two counts running consecutively for a maximum twenty-year total sentence. He appealed, arguing that the trial court's imposition of the statutory maximum sentence was unconstitutional and that the court erred by imposing a partial fee to the public defender and court costs. After review, the Supreme Court held that the trial court did not err in sentencing Howard, assessing court costs, or imposing a partial fee for the public defender. The Court agreed, however, that the trial court erred by imposing the criminal fines, so the criminal fines imposed in the judgment were vacated and the matter remanded back to the trial court for entry of a conforming judgment. View "Howard v. Kentucky" on Justia Law

Appellant David Jenkins appealed his convictions for first-degree rape and first-degree sodomy. A jury found appellant guilty and recommended twenty-year sentences for both crimes, to be served consecutively (for a total maximum term of forty years). On appeal, appellant argued: (1) the evidence presented against him at trial was insufficient to support the jury's verdicts and that, accordingly, he was entitled to a dismissal of the charges; and (2) even if the evidence was not so lacking as to require a directed verdict, a number of trial court errors rendered the proceedings unfair and entitle him to a new trial. Agreeing with Jenkins that the jury's instruction on a single count of sodomy when the evidence reflected two such acts, did not comport with recent cases construing the Kentucky Constitution's unanimous verdict requirement, the Supreme Court reversed the sodomy conviction and the sodomy portion of Jenkins's sentence, and remand for additional proceedings. Finding no other reversible error, the Court affirmed appellant's rape conviction and corresponding twenty-year sentence for that crime. View "Jenkins v. Kentucky" on Justia Law

Appellant Kyle Sheets was convicted of first-degree sexual abuse and two counts of first-degree sodomy. In a separate trial with a separate jury, he was convicted of possession of a handgun by a convicted felon. He was sentenced to ten years' imprisonment for the sexual-abuse conviction, forty years' for each sodomy conviction, and six years' for the handgun conviction, all to run consecutively, subject to the statutory maximum aggregate sentence of seventy years. Sheets appealed, arguing: (1) the trial court erred when it failed to grant his motions for directed verdicts of acquittal; (2) the trial court violated his right to be free from double jeopardy; (3) the trial court violated his right to a unanimous verdict; (4) the Commonwealth erred when it introduced irrelevant evidence of legal sexual acts between Sheets and his wife; (5) the Commonwealth erred when it alleged Sheets' defense attorney acted immorally or illegally by investigating the allegations; (6) one of the Commonwealth's witnesses gave improper testimony on cross examination; (7) the trial court erred by failing to conduct an in camera review of Sheets's alleged victim's psychological counseling records; and (8) the trial court erred when it included an instruction on a definition of "constructive possession" on his possession-of-a-handgun-by-a-convicted-felon charge. The Kentucky Supreme Court concluded it did not have jurisdiction to review the possession-of-a-handgun-by-a-convicted-felon conviction and sentence on direct appeal because the sentence for that conviction was less than twenty years' imprisonment. Thus, the Court did not address Sheets' final claim of error. The Court reversed appellant's conviction with regard to the sodomy conviction, and remanded that for further proceedings. The Court affirmed in all other respects. View "Sheets . Kentucky" on Justia Law

In May and July of 2012, Jonathan McDaniel, David DeShields, and John Martin, all inmates at the State Reformatory in LaGrange, and all serving sentences for felony sex offenses, filed very similar pro se motions at their respective trial courts challenging the legality of the conditional discharge requirement of KRS 532.043, and sought to have the discharge period deleted from their sentences. All three trial courts denied the motion, and all three defendants appealed. The Supreme Court granted defendants' joint motion for discretionary review to address their concern that the Court of Appeals inappropriately characterized their trial court motions as having been brought pursuant to Kentucky Rule of Criminal Procedure (RCr) 11.42, and to address the Court's own concern that the Court of Appeals, "perhaps in its eagerness to try to calm the waters after the 2011 amendment to KRS 532.043," inappropriately ruled on a question not properly before it. After that review, the Court affirmed the Court of Appeals' ultimate affirmance of the trial court rulings denying relief, but "vacated" the Court of Appeals' opinion except as to the issue of whether Martin's and McDaniel's guilty pleas were subject to appellate review. View "McDaniel v. Kentucky" on Justia Law

After entering a guilty plea, the Appellant Bryan Russell sent a letter to the trial court complaining about the effectiveness of his counsel and the legality of the sentence to which he had agreed. The letter did not specifically ask for any relief, such as the setting aside of Russell's plea. The primary issue in this case was whether Russell's letter was sufficient to constitute a pro se motion to withdraw his guilty plea under Criminal Rule 8.10. Resolution of that issue turned primarily on whether the letter "set[s] forth the relief or order sought" as required under the Rule. After review of the letter, the Supreme Court concluded that because Russell's letter did not expressly ask for any relief, much less ask to withdraw his guilty plea, it could not be construed as a motion under Criminal Rule 8.14. Therefore, the Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's judgment. View "Russell v. Kentucky" on Justia Law

Charles Wimberly filed an application for disability retirement benefits with the Kentucky Retirement Systems (KERS). A hearing officer recommended that Wimberly's application be denied and, before KERS could render a final decision, Wimberly filed a second application pursuant to Kentucky Revised Statute (KRS) 61.600(2). Following the recommendation of another hearing officer, KERS denied that application. Wimberly sought judicial review; the circuit court reversed KERS. KERS appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the circuit court. The Supreme Court granted discretionary review to address the parties' arguments regarding the application of the doctrine of res judicata and to determine whether the consumption of alcohol was or could be a pre-existing condition. Having reviewed the record and the arguments of the parties, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Kentucky Retirement Systems v. Wimberly" on Justia Law

Dianne Carson first filed an application for retirement disability benefits in November 2007. Based on the recommendation of a hearing officer, the Kentucky Retirement Systems (KERS) denied Carson's claim. Carson did not seek judicial review of KERS's order, choosing instead to file a second application in October 2009. Based on a recommendation of a different hearing officer, KERS again denied Carson's claim. Carson sought judicial review and the circuit reversed and remanded with instructions for KERS to consider all of the medical evidence Carson submitted. The Court of Appeals affirmed. KERS argued that Carson's second application should have been dismissed under the doctrine of res judicata. "If res judicata applied to this action, Carson would have been barred from filing a second application that was based on the same claim as her first application. However, KRS 61.600(2) requires KERS to accept an employee's timely filed "reapplication based on the same claim of incapacity" and to reconsider the claim 'for disability if accompanied by new objective medical evidence.'" This case was remanded for KERS to undertake the correct review of the evidence. The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals. View "Kentycky Retirement Systems v. Carson" on Justia Law