Justia Kentucky Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s denial of Defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence obtained during a traffic stop, holding that the law enforcement officer did not violate Defendant’s right to privacy when he reviewed Defendant’s license and registration information.The officer’s police car in this case was equipped with a camera that could read license plates in order to provide information about the vehicle’s registered owner. The record check performed by the camera indicated that Defendant had an active warrant for failing to appear in court. The officer pulled Defendant’s vehicle over and, after noticing several signs that Defendant was intoxicated, arrested Defendant for, inter alia, driving under the influence. The district court denied Defendant’s motion to suppress, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Defendant’s rights under the Fourth Amendment were not violated by the officer obtaining information linked to Defendant’s license plate, which was displayed in a place where Defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy; and (2) the officer had the articulable and reasonable suspicion required to stop the vehicle. View "Traft v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court sentencing Defendant to life imprisonment for murder, first-degree assault, and other crimes and sentencing Defendant to life imprisonment for murder. The court held (1) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Defendant’s motion for change of venue; (2) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Defendant’s motion to exclude an incriminating statement Defendant made to a witness; (3) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Defendant’s motions for a continuance; (4) the trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing Defendant’s motion to excuse jurors for cause; (5) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Defendant’s request for a mistrial; and (6) the trial court erred in permitting testimony about what would constitute an appropriate sentence for Defendant, but the error was harmless. View "Hilton v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

A plaintiff may bring a private right of action under Ky. Rev. Stat. 446.070 against an employer for an alleged violation of Ky. Rev. Stat. 341.990(6)(a), Kentucky’s criminal prohibition against making false statements during unemployment proceedings.Plaintiff brought suit against Employer, alleging that he suffered damages due to being temporarily deprived of his unemployment benefits. Employer’s successor-in-interest, the real party-in-interest, removed the case to federal court and moved to dismiss Plaintiff’s section 446.070 claim for failure to state a cognizable legal claim. The federal court denied the motion to dismiss and requested certification of law from the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court answered the question as set forth above and held that Plaintiff’s section 446.070 claim for an alleged violation of section 341.990(6)(a) was cognizable under Kentucky law. View "Hickey v. General Electric Co." on Justia Law

In Kentucky, an attorney’s contingent-fee contracts should be considered marital property to be divided as part of the equitable division of the marital estate, and trial courts must apply the delayed-distribution method to determine the actual distribution of funds.Husband had an active law practice in which he had executed contingent-fee contracts with some clients. When Husband and Wife divorced, the trial court treated the contingent-fee contracts as a component of Husband’s income when received and not as property of the marital estate subject to division. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings, holding (1) a contingent-fee contract in existence during the marriage does constitute marital property to be divided in a dissolution proceeding; and (2) trial court shall apply the delayed-division method to determine the distribution to the attorney and non-attorney ex-spouses. View "Grasch v. Grasch" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the court of appeals reversing the judgment of the trial court in this action arising from a construction dispute.Two subcontractors - the steel fabricator and the steel erector and installer - on a condominium project brought suit against the project owner, developer, and general contractor after the subcontractors proceeded with extra work outside the scope of the original bid documents but were never paid for either that work or the retainage amount owed under the steel fabricator’s contract with the general contractor. The circuit court entered judgment in favor of Plaintiff for the cost of the extra work and unpaid retainage. The general contractor prevailed on its indemnification cross-claim against the other two defendants and on the negligence cross-claim asserted against it by the other two defendants. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court held that the court of appeals (1) erred by reversing the trial court’s judgment against the owner for unjust enrichment; (2) properly reversed the trial court’s judgment against the general contractor for breach of contract; and (3) properly found that the trial court should have instructed the jury on the owner and developer’s breach of contract claim but erred in finding the negligence instruction deficient. View "Superior Steel, Inc. v. Ascent at Roebling’s Bridge, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the opinion of the court of appeals reversing the judgment of the trial court in this case filed by Plaintiff requesting that Smokey Hollow Road in Bath County be recognized as a county road, public passway, or easement. The trial court ruled that Smokey Hollow Road was a county road and a public passway and that Plaintiff had acquired an easement by prescription. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part and reinstated the order of the trial court, holding (1) the passway at issue is not a county road as a matter of law; (2) the trial court’s finding of facts were insufficient to establish an implied dedication of this portion of Smokey Hollow Road to create a public road; and (3) Plaintiff had a prescriptive easement, and it had not been abandoned. View "Ellington v. Becraft" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court convicting Defendant of first-degree trafficking in a controlled substance over two grams and of being a first-degree persistent felony offender and sentencing Defendant to twenty years’ imprisonment. The court held (1) Defendant was not denied a fair trial by the trial court’s admission of testimony from a detective; (2) Defendant was not entitled to a mistrial because of alleged errors in the sentencing phase of the trial proceeding; (3) there was no palpable error with the sentencing evidence; and (4) contrary to Defendant’s argument on appeal, the jury finding that Defendant was a persistent felony offender first-degree was unanimous. View "Conrad v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the opinion of the court of appeals reversing the unanimous jury verdict in Defendant's favor on a personal injury action brought by Plaintiff. Plaintiff was driving his motorcycle when he collided with a downed tree in the roadway. At the time, Defendant was the Metro Louisville County Engineer and an Assistant Director of Public Works. Plaintiff filed an action naming several defendants, including Defendant in his individual capacity. The jury subsequently returned a unanimous verdict in favor of Defendant, finding that Plaintiff had not proven by a preponderance of the evidence that Defendant breached a duty owed to Plaintiff. The court of appeals reversed, ruling (1) the jury’s findings that Defendant did not fail to comply with his duty was against the weight of the evidence, and (2) Defendant was entitled to a new trial but not to a directed verdict. The Supreme Court reversed the opinion of the court of appeals remanding the case to the circuit court for a new trial and affirmed the court of appeals’ denial of a directed verdict, holding that the court erred in granting a new trial because ample evidence on the issue of duty was presented and supported the jury verdict. View "Storm v. Martin" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court convicting Defendant of one count of first-degree assault, eleven counts of first-degree criminal abuse, and one count of second-degree assault and sentencing Defendant to seventy years’ imprisonment. The convictions stemmed from the abuse of Defendant’s boyfriend’s minor child, N.V. After Defendant and her boyfriend were arrested, N.V. was released to foster care. On appeal, Defendant argued that the trial court erred in allowing the testimony of the foster mother. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that the trial court did not err in allowing the testimony of the foster mother. View "Richmond v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court sentencing Defendant to life in prison without the possibility of parole for twenty-five years for two counts of murder, two counts of first-degree robbery, one count of first-degree wanton endangerment, and one count of terroristic threatening. The court held (1) the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the Commonwealth’s ballistics evidence; (2) the trial court did not abuse its discretion by joining the offenses for trial; (3) the trial court properly permitted a witness to make an in-court identification of Defendant; (4) a detective did not improperly bolster his own credibility by answering questions from co-defendant’s counsel on cross-examination; and (5) the Commonwealth’s use of a CourtNet printout to impeach a witness was not improper. View "Garrett v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law