Justia Kentucky Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Appellant pled guilty to DUI, fourth offense, and driving on a DUI-suspended license, second offense. The trial court sentenced Defendant to an aggregate sentence of three years. The court probated Appellant’s three-year sentence for five years and imposed the mandatory-minimum sentence of 240 days. At the time he was sentenced, Appellant had committed to complete a minimum of eight months of in-patient alcohol treatment. Appellant urged the judge to allow him to serve the 240 days through home incarceration. The trial court preliminary ruled that Appellant did not qualify for home incarceration but stayed imposition of the 240-day sentence pending appeal. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s ruling that Appellant was ineligible for home incarceration. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Appellant was eligible for home incarceration at the discretion of the trial court. View "Rice v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of multiple counts of first-degree rape, first-degree sexual abuse, and being a first-degree persistent felony offender. Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court violated his right to confront witnesses against him by permitting the Commonwealth to introduce incriminating forensic test results at trial through the testimony of an expert witness under a hearsay exception. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment, holding that the trial court violated the Confrontation Clause by not allowing Defendant to confront the lab analyst who conducted the test. Remanded. View "Manery v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of two counts each of first-degree sodomy and first-degree sexual abuse. Defendant was sentenced to seventy years’ imprisonment. Defendant appealed, arguing (1) the trial court erred in allowing the Commonwealth to amend the indictment or, alternatively, in denying his motion for a continuance, and (2) the trial court submitted proper instructions to the jury. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the Commonwealth to amend the indictment; (2) the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to grant Defendant’s request for a continuance under the circumstances of this case; and (3) the trial court did not improperly instruct the jury to the level of reversible error. View "Herp v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of one count of criminal facilitation of first degree assault. The court of appeals reversed the conviction, in part because it found that the jury instructions were prejudicially flawed. Both parties filed motions for discretionary review. The Supreme Court reversed in part and affirmed in part, holding that the trial court (1) did not err in its instructions to the jury; (2) did not err when it overruled Defendant’s motions for a directed verdict; and (3) properly denied Defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence obtained from her cell phone. Remanded. View "Commonwealth v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of first-degree robbery. Finding Defendant to be a persistent felony offender, the jury recommended a sentence of thirty years’ imprisonment. The trial court sentenced Defendant accordingly. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court was correct in denying Defendant’s request for the Kentucky State Police laboratory to test two bandanas for Defendant’s DNA; (2) the trial court did not abuse its discretion by excluding Defendant’s proffered alternate perpetrator testimony; (3) the trial court did not err by denying Defendant the opportunity to impeach a witness for an alleged inconsistent statement; and (4) the testimony of a parole officer regarding good-time credit did not rise to the level of palpable error. View "Geary v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of first-degree sexual abuse and first-degree sodomy. The jury recommended a sentence of thirty years’ imprisonment, and the trial court entered judgment accordingly. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court did not err in refusing to disqualify the entire Commonwealth’s attorney’s office after Defendant’s former counsel withdrew from his representation before trial and took a job as an assistant prosecutor in the same attorney’s office; and (2) the trial court did not err in refusing to admonish the jury on a series of questions posed by the Commonwealth in cross examination of a defense witness. View "Calhoun v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Kentucky Shakespeare Festival, Inc. (KSF) and Brantley Dunaway entered into an employment agreement. Two years later, KSF terminated Dunaway’s employment. When KSF informed Dunaway that he was not entitled to a bonus for the 2013 fiscal year, Dunaway filed an action for breach of contract. Nearly one year later, KSF filed a motion for partial summary judgment and declaratory relief, arguing that KSF’s determination that Dunaway was not entitled to a bonus was a binding “arbitration award” issued by an independent accounting firm. The circuit court denied relief, concluding that the employment agreement did not contain an agreement to forgo litigation and arbitrate any bonus dispute. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that no arbitration agreement existed between KSF and Dunaway, and because no arbitration proceeding occurred, there was no arbitration award to be confirmed. View "Kentucky Shakespeare Festival, Inc. v. Dunaway" on Justia Law

Appellant, a juvenile, was charged with misdemeanor sexual misconduct and felony possession of matter portraying a sexual performance by a minor based on his sexual conduct with his also-underage girlfriend. Appellant entered an unconditional admission to amended charges. The district court subsequently entered an adjudication finding that Appellant committed the alleged conduct. The circuit court affirmed. The Court of Appeals denied Appellant’s motion for discretionary review. The Supreme Court initially granted discretionary review to address Appellant’s constitutional claims. However, because Appellant entered what amounts to an unconditional guilty plea, the Supreme Court remanded the matter with directions that the appeal be dismissed, holding that Appellant waived his right to an appeal in this case. View "B.H. v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

The vehicle in which Plaintiff was riding was hit by a drunk driver. Plaintiff was wearing her seatbelt, and the airbags deployed properly, but Plaintiff sustained serious injuries. Plaintiff filed suit against Nissan Motor Company, Ltd. and Nissan North America, Inc. (collectively, Nissan) alleging that her injuries were caused by Nissan’s defectively designed restraint system and failure to warn her about the system’s limitations. The jury ruled in Plaintiff’s favor and found Nissan responsible for approximately $2.6 million in compensatory damages and $2.5 million in punitive damages. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals on the issue of punitive damages, holding that an instruction permitting assessment of punitive damage against Nissan was inappropriate in this case. View "Nissan Motor Co., Ltd. v. Maddox" on Justia Law

Biological parents Michael and Janie Young decided to look for a potential adoptional placement for their fifth child. When it was discovered that the Youngs accepted living expenses from two different sets of prospective adoptive parents, the Youngs were charged with theft by deception over $10,000. The Youngs entered into conditional guilty pleas to the charges. They then appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in denying their motion to dismiss the indictment for failure to state a crime and that the amounts paid by the two set of prospective adoptive parents could not be combined to elevate the theft above the $10,000 threshold to make it a Class C felony. The Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that no crime had been committed. The Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded, holding (1) the Youngs were properly charged with theft by deception in the indictment; and (2) thefts from different victims give rise to separate offenses and cannot be combined to elevate the level of the offense, and this error amounted to palpable error in this case. View "Commonwealth v. Young" on Justia Law