Justia Kentucky Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Developer intended to develop real property into single-family residential lots and secured financing through Bank. Insurer provided a surety bond to the Planning and Zoning Commission. Insurer executed three Bond Agreements as surety for Developer. Developer later defaulted in its loan. In lieu of foreclosure, Developer deed the property to Bank’s property management company. Bank transferred the property to another internal holding company. The Commission subsequently complied with Bank’s request for the Commission to call Developer’s bonds and place the proceeds in escrow for the purpose of reimbursing Bank for completion of the necessary infrastructure projects required by Developer’s approved plat. Developer filed a declaratory judgment action alleging that the bonds were not callable and that payment on the bonds would result in Bank receiving an unjust enrichment. The trial court granted summary judgment for Defendants. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Developer was liable under the bond; and (2) Developer’s claims of error during discovery were unavailing. View "Furlong Development Co. v. Georgetown-Scott County Planning & Zoning Commission" on Justia Law

Plaintiff brought suit against Defendant, a general surgeon, alleging that Defendant negligently performed a surgical procedure known as an anastomosis. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Defendant. Plaintiff appealed, arguing that the fairness of her trial was compromised when the trial court mistakenly denied her request to subject the parties’ expert witnesses to the ordinary separation of witnesses rule - Ky. R. Evid. 615. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court abused its discretion by exempting the defense’s expert witnesses from sequestration without an adequate showing of need; but (2) the trial court’s error was harmless. View "McAbee v. Chapman" on Justia Law

The Commonwealth charged Defendant with felony theft. Defendant was acquitted of the charge by a jury at the conclusion of his trial. The Commonwealth appealed, arguing that the trial judge erred in discharging the jury panel initially selected to try the case because of its racial composition and then proceeding with the trial after empaneling a second, more racially inclusive jury. Defendant’s acquittal and the Double Jeopardy Clause prevented the Commonwealth from retrying the case against Defendant, but the Supreme Court accepted certification of questions posed by the Commonwealth regarding the issues presented in this case. The Supreme Court answered (1) a trial judge does not have the discretion to dismiss a randomly selected jury panel despite its unrepresentative appearance when it was not shown to have failed to reflect a fair cross-section of the community and where its selection was otherwise lawful; and (2) a trial judge may not generally prohibit the parties during voir dire from examining or challenging a prospective juror with respect to statements made by the juror during a previous voir dire examination, although the judge may impose reasonable limitations on the inquiry. View "Commonwealth v. Doss" on Justia Law

After a jury trial in 1980, Appellant was convicted of three counts of capital murder, three counts of first-degree robbery, and one count of burglary. Appellant was sentenced to death for each of the murders. After he was sentenced, Appellant was subjected to a psychological evaluation, which revealed that he had an overall IQ score of 81. On appeal, Appellant’s psychological evaluation was not raised. The Supreme Court affirmed. In 2004, Appellant filed a motion to set aside his death sentences on the grounds that he was intellectually disabled. After two remands, the trial judge (1) ordered that Appellant was not entitled to state funds for a psychological evaluation; (2) determined that, because Appellant indicated that he would refuse evaluation by the Kentucky Correctional Psychiatric Center (KCPC), he had waived his intellectual disability claim; and (3) ordered that Appellant’s case be dismissed. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) Appellant was not entitled to public funds for an expert of his choosing; but (2) Appellant did not waive his intellectual disability claim. Remanded to the trial court to order the KCPC to perform a psychological evaluation of Appellant. View "White v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Kentucky Oaks Mall Co. (the Mall) Owend a commercial real estate development in Paducah. SM Newco Paducah, LLC (Newco) owned a building located within that development that had been vacant and deteriorating for more than a decade. The Mall filed suit to compel the enforcement of Newco’s obligation to keep the building in good condition. When the Mall learned that Newco was considering the possibility of demolishing the building, it filed in the pending litigation a motion for a temporary injunction to stop the demolition. Eventually, counsel for the Mall tendered a proposed order designated as a temporary injunction, and the circuit court entered the temporary injunction over Newco’s objection. Newco filed a motion for interlocutory relief pursuant to Ky. R. Civ. P. 65.07. The court of appeals denied the motion. Newco then moved for interlocutory relief in the Supreme Court under Ky. R. Civ. P. 65.09. The Supreme Court denied Newco’s motion, holding that Newco failed to show the “extraordinary cause” required by Rule 65.09 for obtaining such relief. View "SM Newco Paducah, LLC v. Kentucky Oaks Mall Co." on Justia Law

Robert Guernsey and Trustin Jones were indicted for murder and first-degree robbery. The Commonwealth subsequently filed a notice of intent to seek the death penalty against Guernsey and Jones, identifying murder committed in the course of first-degree robbery as the statutory aggravator. After an evidentiary hearing, the circuit court entered an order excluding the death penalty as disproportionate. The Commonwealth filed an interlocutory appeal. The Supreme Court vacated the circuit court’s order excluding the death penalty and remanded for further proceedings, holding (1) the circuit court erred by concluding prior to trial that the death penalty would be disproportionate in this prosecution for murder and first-degree robbery; and (2) the Commonwealth did not forfeit the right to interlocutory review of the issue presented. View "Commonwealth v. Guernsey" on Justia Law

Ralph Goodwin was attending a convention at the Galt House, a hotel, when he was injured after slipping and falling as he was getting into the bathtub to take a shower. Goodwin filed suit, alleging negligence. In response, the Galt House alleged that Goodwin’s injures were the result of his failure to exercise ordinary care. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the Galt House, determining that Galt House did not have a duty to provide bathmats for all rooms because it provided bathmats for some rooms and that a hotel is not “an insurer of a guest’s safety.” The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the court of appeals and trial court conflated open and obvious, duty, and breach of duty when these were separate and distinct concepts. Remanded for further proceedings. View "Goodwin v. Al J. Schneider Co." on Justia Law

In 2015, the Louisville/Jefferson County Metro Government (Louisville Metro) enacted its own minimum wage ordinance for al employers within the Louisville Metro boundary. The ordinance required a higher wage than the statutory minimum. Appellants filed an action against Louisville Metro, arguing that the ordinance was void as being outside the authority of Louisville Metro to enact. The circuit court entered a ruling in favor of Louisville Metro. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Louisville Metro exceeded its authority by enacting the ordinance because the ordinance conflicts with the comprehensive statutory scheme in Ky. Rev. Stat. 337 on the issue of wages. View "Kentucky Restaurant Ass’n v. Louisville/Jefferson County Metro Government" on Justia Law

Appellant was convicted of theft by unlawful taking of property worth more than ten thousand dollars, second degree burglary, third degree burglary, and being a persistent felony offender in the second degree. The trial court sentenced Appellant to an aggregate sentence of twenty years in prison. Appellant appealed, raising four allegations of error. The Supreme Court reversed Appellant’s convictions, holding that the trial court erred in allowing the prosecutor to impeach Appellant with his failure to disclose his alibi and his alibi witness to the police or prosecuting authorities prior to trial, and the error required reversal. Remanded for a new trial. View "Cunningham v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Richard Tryon was injured by an underinsured motorist while driving his motorcycle. At the time of the accident, Tryon owed two automobiles insured with Encompass Indemnity Co. and Philadelphia Indemnity Insurance Co. (together, the Companies). Both policies included Underinsured Motorist Insurance (UIM) coverage provisions. The Companies denied UIM coverage for Tryon on the basis of their respective insurance policies, which had owned-but-not-scheduled-for-coverage exclusions. Tryon filed suit against the Companies. The trial court granted summary judgment for Encompass and Philadelphia, ruling that the language in the policies issued by the Companies clearly excluded coverage of Tryon’s motorcycle. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the unpublished Court of Appeals opinion in Motorists Mutual Insurance Co. v. Hartley and the Supreme Court’s holding in Chaffin v. Kentucky Farm Bureau Insurance Cos. mandated coverage. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) owned-but-not-scheduled provisions for UIM coverage are enforceable so long as they expressly and plainly apprise insureds of the exclusion; and (2) the Philadelphia policy failed to plainly exclude coverage under the circumstances, but the terms of the Encompass policy plainly excluded coverage. View "Philadelphia Indemnity Insurance Co. v. Tryon" on Justia Law