Justia Kentucky Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Ky. Const. section 170 does not exempt a qualifying charitable institution from the use tax imposed by Ky. Rev. Stat. 139.310.The Finance and Administration Cabinet’s Department of Revenue, the Board of Tax Appeals, and the circuit court concluded that the section 170 constitutional exemption speaks only to ad valorem property taxes and does not relieve a “public charity” from the use tax imposed by section 139.310. The court of appeals disagreed, ruling that the use tax imposed under section 139.310 is similar enough to an ad valorem tax to render its enforcement on governmental entities unconstitutional under section 170. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) section 170 of the Kentucky Constitution provides for exemptions from property taxes only; and (2) the holding in Commonwealth ex rel. Luckett v. City of Elizabethtown, 435 S.W.2d 78 (Ky. 1968), that the section 170 exemption applies to the use tax is not sustainable. View "Commonwealth, Finance & Administration Cabinet, Department of Revenue v. Interstate Gas Supply Inc." on Justia Law

The administrative law judge’s (ALJ) findings that Appellant was exposed to MOCA, a curing agent and a known carcinogen, at a TEMA Isenmann, Inc. production facility and that this exposure resulted in an occupational disease were supported by substantial evidence.Appellant worked for TEMA Isenmann, Inc. When he was diagnosed and treated for bladder cancer, he sought permanent total disability benefits based upon his assertion that his cancer amounted to an occupational disease. On remand for the second time from the Workers’ Compensation Board, the ALJ awarded Appellant the benefits sought. The Board affirmed the ALJ. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals, holding that the ALJ’s award was based upon substantial evidence. View "Miller v. TEMA Isenmann, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the decision of the court of appeals in this appeal brought by both parties from a judgment in a paternity action. The Court held (1) a paternity action can be brought by a private attorney, and therefore, the district court properly exercised jurisdiction over this case; (2) attorneys’ fees are not recoverable in paternity actions, and therefore, the court of appeals erred in ruling that Ky. Rev. Stat. 403.220 provided a statutory avenue for attorneys’ fees in this case; and (3) the court of appeals properly concluded that a trial court has the discretionary authority to allow credits of “excess” dependent benefits toward pre-petition liabilities, but rather than simply upholding the district court’s allowance of the credit, the case must be remanded for further factual findings and a renewed determination of whether that credit is appropriate. View "Seeger v. Lanham" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed in part the final judgment of the trial court convicting Defendant of three misdemeanors and four felonies and sentencing Defendant to a sentence totaling twenty years’ imprisonment and imposing $50 in fines together with court costs and court facility fees. The Court held (1) the trial court erred by imposing a $50 fine but not by imposing court costs, court facilities fee, and bond; (2) the trial court erred when it denied Defendant’s motion for directed verdict on the charge of first-degree theft by unlawful taking, over $500 but less than $10,000; (3) the jury instructions relating to Defendant’s charge of resisting arrest were erroneous, and the only remedy is to reverse the judgment on this charge and remand for further proceedings; and (4) the remainder of the judgment was not in error. View "Hall v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals upholding the trial court’s suppression of evidence discovered as a result of a canine sniff search of Defendant’s vehicle during a traffic stop. The Court held that the court of appeals did not err by concluding (1) the stop of Defendant’s vehicle was proper, but the sniff search improperly extended the traffic stop; (2) the traffic stop was the only legal justification for stopping Defendant; and (3) the Commonwealth failed to preserve for appellate review its claim that Defendant’s parole status subjected him to a warrantless and suspicionless search and seizure. View "Commonwealth v. Smith" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court convicting Defendant of criminal attempt to commit murder, possession of a handgun by a convicted felon, and tampering with physical evidence and sentencing him to twenty years’ imprisonment. The Court held (1) the trial court did not err in denying Defendant’s motion to suppress his statement to police; (2) the trial court did not err in refusing to allow certain cross-examination of the victim; (3) the trial court did not err in denying Appellant’s motion for a mistrial; and (4) the jury instructions on the possession of a handgun by a convicted felon charge did not deprive Appellant of his right to a unanimous verdict. View "Shively v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

In this case, a sheriff’s termination of a deputy sheriff was not constrained by the procedural due process protections purportedly afforded to the deputy sheriff under a now-outdated version of Ky. Rev. Stat. 15.520.Plaintiff, the deputy sheriff, sued the sheriff, alleging that the sheriff violated the due process procedures set forth in section 15.520, otherwise known as the Police Officers’ Bill of Rights. The trial court granted summary judgment for the sheriff. The Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that section 15.520 mandates that a sheriff who, like the sheriff in this case, elects to receive Kentucky Law Enforcement Foundation Program funding is bound by the due process procedures of that statute. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that section 15.520 was not meant to provide due process rights to sheriffs’ deputies. View "Elliott v. Lanham" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals reversing Defendant’s sentence and conviction and remanding for a new trial, having determined that Defendant’s guilty plea did not satisfy Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969).A jury convicted Defendant of first-degree rape and third-degree unlawful transaction with a minor. After a Boykin colloquy, Defendant subsequently entered a guilty plea in exchange for a seventeen-year prison sentence. The Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that Defendant’s guilty plea did not satisfy Boykin. The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and reinstated Defendant’s conviction and sentencing, holding that, based on the totality of the circumstances, Defendant’s guilty plea was made knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently. View "Commonwealth v. Patton" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court upheld Defendant’s convictions for three counts of wanton endangerment in the first degree, holding that an instructional error did not require vacating Defendant’s convictions.The Court of Appeals reversed and vacated Defendant’s convictions, ruling, sua sponte, that the jury instructions required proof of an additional element in order to find Defendant guilty of wanton endangerment, first-degree, and that the error was not harmless. The Supreme Court disagreed and reinstated the judgment of the trial court, holding that the instructional error was harmless. Given that the Commonwealth proved its case to the jury with an additional element to prove, there was no reasonable probability that omitting this added element would change the jury’s verdict. View "Commonwealth v. Caudill" on Justia Law

The language of Ky. Rev. Stat. 258.235(4) imposes strict liability upon the owner of a dog that attacks and injures a person.Plaintiff sued Defendant after Defendant’s dogs attacked and injured her, relying on section 258.235(4). After the conclusion of the evidence, Plaintiff unsuccessfully requested instruction requiring an imposition of liability upon Defendant solely by showing Defendant’s ownership of the dogs that attacked her. The jury determined that Defendant was the owner of the dogs that caused injury to Plaintiff but that Defendant was not liable to Plaintiff. The Court of Appeals affirmed, ruling that the jury instructions properly stated the law of a dog owner’s liability for injuries caused by his dog. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded for a new trial, holding that a dog owner is strictly liable for injuries caused when his dog attacks a person and that a plaintiff’s comparative negligence in a dog bite case may be considered in measuring the damages awarded to her. View "Maupin v. Tankersley" on Justia Law