Justia Kentucky Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In this case, a sheriff’s termination of a deputy sheriff was not constrained by the procedural due process protections purportedly afforded to the deputy sheriff under a now-outdated version of Ky. Rev. Stat. 15.520.Plaintiff, the deputy sheriff, sued the sheriff, alleging that the sheriff violated the due process procedures set forth in section 15.520, otherwise known as the Police Officers’ Bill of Rights. The trial court granted summary judgment for the sheriff. The Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that section 15.520 mandates that a sheriff who, like the sheriff in this case, elects to receive Kentucky Law Enforcement Foundation Program funding is bound by the due process procedures of that statute. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that section 15.520 was not meant to provide due process rights to sheriffs’ deputies. View "Elliott v. Lanham" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals reversing Defendant’s sentence and conviction and remanding for a new trial, having determined that Defendant’s guilty plea did not satisfy Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969).A jury convicted Defendant of first-degree rape and third-degree unlawful transaction with a minor. After a Boykin colloquy, Defendant subsequently entered a guilty plea in exchange for a seventeen-year prison sentence. The Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that Defendant’s guilty plea did not satisfy Boykin. The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and reinstated Defendant’s conviction and sentencing, holding that, based on the totality of the circumstances, Defendant’s guilty plea was made knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently. View "Commonwealth v. Patton" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court upheld Defendant’s convictions for three counts of wanton endangerment in the first degree, holding that an instructional error did not require vacating Defendant’s convictions.The Court of Appeals reversed and vacated Defendant’s convictions, ruling, sua sponte, that the jury instructions required proof of an additional element in order to find Defendant guilty of wanton endangerment, first-degree, and that the error was not harmless. The Supreme Court disagreed and reinstated the judgment of the trial court, holding that the instructional error was harmless. Given that the Commonwealth proved its case to the jury with an additional element to prove, there was no reasonable probability that omitting this added element would change the jury’s verdict. View "Commonwealth v. Caudill" on Justia Law

The language of Ky. Rev. Stat. 258.235(4) imposes strict liability upon the owner of a dog that attacks and injures a person.Plaintiff sued Defendant after Defendant’s dogs attacked and injured her, relying on section 258.235(4). After the conclusion of the evidence, Plaintiff unsuccessfully requested instruction requiring an imposition of liability upon Defendant solely by showing Defendant’s ownership of the dogs that attacked her. The jury determined that Defendant was the owner of the dogs that caused injury to Plaintiff but that Defendant was not liable to Plaintiff. The Court of Appeals affirmed, ruling that the jury instructions properly stated the law of a dog owner’s liability for injuries caused by his dog. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded for a new trial, holding that a dog owner is strictly liable for injuries caused when his dog attacks a person and that a plaintiff’s comparative negligence in a dog bite case may be considered in measuring the damages awarded to her. View "Maupin v. Tankersley" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that the denial of Defendant’s motion to suppress evidence seized from her vehicle during a traffic stop was proper.In her suppression motion, Defendant argued that the traffic stop of her vehicle was not justified because she was not required to have her license plate illuminated when Sergeant James Jenkins pulled her over. The Commonwealth acknowledged that a license plate violation may not have been a proper basis for the stop but that Detective Wade Shoemaker had reasonable suspicion of Defendant’s participation in controlled drug buys, and Det. Shoemaker’s reasonable suspicion to stop Defendant’s vehicle transferred to Sgt. Jenkins so as to justify the traffic stop. The trial court concluded that no traffic violation occurred but that law enforcement had reasonable suspicion to pull over Defendant’s vehicle. The Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that because Sgt. Jenkins did not actually rely on Det. Shoemaker’s information and instead made the stop based solely on the license plate violation, the collective knowledge doctrine was irrelevant. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the record reflected that the real reason Sgt. Jenkins pulled over Defendant’s vehicle was upon Det. Shoemaker’s request, and because Det. Shoemaker had reasonable suspicion to make the investigatory stop, suppression of the evidence was not required. View "Commonwealth v. Blake" on Justia Law

In this appeal from a criminal conviction, the Supreme Court vacated the portion of the circuit court’s judgment imposing criminal restitution and otherwise affirmed the judgment of conviction and sentence. Defendant was convicted of second-degree manslaughter and of being a first-degree persistent felony offender (PFO). The Supreme Court affirmed in part and vacated in part the judgment, holding (1) the trial court erred when it ordered Defendant to pay criminal restitution because the court did not comply with the procedural due process requirements for imposing restitution as outlined in Jones v. Commonwealth, 382 S.W.3d 22 (Ky. 2011), and therefore, the criminal restitution award must be vacated and remanded for a new hearing; (2) the trial court did not err in allowing evidence that Defendant cut off his ankle monitor while on probation because evidence of probation violations, like evidence of parole violations, can be admissible evidence in the penalty phase of a criminal trial; and (3) the trial court did not err when it allowed the use of Defendant’s prior conviction for drug possession as a qualifier for PFO enhancement. View "Brown v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the trial court convicting Defendant of incest, first-degree unlawful transaction with a minor, use of a minor in a sexual performance, first-degree unlawful imprisonment, and first-degree sexual abuse. The trial court sentenced Defendant to seventy years’ imprisonment. In reversing in part, the Supreme Court held that Defendant’s convictions of incest, use of a minor in a sexual performance, and unlawful imprisonment were reasonably likely a result of prosecutorial vindictiveness. The court otherwise affirmed, holding that the trial court (1) did not err in overruling Defendant’s motion to dismiss his indictment due to prosecutorial vindictiveness; (2) did not err by not granting a directed verdict on the charge of unlawful transaction with a minor; (3) did not permit double jeopardy violations; and (4) erred by permitting the victim’s mother to improperly vouch for the victim’s credibility, but the error was harmless. View "Yates v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court convicting Appellant of murder, criminal attempt to commit murder, and related crimes. The Supreme Court held that the trial court (1) did not err by denying Appellant’s request to introduce parole eligibility information during the death penalty phase of the trial; (2) did not err by permitting the Commonwealth to introduce during the guilt phase evidence of other crimes committed by Appellant against the victim’s family; and (3) did not err by allowing the testimony of a witness who was three years old at the time of the crimes and six years old at the time of the trial. View "Huddleston v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals reversing the decision of the Workers’ Compensation Board (Board), which reversed the ALJ’s rejection of Plaintiff’s claim for enhanced benefits and reinstated the judgment of the ALJ.Plaintiff, an employee of VanMeter Contracting, Inc., was critically injured in a workplace accident. After an investigation, the Kentucky Occupational Safety and Health Administration (KOSHA) issued a citation against VanMeter, charging it with violating 29 CFR 1926.703(a)(1). Plaintiff filed a claim for workers’ compensation benefits and asserted a claim for a thirty percent benefit enhancement provided by Ky. Rev. Stat. 342.165(1) for the workplace injury. Plaintiff alleged the same regulatory violations asserted by KOSHA and a violation of the general workplace safety duty of Ky. Rev. Stat. 338.031(1)(a). The ALJ declined to grant the thirty percent enhancement, finding that Plaintiff had not presented sufficient evidence to prove the intentional violation of any safety statute or regulation. The Board reversed. The Court of Appeals reversed the Board. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Board misconstrued or overlooked controlling law when, in contradiction of the ALJ’s findings, it accorded conclusive weight to the KOSHA settlement agreement. View "Groce v. Vanmeter Contracting, Inc." on Justia Law

In this case arising from the 1996 murder of LeBron Gaither, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals that, in the circumstances of this case, the Estate of LeBron Gaither was entitled to post-judgment interest on damages awarded by the Board of Claims from the date of the initial circuit court judgment. This was the third appeal in this matter. In this appeal, the Kentucky State Police, a department within the Commonwealth’s Justice and Public Safety Cabinet, argued that the Court of Appeals misconstrued Civil Rule 54.01 and Ky. Rev. Stat. 360.040, 44.130 and 44.140, which govern post-judgment interest on Board of Claims’ awards. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding (1) the Court of Appeals correctly read the Board of Claims Act as according circuit court judgments entered pursuant to the Act the same treatment under the post-judgment interest statute as ordinary civil judgments; and (2) the Court of Appeals properly held that post-judgment interest began to accrue from the circuit court’s initial judgment. View "Commonwealth, Justice & Public Safety Cabinet v. Gaither" on Justia Law