Justia Kentucky Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant was convicted for having assaulted by neglect a severely disabled young man who lived with her. The Court of Appeals effectively dismissed the indictment against Defendant for assault, concluding (1) contrary to Ky. Rev. Stat. 501.030(1), the Commonwealth failed to show that Defendant had a duty to care for the young man; and (2) therefore, the circuit court erred by denying Defendant’s motion for a directed verdict of acquittal. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Court of Appeals did not err in concluding that the Commonwealth did not properly plead its case against Defendant. Defendant, however, was not entitled to a directed verdict. Further, reinstatement of the assault conviction was not appropriate. Instead, the Supreme Court vacated the trial court’s judgment convicting Defendant of assault and remanded for additional proceedings. View "Commonwealth v. Mitchell" on Justia Law

Defendant was arrested for operating a motor vehicle on a DUI-suspended license. Defendant was charged with a Class D felony under the penalty-enhancement provision in Ky. Rev. Stat. 189A.090(2)(c) because this was his third such offense in less than three years. Defendant challenged the enhancement by collaterally attacking his earlier convictions, arguing that his guilty pleas in those cases were invalid under Boykin v. Alabama. The circuit court rejected the challenge. Defendant conditionally pleaded guilty. The Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that there was insufficient evidence showing that Defendant’s prior guilty pleas complied with the Boykin requirements. The Supreme Court reversed and reinstated Defendant’s conviction, holding that Defendant’s prior convictions were not subject to collateral attack on Boykin matters in this case. View "Commonwealth v. Fugate" on Justia Law

Louisville Gas and Electric Company (LG&E) sought a permit authorizing it to discharge certain pollutants into the Ohio River in conjunction with the operation of its recently expended generating facility. The Commonwealth of Kentucky, Energy and Environment Cabinet’s Division of Water issued the permit. The circuit court vacated the permit. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed and reinstated LG&E’s permit, holding (1) in vacating the permit, the circuit court and Court of Appeals misapplied controlling federal law; and (2) the Cabinet’s determination that the LG&E permit should proceed under 40 C.F.R. 125.3(c)(1) was a reasonable interpretation of the regulation. View "Louisville Gas & Electric Co. v. Kentucky Waterways Alliance" on Justia Law

Marshall Parker sought an award of benefits for a back injury he received during the course of his employment with Webster County Coal. An administrative law judge (ALJ) awarded benefits for the back injury. However, the ALJ found that, pursuant to Ky. Rev. Stat. 342.730(4), Webster County Coal did not have liability for payment of income benefits in addition to the two years of temporary total disability income benefits Parker had already received. The Workers’ Compensation Board and Court of Appeals affirmed. Parker appealed, arguing that section 342.730(4) is unconstitutional because, under the statute, injured older workers who qualify for normal old-age Social Security retirement benefits are treated differently from injured older workers who do not qualify. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that section 342.730(4) is constitutionally infirm on equal protection grounds because there is no rational basis or substantial and justifiable reason for the disparate treatment of two groups of workers. View "Parker v. Webster County Coal, LLC" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of murder. Defendant had recently become a “fully-patched” member of the Iron Horsemen motorcycle club at the time of the murder. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court (1) did not err by permitting increased security during trial; (2) did not err by admitting testimony regarding the culture of the Iron Horsemen; (3) erred in permitting alleged ex parte communication between the Commonwealth and the trial court, but the error was harmless; and (4) did not abuse its discretion by overruling Defendant’s motion for a mistrial. View "Rigdon v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

An oversized tractor-trailer collided with the school bus Leonard Collins was driving on a portion of highway meandering across Pine Mountain, resulting in Collins’s death. Sycilla Collins (Appellant) filed a claim with the Board of Claims alleging negligence on the part of the Commonwealth of Kentucky Transportation Cabinet’s Department of Highways. The Board concluded that the Department of Highways was not negligent in performing its duty to enforce vehicle size restrictions. The circuit court reversed, concluding that the Board’s ruling was not supported by substantial evidence. The Court of Appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Department of Highways did not owe Appellant a statutory or regulatory duty to enforce the vehicle size restrictions found within Ky. Rev. Stat. 189.221. View "Collins v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of second-degree assault, fourth-degree assault, first-degree wanton endangerment, and third-degree arson. Appellant appealed, arguing, primarily, that the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on voluntarily intoxication under Ky. Rev. Stat. 501.080(1). The Supreme Court reversed the second-degree assault conviction and otherwise affirmed, holding (1) the evidence was sufficient to entitle Defendant to a voluntary intoxication instruction, and the failure to include the instruction was reversible error as to the second-degree assault conviction; and (2) the remaining convictions’ required mental states cannot be negated by voluntary intoxication, and therefore, those convictions and sentences were not in error. View "King v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

This personal injury suit arose from a 2007 trip-and-fall at the Speedway SuperAmerica filling-station in Manchester. After a bench trial, the circuit court found for Teresa and Randy Grubb (together, Plaintiffs) and against Speedway SuperAmerica LLC, the store’s owner, and Roxanne Smith, the store’s manager at the time of the accident (collectively, Defendants). The court of appeals reversed and remanded for entry of a defense judgment, concluding that the trial court erred by failing to apply the “open and obvious” doctrine under the circumstances of this case. On discretionary review, the Supreme Court remanded to the court of appeals for reconsideration in light of the Court’s recent attempts to modernize the open and obvious doctrine and to harmonize it with tort law’s shift to a regime of comparative negligence. On remand, the court of appeals stood by its prior ruling. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the court of appeals read recent precedent too narrowly; (2) the trial court erred by failing to consider whether Teresa shared responsibility for the accident and by failing to find that she did; and (3) the trial court erred in finding Smith jointly and severally liable with Speedway on Plaintiffs’ claims. View "Grubb v. Smith" on Justia Law

Appellant was convicted of incest, first-degree rape, first-degree sodomy, and other crimes. Appellant was sentenced to a total of sixty-five years in prison, the maximum sentence allowable in this case. On appeal, Appellant argued, inter alia, that he was entitled to relief because during voir dire the juror who ultimately became foreperson lied on her juror qualification form and also during voir dire proceedings concerning whether a member of her family had ever been prosecuted in a criminal matter. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded for a new trial, holding (1) the jury foreperson wrongfully failed to disclose the criminal prosecutions of her family, and the concealment of that information denied Appellant the opportunity to challenge the juror for cause or alternatively, use a peremptory strike to remove the juror; and (2) Appellant was deprived of a substantial right not subject to harmless error analysis. View "Gullett v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Appellants were charged with one count each of cultivation of marijuana five or more plants and other drug-related offenses. Appellants filed separate motions to suppress, arguing (1) police officers violated the curtilage of their apartment when they entered the back patio enclosure, thereby having no legal authority to view marijuana baggies, and (2) the officers lacked any exigencies to enter the apartment and conduct the search. The trial court denied Appellants’ motions to suppress. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) officers breached the curtilage of Appellants’ apartment when viewing the marijuana baggies, in addition to conducting an illegal search of Appellants’ apartment; and (2) the evidence seized should be excluded as fruit of the poisonous tree. View "Pace v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law