Justia Kentucky Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The parties in this case, neighboring landowners, disputed the ownership of Church Lane, an old road or passway in Gallatin County. Appellee argued that the road was owned by the County or, alternatively, was a public road. Appellants contended that the road was their private property. The circuit court determined that Church Lane was a private road. The Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that Church Lane was a public road. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court correctly determined that Church Lane had been discontinued as a public road, and the eastern portion of the road reverted back to Appellants as a private road. View "Kentucky Props. Holding LLC v. Sproul" on Justia Law

Samantha Hollaway was involved in an accident with Harry Sykes, who was insured by Direct General Insurance Company of Mississippi. Hollaway sought compensation from Direct General for both bodily and property damage. Direct General settled Hollaway’s property damage claim, but there was a breakdown of settlement negotiations with respect to Hollaway’s bodily injury claim. Hollaway filed suit, asserting a third-party bad faith claim against Direct General under the Kentucky Unfair Claims Settlement Practices Act. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Direct General, finding that liability and causation were legitimately disputed, and therefore, Direct General could not have acted in bad faith as a matter of law. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Hollaway failed to make a colorable third-party bad-faith claim and, therefore, summary judgment in favor of Direct General was appropriate. View "Hollaway v. Direct Gen. Ins. Co. of Miss., Inc." on Justia Law

After a criminal investigation into Stephen O’Daniel conducted by certain Kentucky State Police officers (collectively, the Officers), O’Daniel was indicted for second-degree forgery. The jury acquitted O’Daniel. Thereafter, O’Daniel brought a malicious prosecution action against the Officers. The Officers moved for summary judgment on the grounds of immunity. The trial court granted summary judgment, concluding that O’Daniel could not establish that the criminal prosecution was instituted “by, or at the instance of” the Officers, as required by Raine v. Drasin. The court also concluded that the officers were shielded from liability by the doctrine of immunity as expressed by the Supreme Court in Rehberg v. Paulk. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Officers were not entitled to dismissal of the malicious prosecution action on grounds of absolute immunity or qualified official immunity; (2) the Court of Appeals did not err in reversing the summary judgment but used an improper standard in remanding the case for consideration; and (3) the expression of the malicious prosecution elements set forth in Raine v. Drasin is hereby abrogated in favor of the articulation set forth in this opinion. View "Martin v. O’Daniel" on Justia Law

Rebekah McCarty and Kenneth Faried had a daughter together but never married and never cohabitated. McCarty later filed a motion for child support. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court established joint custody and ordered Faried to pay $4,250 a month in child support. The court of appeals, considering the issue a matter of first impression, vacated and remanded the trial court’s award of child support, holding that the amount was arbitrary. The Supreme Court reversed and reinstated the trial court’s order establishing child support, holding that the order was not arbitrary, unreasonably, erroneous, or an abuse of discretion. View "McCarty v. Faried" on Justia Law

Tim Agee, individually and on the behalf of the estate of his wife, Eva, sued Baptist Health Richmond, Inc. and other medical care providers alleging that Eva’s death was the result of medical negligence. During discovery, Agee requested from Baptist Health the production of certain documents. Baptist Health refused to produce the documents, claiming that they were protected from disclosure by the Patient Safety and Quality Improvement Act of 2005. Agee filed a motion to compel, which the trial court granted in part. Thereafter, Baptist Health filed an original action in the court of appeals seeking a writ of prohibition. The court of appeals denied the request, citing the plurality opinion in Tibbs v. Bunnell. The Supreme Court vacated the trial court’s discovery order and remanded for further proceedings, holding that the correct result in this case lay in middle ground between the plurality and the dissenting opinions in Tibbs. Remanded with instructions for the trial court to undertake the review set forth in this opinion. View "Baptist Health Richmond, Inc. v. Hon. William Clouse" on Justia Law

In 2016, the Governor ordered a 4.5 percent budget reduction in the fourth quarter of the 2015-2016 fiscal year that extended to the state’s nine institutions of high education (collectively, the Universities). That same year, the Governor revised the allotments to each institution so that eight institutions’ budget reductions were amended to two percent. The Attorney General filed a declaratory-judgment action against the Governor, the State Budget Director, the Secretary of the Finance and Administration Cabinet, and the State Treasurer, challenging this action. Three members of the House of Representatives joined as intervening plaintiffs. The Governor moved to dismiss the case claiming that the Attorney General and legislators lacked standing and that his actions were legal. The circuit court granted summary judgment for the Governor, concluding (1) the Attorney General had standing, and (2) the Governor had statutory authority to revise downward the Universities’ allotments. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the Attorney General had standing the challenge the Governor’s actions, but the individual legislators did not; and (2) the Governor’s reduction of the allotments of the Universities exceeded his statutory authority to revise allotments and to withhold allotments. View "Commonwealth ex rel. Beshear v. Commonweath Office of the Gov. ex rel. Bevin" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed an action against several anonymous users of the website Topix (collectively, “the John Does”) alleging that the John Does had recklessly posted defamatory statements about him on the website. Plaintiff issued subpoenas to Topix and another internet provider seeking the identity and address of John Does 1 and 2. The two John Does filed a motion to quash the subpoenas. The trial court denied the motion to quash. The John Does subsequently filed a petition for a writ of prohibition with the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals required Plaintiff, in order to obtain the identities of the John Does, to make a prima facie showing that defamation had occurred under the Delaware case in Doe v. Cahill. On remand, Plaintiff sought to prove his prima facie case. The circuit court then ordered subpoenas to be served and ordered counsel for the John Does to disclose their identities. The John Does filed another writ petition in the Court of Appeals. The court denied the petition, concluding that Plaintiff had made a prima facie case. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Plaintiff failed to make an adequate prima facie case of the elements of defamation to allow him to obtain the John Does’ identities. View "Doe v. Hon. Eddy Coleman" on Justia Law

Defendant, a United States citizen and native of Somalia, was convicted of first degree rape. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the trial court violated Ky. Rev. Stat. 30A.410 by failing to provide Defendant with a Somali interpreter for his trial. The Commonwealth sought discretionary review. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it determined that Defendant was not entitled to an interpreter; and (2) the matter must also be remanded for the court of appeals to consider Defendant’s argument under Batson v. Kentucky, which the court declined to address because it reversed Defendant’s conviction on other grounds. View "Commonwealth v. Abukar" on Justia Law

Defendant entered a guilty plea to several drug offenses and was sentenced to one year in prison, probated for one year. Defendant was subsequently cited for a traffic violation. On January 31, 2013, the circuit court served a bench warrant for Defendant’s arrest. On February 12, 2013, at the probation hearing, Defendant argued that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to hear the matter because his probationary period expired on February 2, 2013. In response, the Commonwealth argued that the warrant issued by the court tolled the expiration period. The circuit court found that it retained jurisdiction and revoked Defendant’s probation. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the warrant expired when served, and therefore, the circuit court lacked jurisdiction. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) a warrant remains “pending” until the defendant is brought before the court, at which time the court may extend the probationary period for a reasonable time until a revocation hearing can be held; and (2) because Defendant’s probationary period was not extended, the court lost jurisdiction to revoke his probation. View "Commonwealth v. Tapp" on Justia Law

The juvenile Appellant in this case, "Bill," a fifteen-year-old eighth-grade boy, was charged with multiple public offenses based on his sexual conduct with his thirteen-year-old girlfriend "Carol", who was not charged. He entered an unconditional admission to amended charges, and the district court entered an adjudication finding that he committed the alleged conduct. After disposition of his case, he appealed to the circuit court, which affirmed. The Court of Appeals denied his motion for discretionary review, but the Supreme Court granted it initially to address constitutional challenges that Bill raised. After consideration of those challenges, the Supreme Court concluded that the appeal should have been dismissed by the circuit court, with no consideration of any of the substantive issues raised, because Bill entered an unconditional admission to the offenses and thereby waived an appeal in this case. View "B. H. v. Kentucky" on Justia Law