Justia Kentucky Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court convicting Defendant of kidnapping with serious physical injury and other offenses, holding that the trial court did not err when it instructed the jury on the crime of kidnapping with serious physical injury.On appeal, Defendant argued that the trial court’s jury instruction on the crime of kidnapping with serious physical injury was improper because the serious physical injury suffered by the victim was inflicted before the kidnapping occurred. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that the trial court did not err in instructing the jury because the victim did suffer a serious physical injury “during the kidnapping” because Defendant’s infliction of the serious physical injury could be said to be the “first step of the kidnapping.” View "Malone v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals affirming the Workers’ Compensation Board’s decision affirming the decision of the administrative law judge concluding that Katherine Rudd was entitled to the two-multiplier under under Ky. Rev. Stat. 342.730(1)(c)(2), holding that a workers’ compensation claimant is entitled to the two-multiplier when that individual voluntarily chooses to retire.At issue was whether the two-multiplier under section 342.730(1)(c)(2) applies to a claimant’s benefits when the claimant returns to work and later retires for reasons not solely related to the work-related injury itself. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment below, holding that, under the circumstances presented in this case, the two-multiplier must be applied to comply with the unambiguous language of the statute. View "Active Care Chiropractic, Inc. v. Rudd" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the court of appeals granting in part the Presbyterian Church’s petition for a writ to prohibit the trial court from lifting its stay of discovery in this defamation case, holding that the Church failed to establish it was entitled to the writ as to certain limited discovery.Reverend Eric Hoey filed a complaint alleging that the Church had defamed him. After Hoey served the Church discovery requests the Church argued that Hoey should not be entitled to discovery until the trial court ruled on the Church’s ecclesiastical-abstention and ministerial-exception defenses. The trial court disagreed and ordered the Church to respond to Hoey’s discovery requests. The Church petitioned the court of appeals for a writ, arguing that the trial court had abrogated its immunity by forcing it to participate in discovery without first making a threshold immunity determination. The court of appeals granted the writ to the extent the trial court should limit discovery to that which was necessary to determine whether the church was entitled to ecclesiastical immunity. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Church satisfied the “certain special cases” writ criteria as to broad-reaching discovery but failed to meet this standard as to limited discovery the court may deem necessary to determine whether the Church was immune from suit. View "Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.) v. Honorable Brian Edwards" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals reversing the circuit court’s denial of Defendant’s Ky. R. Crim. P. 11.42 motion without a hearing, holding that counsel’s failure to advise a client of the sex offender registration requirement constitutes deficient performance.Defendant pled guilty to criminal attempt to commit kidnapping of a minor victim and other offenses. After he was released from prison, Defendant learned that, as a consequence of his guilty plea, he was required to register under Ky. Rev. Stat. 17.510 as a person who had committed sex crimes or crimes against minors. Defendant filed a motion to vacate, set aside, or correct sentence pursuant to Rule 11.42, claiming that counsel had failed to discuss the sex offender registration requirement with him. The circuit court denied the motion without a hearing, ruling that counsel’s failure to advise his client about registration did not warrant relief under Rule 11.42. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that a defendant has a right to effective assistance of counsel concerning the requirement to register as a sex offender. View "Commonwealth v. Thompson" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals dissolving the stay of execution, and thus all collection activity, upon a judgment issued by the circuit court holding that Appellants failed to show “extraordinary cause.”The underlying merits of the circuit court’s case concerned the Public Service Commission’s enforcement of a previously-obtained money judgment that was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Because the trial court’s order did not specify the procedural grounds for its decision to stay the case pending the resolution of an ongoing administrative case, the Supreme Court analyzed this case as an appeal from an order imposing a temporary injunction. The Court then denied Appellants’ motion to vacate the Court of Appeals’ order and affirmed the lower appellate court, holding that the judgment was valid and enforceable and that the equities did not weigh in Plaintiff’s favor. View "Pollitt v. Public Service Commission of Kentucky" on Justia Law

On review of the decision of the Court of Appeals reversing a final order issued by the Kentucky Board of Medical Licensure issued against Appellee, the Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Court of Appeals misconstrued the relevant statutes.Upon the issuance of a complaint against a physician, a hearing officer is appointed to conduct and evidentiary hearing and issue a recommended order. Thereafter, a hearing panel of the Board considers the matter and determines either to dismiss the complaint or to issue a final order regarding the violation and an appropriate penalty. In the instant case, the Court of Appeals concluded that the hearing officer erred by not recommending a specific penalty and that the Board’s hearing panel also erred by not independently reviewing the entire evidentiary record before rendering a final order. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Ky. Rev. Stat. 13B.110(1) allows a hearing officer to recommend a penalty but does not require him or her to do so; and (2) Ky. Rev. Stat. 13B.120(1) requires the Board to consider the record but does not require the Board to review the proceedings in their entirety before issuing a final order. View "Kentucky Board of Medical Licensure v. Strauss" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the judgment of the trial court ruling in favor of Peters Farms, LLC, which sued Ikerd Mining, LLC and Ikerd’s insurer, American Mining Insurance Company (AMIC), holding that Ikerd’s unauthorized removal of coal from Peters’ property was not an accident and therefore not covered under the insurance policy.The trial court concluded that Ikerd’s removal of coal from Peters’ property were “accidents,” which meant each “mistake” was an “occurrence” that unintentionally caused “property damage” as defined by Ikerd’s commercial general liability (CGL) policy. Therefore, the court concluded that the mineral removal was covered under the CGL policy. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that the intentional removal and conversion of coal is not an “accident” constituting an “occurrence,” regardless of whether the trespass was willful or innocent. View "American Mining Insurance Co. v. Peters Farms, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals reversing the circuit court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendants in this case alleging that Defendants breached their duties under the Farm Animals Activity Act by failing to make a reasonable inquiry into Plaintiff’s ability to manage a horse named Flash before letting her ride the horse, holding that Defendants were not liable under the statute.When Plaintiff visited a stable owned by Defendants to test-ride horses for sale she was injured when she was thrown by Flash. Plaintiff sought compensation for her injuries. The trial court granted summary judgment for Defendants. The Court of Appeals revered, finding that Defendants had a duty to make a reasonable and prudent inquiry into Plaintiff’s ability to manage flash before letting her ride the horse and that a genuine issue of fact existed regarding Plaintiffs allegation that defendants caused Plaintiff’s injuries. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Defendants reasonably determined that Flash was suitable for Plaintiff to ride based upon Plaintiff's representations; and (2) no genuine issue of material fact existed as to Defendants’ liability under the statute. View "Daugherty v. Tabor" on Justia Law

In this dispute between neighboring landowners over the location of the boundary line between their adjoining properties the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals reversing the circuit court’s judgment in favor of Appellants, holding that the Court of Appeals exceeded its scope of review by reversing the trial court.The location of the boundary line in this case determined which of the parties was entitled to $440,000 of coal royalties from mining that occurred in the disputed area between the properties. The circuit court ruled in favor of Appellants. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded for entry of a judgment in favor of Appellees and the mining company. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court did not err in determining the boundary line in the manner that it did, that substantial evidence supported the trial court’s findings, and that the Court of Appeals erred by improperly substituting its own judgment for that of the trial court. View "C.W. Hoskins Heirs v. Wells" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals reversing the circuit court’s grant of a directed verdict in favor of Norfolk Southern Railway Company on Appellant’s complaint alleging negligence, holding that the circuit court correctly ruled that the common-law Firefighter’s Rule barred Appellant’s claim.Appellant, a patrol officer with the Danville Police Department, fell down an embankment and was injured while pursuing a suspect on foot. Appellant filed suit against Norfolk Southern, asserting that the embankment was a dangerous condition on the company’s premises and that the company was liable to her for the fall. The circuit court granted Norfolk Southern’s motion for a directed verdict, determining that Appellant’s claim was barred by the Firefighter’s Rule. The Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that the case did not satisfy the three factors under the rule. The Supreme Court reversed and reinstated the circuit court’s directed verdict, holding that Appellant met the three prongs of the Firefighter’s Rule and may therefore not recover from Norfolk Southern. View "Norfolk Southern Railway Co. v. Johnson" on Justia Law