Justia Kentucky Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

An administrative law judge (ALJ) awarded Brandon Fleming partial disability benefits based on a finding that Fleming had a combined permanent impairment rating of seventeen percent. In 2010, Fleming moved to reopen his claim, alleging that his condition had worsened. A different ALJ found that Fleming had a combined permanent impairment rating of thirty-two percent. The Workers’ Compensation Board and court of appeals affirmed. LKLP CAC Inc. appealed, arguing that the ALJ’s opinion was not supported by substantial evidence because the ALJ relied on a physician who stated that Fleming’s permanent impairment rating had not changed following the 2010 opinion and award. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that there was no abuse of discretion in the ALJ’s finding that Fleming had an increase in his permanent impairment rating, in his impairment, and in his disability. View "LKLP CAC Inc. v. Fleming" on Justia Law

Appellant was convicted of kidnapping, first-degree manslaughter, tampering with physical evidence, and theft by unlawful taking. Upon Appellant’s motion for postconviction relief, the trial court set aside Appellant’s kidnapping sentence and granted a new penalty phase trial on that charge. After a retrial, the trial court sentenced Appellant to imprisonment for life, to be served concurrently with the twenty-year sentence for manslaughter. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the retrial of the kidnapping penalty phase was not fatally flawed because (1) gruesome details of the condition of the victim’s body were irrelevant and cumulative but did not sway the jury’s sentencing decision; (2) victim impact testimony relating to several victims was proper, and certain improper victim impact testimony was not palpable error; (3) the trial court did not improperly limit Appellant’s presentation of mitigation evidence; and (4) the trial court did not err by permitting the Commonwealth to use guilt-phase physical evidence during its closing argument. View "Gaither v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Appellant appealed his conviction for the murder of his brother. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court (1) did not abuse its discretion in failing to strike Juror 500 for cause because there was nothing in the record to establish a reasonable ground to doubt the juror’s qualifications; (2) did not abuse its discretion by denying Appellant’s motion to strike Juror 566 for cause because there was no reasonable ground to believe that the Juror could not render a fair and impartial verdict on the evidence; (3) properly determined that the evidence did not support an instruction on reckless homicide; and (4) did not err by permitting the Commonwealth to introduce statements made by the victim in the form of text messages sent in the days and weeks immediately preceding the shooting. View "Sturgeon v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

The legislature has affirmed that a county jailer’s salary shall at least equal the prior year’s salary level in counties that do not operate a jail.Garrard County does not operate a jail. Before the 2010 election of Garrard County’s jailer, the Garrard Fiscal Court voted to fix the amount of the jailer’s salary for the new term at an amount lower than that set for the incumbent jailer. The trial court ruled that the fiscal court had acted properly in reducing the jailer’s pay before the commencement of his term. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that fiscal courts in counties without jails are statutorily prohibited from reducing the pay of their elected jailer. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the unambiguous language of Ky. Rev. Stat. 441-243(3) prevents the fiscal court from decreasing the county jailer’s salary in between elected terms of service. View "Garrard County v. Middleton" on Justia Law

Plaintiff’s acknowledgement that she would not present an expert witness to prove her informed consent claim was not fatal to her case and thus was not a proper basis for entry of a directed verdict.Plaintiff brought this medical malpractice claim alleging that Defendant failed to obtain her informed consent before undertaking a surgical procedure on her. The trial court entered a directed verdict in favor of Defendant after Plaintiff conceded that she would not present an expert’s testimony. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the trial court erred in dismissing the case too hastily since the evidence to be presented at trial may have established an exception to the general rule requiring expert testimony to establish a professional standard of care. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court erred in granting the directed verdict. View "Argotte v. Harrington" on Justia Law

Appellant appealed his convictions stemming from three separate robberies committed in downtown Louisville in January 2014. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court did not err in declining to suppress Appellant’s recorded statements to a detective; (2) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in prohibiting Appellant from introducing evidence about his refusal to sign a Miranda-waiver form without having an attorney present; (3) the admission into evidence of Appellant’s hooded sweatshirt was improper, but any error was harmless and did not require reversal; and (4) the trial court’s denial of Appellant’s motion to sever the charged offenses for separate trials did not result in any actual undue prejudice to Appellant. View "Smith v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

In order for there to be a “collapse” under a homeowner's insurance policy, there must have been a “falling down or collapsing of a part of a building,”Wanda Thiele, the daughter of Hiram Campbell, moved into Campbell’s residence following his death. After she discovered terminate infestation, Thiele contacted Kentucky Growers Insurance Company, which had issued a homeowner’s insurance policy to Campbell, to make a claim under the policy provision covering collapse. Insurer denied Thiele’s claim because no collapse had occurred. Thiele then filed a declaration of rights claim. The trial court issued a judgment in Thiele’s favor. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, under the definition set forth in Niagara Fire Insurance Co. v. Curtsinger, 361 S.W.2d, 762 (Ky. Ct. App. 1962), in order for there to be a “collapse,” there must have been a “falling down or collapsing of a part of a building,” which did not happen in this case. View "Thiele v. Kentucky Growers Insurance Co." on Justia Law

Michael Flick was convicted of the 2005 murder of Christina Wittich and sentenced to life imprisonment. In 2008, Wittich’s Estate filed this wrongful-death action against Flick. Flick filed a motion to dismiss the complaint as untimely filed. The trial court denied the motion. A jury awarded the Estate $2,900,000 in compensatory damage and $53,000,000 in punitive damages. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Estate’s wrongful-death claim was untimely filed; (2) the Estate’s wrongful-death claim was not saved by a tolling statute; (3) the legislature’s recent amendment to Ky. Rev. Stat. 413.140(1) did not save the Estate’s claim; and (4) this court’s holding was not prospective only in nature. View "Estate of Christina Witch v. Flick" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued the doctor (Defendant) who twice performed surgery on Plaintiff to repair a fracture, alleging (1) Defendant made mistakes during the initial surgery that resulted in the failure of the fracture to heal, and (2) following the second surgery, the doctor failed to timely identify an infection, which necessitated two additional surgeries. A trial ensued. The judge declared a mistrial because Defendant had mentioned insurance several times in violation of a court order. After a second trial, the jury rendered a verdict in favor of the doctor. The court entered an order granting Plaintiff’s motion for sanctions given Defendant’s “contemptuous conduct” in the first trial and the fact that Defendant compounded his conduct in the second trial. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s denial of Plaintiff’s motion for a new trial but affirmed the imposition of sanctions against Defendant. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and vacated the trial court’s order imposing sanctions on Defendant, holding (1) the trial court did not err when it denied Plaintiff’s motion for a new trial; and (2) the trial court erred in failing to notify Defendant that it was finding him in contempt and whether the contempt was civil or criminal. View "Jefferson v. Eggemeyer" on Justia Law

Appellant entered an Alford plea to one count of murder. Before sentencing, Appellant submitted a motion to withdraw his plea, arguing that his counsel deceived him when she informed him that he could withdraw his plea at any time before sentencing and that his plea was involuntarily entered. After a hearing, the trial court denied the motion. On appeal, Appellant argued that the trial court erred by resolving the plea issue without taking evidence and without appointing conflict-free counsel. The Supreme court vacated the judgment and the order denying Appellant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea, holding (1) an actual conflict existed in this case, and an evidentiary hearing should have been held at which Appellant’s attorney’s testimony would have been necessary; and (2) the error created a manifest injustice. Remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Zapata v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law