Justia Kentucky Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In this custody and support action, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals reversing and remanding Laura Smith’s award of attorney’s fees, holding that the trial court acted within its discretion when assessing attorney’s fees against Jimmy McGill after considering the parties’ financial resources.Jimmy filed a motion to become the primary residential custodian of his and Laura’s two youngest daughters. The family court denied the motion. Laura then moved for attorney’s fees. The trial court then ordered Jimmy to pay a portion of Laura’s attorney’s fees. The court of appeals reversed and remanded as to this issue, determining that no actual disparity existed between the parties’ income to justify an award of attorney’s fees to Laura pursuant to Ky. Rev. Stat. 403.220. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court followed the dictates of the statute and therefore did not err in its award of attorney’s fees. View "Smith v. McGill" on Justia Law

In this criminal case, the Supreme Court held that even though evidence of a previous conviction may be prohibited to allow a general attack on the witness’s credibility under Ky. R. Evid. 609(b), evidence of the witness’s lifetime parole status stemming from the conviction may be admissible to allow a more specific attack on the witness’s credibility by showing bias or motive to lie under the broader scope of Ky. R. Evid. 611.Defendant was convicted of fourth-degree assault. The court of appeals reversed, holding that evidence of a witness’s lifetime parole status was admissible under Rule 611 and that the trial court abused its discretion by excluding such evidence. At issue before the Supreme Court was whether a witness’s status as a parolee is admissible on cross-examination as impeachment evidence pursuant to Rule 611 despite a provision in Rule 609(b) that would render evidence of a more than thirty-year-old conviction upon which the witness’s parole was based as presumptively too remote in time. The Supreme Court answered in the affirmative, holding that the trial court abused its discretion by prohibiting Defendant from cross-examining the witness about his motive or bias but that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. View "Commonwealth v. Armstrong" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the opinion of the court of appeals upholding the circuit court’s dismissal of this action alleging that a child’s developmental delays were caused by a doctor’s negligence in the mother’s prenatal care and the child’s delivery. The Court held (1) the trial court erred in permitting Plaintiffs’ attorney to withdraw; (2) the mother did not engage in the unauthorized practice of law, and the trial court erred in striking the pleadings; (3) summary judgment was improper; and (4) “next friend” cannot proceed pro se on behalf of a real party in interest. View "Azmat v. Bauer" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals reversing the decision of the circuit court finding C.B.’s daughter to be a neglected child pursuant to the Kentucky Unified Juvenile Code and reinstated the orders of the circuit court, holding that substantial evidence supported the lower court’s finding of neglect.In reversing, the court of appeals found that the evidence supporting the circuit court’s orders was speculative and did not rise to the preponderance level and that the child could not be found to be neglected because C.B. had never exercised custodial control or supervision over the child. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the General Assembly drafted Ky. Rev. Stat. 600.020(1)(a) with the intention that a parent does not have to be exercising control or supervision in order to be found to have neglected or abused a child; and (2) the lower court’s finding of neglect was supported by substantial evidence. View "Cabinet for Health & Family Services v. C.B." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the trial court’s order denying Employer’s motion to compel enforcement of the arbitration agreement between the parties in this case, holding that the arbitration agreement between Employer and Employee was unenforceable as a matter of law.Employer conditioned Employee’s continued employment on her agreement to arbitrate any dispute that may arise between them. The Supreme Court held that the arbitration agreement was unenforceable as a matter of state statutory law because (1) Ky. Rev. Stat. 336.700(2) prohibits employers from conditioning employment on an existing employee’s or prospective employee’s agreement to “waive, arbitrate, or otherwise diminish any existing or future claim, right, or benefit to which the employee or person seeking employment would otherwise be entitled”; and (2) the Federal Arbitration Act does not mandate a contrary holding because it does not preempt section 336.700(2) in this case. View "Northern Kentucky Area Development District v. Snyder" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals granting a Ky. R. Civ. P. 65.09 motion filed by Respondent to compel arbitration, holding that the arbitration agreement between the parties was enforceable.The circuit court in this case issued an order invalidating the arbitration clause contained in the parties’ employment contract. Thereafter, Respondent a motion seeking interlocutory relief to compel arbitration. The court of appeals determined that even where the contract expressly allows Respondent to seek provisional injunctive remedies in a court pending arbitration but did not specifically provide the same right to Movant, the lack of reciprocal access to the courts for injunctive relief did not invalidate the arbitration agreement. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the arbitration agreement did not lack mutuality, was supported by adequate consideration, and was not unconscionable. View "Grimes v. GHSW Enterprises, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court convicting Defendant of kidnapping with serious physical injury and other offenses, holding that the trial court did not err when it instructed the jury on the crime of kidnapping with serious physical injury.On appeal, Defendant argued that the trial court’s jury instruction on the crime of kidnapping with serious physical injury was improper because the serious physical injury suffered by the victim was inflicted before the kidnapping occurred. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that the trial court did not err in instructing the jury because the victim did suffer a serious physical injury “during the kidnapping” because Defendant’s infliction of the serious physical injury could be said to be the “first step of the kidnapping.” View "Malone v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals affirming the Workers’ Compensation Board’s decision affirming the decision of the administrative law judge concluding that Katherine Rudd was entitled to the two-multiplier under under Ky. Rev. Stat. 342.730(1)(c)(2), holding that a workers’ compensation claimant is entitled to the two-multiplier when that individual voluntarily chooses to retire.At issue was whether the two-multiplier under section 342.730(1)(c)(2) applies to a claimant’s benefits when the claimant returns to work and later retires for reasons not solely related to the work-related injury itself. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment below, holding that, under the circumstances presented in this case, the two-multiplier must be applied to comply with the unambiguous language of the statute. View "Active Care Chiropractic, Inc. v. Rudd" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the court of appeals granting in part the Presbyterian Church’s petition for a writ to prohibit the trial court from lifting its stay of discovery in this defamation case, holding that the Church failed to establish it was entitled to the writ as to certain limited discovery.Reverend Eric Hoey filed a complaint alleging that the Church had defamed him. After Hoey served the Church discovery requests the Church argued that Hoey should not be entitled to discovery until the trial court ruled on the Church’s ecclesiastical-abstention and ministerial-exception defenses. The trial court disagreed and ordered the Church to respond to Hoey’s discovery requests. The Church petitioned the court of appeals for a writ, arguing that the trial court had abrogated its immunity by forcing it to participate in discovery without first making a threshold immunity determination. The court of appeals granted the writ to the extent the trial court should limit discovery to that which was necessary to determine whether the church was entitled to ecclesiastical immunity. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Church satisfied the “certain special cases” writ criteria as to broad-reaching discovery but failed to meet this standard as to limited discovery the court may deem necessary to determine whether the Church was immune from suit. View "Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.) v. Honorable Brian Edwards" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals reversing the circuit court’s denial of Defendant’s Ky. R. Crim. P. 11.42 motion without a hearing, holding that counsel’s failure to advise a client of the sex offender registration requirement constitutes deficient performance.Defendant pled guilty to criminal attempt to commit kidnapping of a minor victim and other offenses. After he was released from prison, Defendant learned that, as a consequence of his guilty plea, he was required to register under Ky. Rev. Stat. 17.510 as a person who had committed sex crimes or crimes against minors. Defendant filed a motion to vacate, set aside, or correct sentence pursuant to Rule 11.42, claiming that counsel had failed to discuss the sex offender registration requirement with him. The circuit court denied the motion without a hearing, ruling that counsel’s failure to advise his client about registration did not warrant relief under Rule 11.42. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that a defendant has a right to effective assistance of counsel concerning the requirement to register as a sex offender. View "Commonwealth v. Thompson" on Justia Law