Justia Kentucky Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of fifteen counts of first-degree sodomy, thirteen counts of first-degree sexual abuse, and two counts of witness tampering. Appellant was sentenced to an aggregate sentence of seventy years imprisonment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to sever Count No. 33 of the indictment from the remaining charges; (2) the trial court did not err by consolidating for a single trial the sexual offenses and the witness tampering charges; (3) the jury instructions did not violate Appellant’s right to a unanimous verdict; and (4) Appellant waived any objections to deficiencies in the form of the indictment by failing to object. View "Elam v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of first-degree robbery and of being a first-degree persistent felony offender. Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court violated his right to a public trial when it cleared visitors from the courtroom during the victim’s testimony and when it denied his motion to suppress an out-of-court photo identification. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s judgment on both issues, holding (1) because Defendant failed to object to the courtroom closure, he waived his argument that his right to a public trial was violated; and (2) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the out-of-court identification was valid. View "Crutcher v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Appellant waived his right to indictment by a grand jury and agreed to enter a guilty plea based upon an information filed by the Commonwealth charging him with four counts of second degree burglary. Before Appellant formally entered his guilty plea to the original charges, further negotiations took place, resulting in a different plea agreement, under which the Commonwealth agreed to amend each count of second degree burglary to third degree burglary. Appellant was subsequently convicted of four counts of third degree burglary and sentenced to five years’ imprisonment on each count, to be served consecutively. Appellant appealed, arguing that the circuit court lost jurisdiction to adjudicate his case when the original charges were amended. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellant provided no persuasive basis to invalidate the circuit court’s judgment and to revert to the original plea agreement. View "Pursley v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Defendant was required to register as a sex offender in Michigan because he was adjudicated a juvenile delinquent for a sex offense. Defendant later moved to Kentucky, where he was charged with failing to register under the Kentucky Sex Offender Registration Act. Defendant entered a conditional guilty plea to the charge. The court of appeals affirmed on appeal, concluding that Defendant was required to register under the plain language of the Act. Defendant appealed, claiming that he was not required to register under the Act because he was a juvenile and was not “convicted” of any crime. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the statute requires registration in the state of Kentucky of any person who was required to register in another state upon that person’s relocation; and (2) because Defendant was required to register in Michigan, he was also required to register in Kentucky. View "Murphy v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

The parties in this case, neighboring landowners, disputed the ownership of Church Lane, an old road or passway in Gallatin County. Appellee argued that the road was owned by the County or, alternatively, was a public road. Appellants contended that the road was their private property. The circuit court determined that Church Lane was a private road. The Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that Church Lane was a public road. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court correctly determined that Church Lane had been discontinued as a public road, and the eastern portion of the road reverted back to Appellants as a private road. View "Kentucky Props. Holding LLC v. Sproul" on Justia Law

Samantha Hollaway was involved in an accident with Harry Sykes, who was insured by Direct General Insurance Company of Mississippi. Hollaway sought compensation from Direct General for both bodily and property damage. Direct General settled Hollaway’s property damage claim, but there was a breakdown of settlement negotiations with respect to Hollaway’s bodily injury claim. Hollaway filed suit, asserting a third-party bad faith claim against Direct General under the Kentucky Unfair Claims Settlement Practices Act. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Direct General, finding that liability and causation were legitimately disputed, and therefore, Direct General could not have acted in bad faith as a matter of law. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Hollaway failed to make a colorable third-party bad-faith claim and, therefore, summary judgment in favor of Direct General was appropriate. View "Hollaway v. Direct Gen. Ins. Co. of Miss., Inc." on Justia Law

After a criminal investigation into Stephen O’Daniel conducted by certain Kentucky State Police officers (collectively, the Officers), O’Daniel was indicted for second-degree forgery. The jury acquitted O’Daniel. Thereafter, O’Daniel brought a malicious prosecution action against the Officers. The Officers moved for summary judgment on the grounds of immunity. The trial court granted summary judgment, concluding that O’Daniel could not establish that the criminal prosecution was instituted “by, or at the instance of” the Officers, as required by Raine v. Drasin. The court also concluded that the officers were shielded from liability by the doctrine of immunity as expressed by the Supreme Court in Rehberg v. Paulk. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Officers were not entitled to dismissal of the malicious prosecution action on grounds of absolute immunity or qualified official immunity; (2) the Court of Appeals did not err in reversing the summary judgment but used an improper standard in remanding the case for consideration; and (3) the expression of the malicious prosecution elements set forth in Raine v. Drasin is hereby abrogated in favor of the articulation set forth in this opinion. View "Martin v. O’Daniel" on Justia Law

Rebekah McCarty and Kenneth Faried had a daughter together but never married and never cohabitated. McCarty later filed a motion for child support. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court established joint custody and ordered Faried to pay $4,250 a month in child support. The court of appeals, considering the issue a matter of first impression, vacated and remanded the trial court’s award of child support, holding that the amount was arbitrary. The Supreme Court reversed and reinstated the trial court’s order establishing child support, holding that the order was not arbitrary, unreasonably, erroneous, or an abuse of discretion. View "McCarty v. Faried" on Justia Law

Tim Agee, individually and on the behalf of the estate of his wife, Eva, sued Baptist Health Richmond, Inc. and other medical care providers alleging that Eva’s death was the result of medical negligence. During discovery, Agee requested from Baptist Health the production of certain documents. Baptist Health refused to produce the documents, claiming that they were protected from disclosure by the Patient Safety and Quality Improvement Act of 2005. Agee filed a motion to compel, which the trial court granted in part. Thereafter, Baptist Health filed an original action in the court of appeals seeking a writ of prohibition. The court of appeals denied the request, citing the plurality opinion in Tibbs v. Bunnell. The Supreme Court vacated the trial court’s discovery order and remanded for further proceedings, holding that the correct result in this case lay in middle ground between the plurality and the dissenting opinions in Tibbs. Remanded with instructions for the trial court to undertake the review set forth in this opinion. View "Baptist Health Richmond, Inc. v. Hon. William Clouse" on Justia Law

In 2016, the Governor ordered a 4.5 percent budget reduction in the fourth quarter of the 2015-2016 fiscal year that extended to the state’s nine institutions of high education (collectively, the Universities). That same year, the Governor revised the allotments to each institution so that eight institutions’ budget reductions were amended to two percent. The Attorney General filed a declaratory-judgment action against the Governor, the State Budget Director, the Secretary of the Finance and Administration Cabinet, and the State Treasurer, challenging this action. Three members of the House of Representatives joined as intervening plaintiffs. The Governor moved to dismiss the case claiming that the Attorney General and legislators lacked standing and that his actions were legal. The circuit court granted summary judgment for the Governor, concluding (1) the Attorney General had standing, and (2) the Governor had statutory authority to revise downward the Universities’ allotments. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the Attorney General had standing the challenge the Governor’s actions, but the individual legislators did not; and (2) the Governor’s reduction of the allotments of the Universities exceeded his statutory authority to revise allotments and to withhold allotments. View "Commonwealth ex rel. Beshear v. Commonweath Office of the Gov. ex rel. Bevin" on Justia Law