Justia Kentucky Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of manufacturing methamphetamine and first-degree trafficking in a controlled substance. Defendant was sentenced as a first-degree persistent felon to life in prison. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) delays in bringing Defendant to trial - both the nearly five-year delay between indictment and trial and the more than 180-day delay following Defendant’s pro se speedy-trial motion - did not violate Defendant’s constitutional and statutory rights to a prompt disposition of his charges; (2) law enforcement officers’ warrantless entry of Defendant’s apartment did not violate Defendant’s constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches; (3) none of what Defendant claimed were evidentiary errors was reversible; and (4) the judgment should clearly reflect that Defendant’s twenty-year sentence runs concurrently with his life sentence. View "Goben v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Keeneland Association, Inc. entered into a contract with Appalachian Racing, LLC to preserve its interest in purchasing Appalachian Racing’s ownership of the racing track Thunder Ridge. Floyd County held bonds that were to be paid upon Keeneland’s purchase of Thunder Ridge. While the contract was pending, Keeneland applied for a license with the Kentucky Horse Racing Commission on behalf of Cumberland Run, LLC to operate another racing track. The Commission issued a public notice that it would review and consider the application. Appalachian Racing, joined by Floyd County, sued the Commission on a theory of aiding and abetting fraud and tortious interference with a prospective advantage. The circuit court issued a restraining order prohibiting the Commission from considering or taking any action on the license application. The Commission then sought a writ of prohibition to prevent the circuit court from enforcing its restraining order. The court of appeals granted the Commission’s request determining that the circuit court violated Kentucky’s separation of powers doctrine in issuing the order. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that there was nothing in the present suit that authorized the circuit court to prevent the Commission from considering Keeneland’s application. View "Appalachian Racing, LLC v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Husband petitioned for dissolution of his marriage from Wife. Previous to filing this action, however, Husband was declared incompetent and Wife was appointed as his guardian and conservator. The trial court dismissed Husband’s petition on the basis that a person who has been declared incompetent cannot bring a legal action in Kentucky. The court of appeals affirmed. Both courts relied exclusively on the 1943 case of Johnson v. Johnson. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) there is not a Johnson issue in this case because the guardian was not bringing this action as required by Civil Rule 17.03(1); and (2) it necessarily follows that this case was procedurally flawed. View "Riehle v. Riehle" on Justia Law

Eddie Ray Thomas, Jr. died from a heart attack while attempting to tow a truck from a roadside culvert. Eddie’s estate filed a claim for workers’ compensation benefits. During the proceedings, the estate offered various testimony supporting the estate’s claim that Eddie’s heart attack was work-related, thus meeting its burden of proving that Eddie’s death was work-related without the presumption provided by Ky. Rev. Stat. 342.680. Eddie’s employer attempted to rebut the statutory presumption with testimony by Dr. Roseman. An administrative law judge (ALJ) determined that Eddie’s death was not work-related, finding that Eddie suffered from pre-existing and active ischemic heart disease and that any anxiety Eddie suffered at the time of his death was not work-related. The Workers’ Compensation Board affirmed. The court of appeals reversed and remanded the matter to the ALJ with instructions to award benefits. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Dr. Roseman’s opinion was not evidence of substance, and therefore, the presumption stood and the ALJ was required to award benefits. View "Eddie’s Service Center v. Thomas" on Justia Law

Shortly after leaving Liberty Place Recovery Center for Women, LLC, a substance abuse recovery program administered by Kentucky River Foothills Development Council, Inc., Melissa Steffen committed suicide. Steffen’s estate and the guardians of Melissa’s children sued Liberty Place and Kentucky River. Before trial, Kentucky River filed a motion for summary judgment on the grounds of sovereign immunity. The circuit court denied the motion. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed but for reasons that differed from those set forth by the circuit court and the court of appeals, holding that Kentucky River did not have immunity with regard to its operation of Liberty Place. View "Kentucky River Foothills Development Council, Inc. v. Phirman" on Justia Law

Pennie and John DuBarry were divorced in 2013. Pennie was represented by Thomas Stone during the divorce proceedings. The family court entered a decree of dissolution incorporating a property settlement agreement. Stone subsequently filed a motion seeking leave to withdraw as counsel for Pennie and a notice of attorney’s lien and intent to hold property liable, listing the marital residence as the property subject to the lien. John, in turn, asked the court to release the lien, arguing that the lien was improper because he had been awarded the marital residence under the settlement agreement. The trial court granted John’s motion and set aside the lien. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the attorney’s fees lien statute does not apply to property assigned or divided in divorce proceedings; but (2) an attorney may obtain a contractual lien through his contract of employment with a client, and that lien may be upheld against assets held by his client after entry of the decree if the employment contract so provides. View "Stone v. Bubarry" on Justia Law

Developer intended to develop real property into single-family residential lots and secured financing through Bank. Insurer provided a surety bond to the Planning and Zoning Commission. Insurer executed three Bond Agreements as surety for Developer. Developer later defaulted in its loan. In lieu of foreclosure, Developer deed the property to Bank’s property management company. Bank transferred the property to another internal holding company. The Commission subsequently complied with Bank’s request for the Commission to call Developer’s bonds and place the proceeds in escrow for the purpose of reimbursing Bank for completion of the necessary infrastructure projects required by Developer’s approved plat. Developer filed a declaratory judgment action alleging that the bonds were not callable and that payment on the bonds would result in Bank receiving an unjust enrichment. The trial court granted summary judgment for Defendants. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Developer was liable under the bond; and (2) Developer’s claims of error during discovery were unavailing. View "Furlong Development Co. v. Georgetown-Scott County Planning & Zoning Commission" on Justia Law

Plaintiff brought suit against Defendant, a general surgeon, alleging that Defendant negligently performed a surgical procedure known as an anastomosis. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Defendant. Plaintiff appealed, arguing that the fairness of her trial was compromised when the trial court mistakenly denied her request to subject the parties’ expert witnesses to the ordinary separation of witnesses rule - Ky. R. Evid. 615. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court abused its discretion by exempting the defense’s expert witnesses from sequestration without an adequate showing of need; but (2) the trial court’s error was harmless. View "McAbee v. Chapman" on Justia Law

The Commonwealth charged Defendant with felony theft. Defendant was acquitted of the charge by a jury at the conclusion of his trial. The Commonwealth appealed, arguing that the trial judge erred in discharging the jury panel initially selected to try the case because of its racial composition and then proceeding with the trial after empaneling a second, more racially inclusive jury. Defendant’s acquittal and the Double Jeopardy Clause prevented the Commonwealth from retrying the case against Defendant, but the Supreme Court accepted certification of questions posed by the Commonwealth regarding the issues presented in this case. The Supreme Court answered (1) a trial judge does not have the discretion to dismiss a randomly selected jury panel despite its unrepresentative appearance when it was not shown to have failed to reflect a fair cross-section of the community and where its selection was otherwise lawful; and (2) a trial judge may not generally prohibit the parties during voir dire from examining or challenging a prospective juror with respect to statements made by the juror during a previous voir dire examination, although the judge may impose reasonable limitations on the inquiry. View "Commonwealth v. Doss" on Justia Law

After a jury trial in 1980, Appellant was convicted of three counts of capital murder, three counts of first-degree robbery, and one count of burglary. Appellant was sentenced to death for each of the murders. After he was sentenced, Appellant was subjected to a psychological evaluation, which revealed that he had an overall IQ score of 81. On appeal, Appellant’s psychological evaluation was not raised. The Supreme Court affirmed. In 2004, Appellant filed a motion to set aside his death sentences on the grounds that he was intellectually disabled. After two remands, the trial judge (1) ordered that Appellant was not entitled to state funds for a psychological evaluation; (2) determined that, because Appellant indicated that he would refuse evaluation by the Kentucky Correctional Psychiatric Center (KCPC), he had waived his intellectual disability claim; and (3) ordered that Appellant’s case be dismissed. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) Appellant was not entitled to public funds for an expert of his choosing; but (2) Appellant did not waive his intellectual disability claim. Remanded to the trial court to order the KCPC to perform a psychological evaluation of Appellant. View "White v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law