Justia Kentucky Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Kentucky Oaks Mall Co. (the Mall) Owend a commercial real estate development in Paducah. SM Newco Paducah, LLC (Newco) owned a building located within that development that had been vacant and deteriorating for more than a decade. The Mall filed suit to compel the enforcement of Newco’s obligation to keep the building in good condition. When the Mall learned that Newco was considering the possibility of demolishing the building, it filed in the pending litigation a motion for a temporary injunction to stop the demolition. Eventually, counsel for the Mall tendered a proposed order designated as a temporary injunction, and the circuit court entered the temporary injunction over Newco’s objection. Newco filed a motion for interlocutory relief pursuant to Ky. R. Civ. P. 65.07. The court of appeals denied the motion. Newco then moved for interlocutory relief in the Supreme Court under Ky. R. Civ. P. 65.09. The Supreme Court denied Newco’s motion, holding that Newco failed to show the “extraordinary cause” required by Rule 65.09 for obtaining such relief. View "SM Newco Paducah, LLC v. Kentucky Oaks Mall Co." on Justia Law

Robert Guernsey and Trustin Jones were indicted for murder and first-degree robbery. The Commonwealth subsequently filed a notice of intent to seek the death penalty against Guernsey and Jones, identifying murder committed in the course of first-degree robbery as the statutory aggravator. After an evidentiary hearing, the circuit court entered an order excluding the death penalty as disproportionate. The Commonwealth filed an interlocutory appeal. The Supreme Court vacated the circuit court’s order excluding the death penalty and remanded for further proceedings, holding (1) the circuit court erred by concluding prior to trial that the death penalty would be disproportionate in this prosecution for murder and first-degree robbery; and (2) the Commonwealth did not forfeit the right to interlocutory review of the issue presented. View "Commonwealth v. Guernsey" on Justia Law

Ralph Goodwin was attending a convention at the Galt House, a hotel, when he was injured after slipping and falling as he was getting into the bathtub to take a shower. Goodwin filed suit, alleging negligence. In response, the Galt House alleged that Goodwin’s injures were the result of his failure to exercise ordinary care. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the Galt House, determining that Galt House did not have a duty to provide bathmats for all rooms because it provided bathmats for some rooms and that a hotel is not “an insurer of a guest’s safety.” The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the court of appeals and trial court conflated open and obvious, duty, and breach of duty when these were separate and distinct concepts. Remanded for further proceedings. View "Goodwin v. Al J. Schneider Co." on Justia Law

In 2015, the Louisville/Jefferson County Metro Government (Louisville Metro) enacted its own minimum wage ordinance for al employers within the Louisville Metro boundary. The ordinance required a higher wage than the statutory minimum. Appellants filed an action against Louisville Metro, arguing that the ordinance was void as being outside the authority of Louisville Metro to enact. The circuit court entered a ruling in favor of Louisville Metro. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Louisville Metro exceeded its authority by enacting the ordinance because the ordinance conflicts with the comprehensive statutory scheme in Ky. Rev. Stat. 337 on the issue of wages. View "Kentucky Restaurant Ass’n v. Louisville/Jefferson County Metro Government" on Justia Law

Appellant was convicted of theft by unlawful taking of property worth more than ten thousand dollars, second degree burglary, third degree burglary, and being a persistent felony offender in the second degree. The trial court sentenced Appellant to an aggregate sentence of twenty years in prison. Appellant appealed, raising four allegations of error. The Supreme Court reversed Appellant’s convictions, holding that the trial court erred in allowing the prosecutor to impeach Appellant with his failure to disclose his alibi and his alibi witness to the police or prosecuting authorities prior to trial, and the error required reversal. Remanded for a new trial. View "Cunningham v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Richard Tryon was injured by an underinsured motorist while driving his motorcycle. At the time of the accident, Tryon owed two automobiles insured with Encompass Indemnity Co. and Philadelphia Indemnity Insurance Co. (together, the Companies). Both policies included Underinsured Motorist Insurance (UIM) coverage provisions. The Companies denied UIM coverage for Tryon on the basis of their respective insurance policies, which had owned-but-not-scheduled-for-coverage exclusions. Tryon filed suit against the Companies. The trial court granted summary judgment for Encompass and Philadelphia, ruling that the language in the policies issued by the Companies clearly excluded coverage of Tryon’s motorcycle. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the unpublished Court of Appeals opinion in Motorists Mutual Insurance Co. v. Hartley and the Supreme Court’s holding in Chaffin v. Kentucky Farm Bureau Insurance Cos. mandated coverage. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) owned-but-not-scheduled provisions for UIM coverage are enforceable so long as they expressly and plainly apprise insureds of the exclusion; and (2) the Philadelphia policy failed to plainly exclude coverage under the circumstances, but the terms of the Encompass policy plainly excluded coverage. View "Philadelphia Indemnity Insurance Co. v. Tryon" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of fifteen counts of first-degree sodomy, thirteen counts of first-degree sexual abuse, and two counts of witness tampering. Appellant was sentenced to an aggregate sentence of seventy years imprisonment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to sever Count No. 33 of the indictment from the remaining charges; (2) the trial court did not err by consolidating for a single trial the sexual offenses and the witness tampering charges; (3) the jury instructions did not violate Appellant’s right to a unanimous verdict; and (4) Appellant waived any objections to deficiencies in the form of the indictment by failing to object. View "Elam v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of first-degree robbery and of being a first-degree persistent felony offender. Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court violated his right to a public trial when it cleared visitors from the courtroom during the victim’s testimony and when it denied his motion to suppress an out-of-court photo identification. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s judgment on both issues, holding (1) because Defendant failed to object to the courtroom closure, he waived his argument that his right to a public trial was violated; and (2) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the out-of-court identification was valid. View "Crutcher v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Appellant waived his right to indictment by a grand jury and agreed to enter a guilty plea based upon an information filed by the Commonwealth charging him with four counts of second degree burglary. Before Appellant formally entered his guilty plea to the original charges, further negotiations took place, resulting in a different plea agreement, under which the Commonwealth agreed to amend each count of second degree burglary to third degree burglary. Appellant was subsequently convicted of four counts of third degree burglary and sentenced to five years’ imprisonment on each count, to be served consecutively. Appellant appealed, arguing that the circuit court lost jurisdiction to adjudicate his case when the original charges were amended. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellant provided no persuasive basis to invalidate the circuit court’s judgment and to revert to the original plea agreement. View "Pursley v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Defendant was required to register as a sex offender in Michigan because he was adjudicated a juvenile delinquent for a sex offense. Defendant later moved to Kentucky, where he was charged with failing to register under the Kentucky Sex Offender Registration Act. Defendant entered a conditional guilty plea to the charge. The court of appeals affirmed on appeal, concluding that Defendant was required to register under the plain language of the Act. Defendant appealed, claiming that he was not required to register under the Act because he was a juvenile and was not “convicted” of any crime. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the statute requires registration in the state of Kentucky of any person who was required to register in another state upon that person’s relocation; and (2) because Defendant was required to register in Michigan, he was also required to register in Kentucky. View "Murphy v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law