Justia Kentucky Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court denied the Commonwealth’s petition for a writ to prohibit enforcement of a trial court’s order authorizing the use of public funds for the procurement of private-expert assistance in William Meece’s post-conviction proceedings under Ky. R. Crim. P. 11.42, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering the use of public funds.Meece moved to vacate his judgment of conviction under Rule 11.42. Meece requested the use of private experts in proving his motion. The trial court granted in part and denied in part Meece’s public-funding request after holding an ex parte hearing. The Commonwealth then filed this petition for a writ of prohibition, arguing that the trial court erred in authorizing the use of public funds. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court did not err in holding the ex parte hearing to determine whether Meece was entitled to the requested state funds; and (2) the circuit court’s hearing to determine whether Meece was entitled to public funds for the procurement of private experts was not premature. View "Commonwealth v. Honorable John R. Grise" on Justia Law

In this interlocutory appeal from the circuit court’s review of an agency ruling, the Supreme Court adopted the United States Supreme Court’s test for standing as set forth in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-561 (1992) and held that the existence of a plaintiff’s standing is a constitutional requirement to prosecute any action in the courts of the Commonwealth, including seeking judicial review of an administrative agency’s final order.The putative petitioner in this case, a Medicaid beneficiary (the patient), sought judicial review of a final order of the Kentucky Cabinet for Health and Human Services ruling that the patient lacked standing to pursue an appeal of an insurer’s denial of reimbursement to a hospital for the patient’s services. The hospital, acting as the patient’s representative, sought judicial review of the Cabinet’s final order. The circuit court denied the Cabinet and the insurer’s motions to dismiss the petition. The Supreme Court remanded the case with instructions to dismiss the case, holding (1) Kentucky courts have the responsibility to ascertain whether a plaintiff has constitutional standing to pursue the case in court; and (2) under that test, the patient did not have the requisite constitutional standing to pursue her case in the courts of the Commonwealth. View "Commonwealth v. Sexton" on Justia Law

At issue was the implications of the statutory language found in Ky. Rev. Stat. 186A.220 to the sale of a vehicle that was involved in an accident that killed both Jonathan Elmore and Craig Armstrong.Charles Armstrong sued Martin Cadillac, Inc.; The Travelers Indemnity Company, Martin’s insurer; Elmore’s estate, and other parties for the wrongful death of his son, Craig. Elmore was driving the vehicle, and Craig was a passenger when the vehicle was involved in the accident. This litigation centered around who owned, operated, or was financially responsible for the vehicle Elmore was driving. The circuit court found that Elmore was the owner of the vehicle, and therefore, that Martin and Travelers were not financially liable for the loss. The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court’s order granting summary judgment on all claims against Martin and Travelers, holding that, pursuant to section 186A. 220, Martin was not the “owner” of the vehicle, and therefore, Martin and Travelers were not responsible for coverage of the vehicle. View "Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Armstrong" on Justia Law

In this eminent domain action challenging the just compensation paid for property to be taken, the Supreme Court reversed the order of the court of appeals dismissing this appeal for failure to name an indispensable party, holding that Riley v. Department of Highways, 375 S.W.2d 245 (Ky. 1963), remains sound and applicable to the circumstances before the Court in this case.The court of appeals dismissed this appeal because the notice of appeal failed to include the name of Edward Gravell, the husband of one of Appellants, a tenant-in-common owning the property. The court of appeals reasoned that Edward’s interest, an inchoate right, would be affected by the appellate court’s decision, and thus, he was an indispensable party. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the court of appeals’s decision was contrary to applicable precedent in Riley; and (2) Edward was not an indispensable party at this stage of the proceeding. View "Hagan v. Commonwealth, Transportation Cabinet" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals reversing the judgment of the trial court, after a jury trial, in favor of Appellant on her claim that she was wrongfully terminated from her employment with the University of Louisville in violation of the Kentucky Whistleblower Act (KWA), Ky. Rev. Stat. 61.101-61.103, holding that the evidence at trial was sufficient to support the judgment entered upon the jury’s verdict.After a jury trial, Appellant was awarded damages in the form of back pay and mental anguish, but the trial court denied Appellant’s claim for front pay. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the evidence was insufficient to support the jury’s verdict on whistleblower liability. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, contrary to the opinion of the court of appeals, the evidence supported the verdict of the jury in finding liability against the University. View "Harper v. University of Louisville" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeal reversing the circuit court’s interlocutory judgment concluding that Lexington-Fayette Urban County Government (LFUCG) properly exercised its power of eminent domain in the taking of a permanent easement on Appellee’s land for the public purpose of constructing a storm water culvert and drainage system, holding that the circuit court’s finding was not clearly erroneous.Specifically, the Court held that the court of appeals (1) failed to give appropriate deference to the circuit court’s finding that LFUCG acted in good faith; (2) improperly extended the holding in Sprint Communications v. Leggett, 307 S.W.3d 109 (Ky. 2010); and (3) failed to follow controlling precedent by requiring that local governments condemn property in fee simple when a lesser interest would be equally effective. View "Lexington-Fayette Urban County Government v. Moore" on Justia Law

At issue was the role of the courts on judicial review of a final decision of the Kentucky Retirement Systems (KERS) as to a KERS member’s entitlement to disability retirement.A hearing officer recommended granting Plaintiff’s disability benefits application. The Board of Trustees of KERS (Board) denied Plaintiff’s application for disability benefits. The trial court affirmed the Board’s final order. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that substantial evidence compelled a finding in favor of Plaintiff. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the KERS Board’s final decision must be supported by substantial evidence; (2) the standard set forth in McManus v. Ky. Retirement Systems, 124 S.W.3d 454, 458 (Ky. App. 2003), in conjunction with Ky. Rev. Stat. 13B.150, provides the proper standard for judicial review of KERS disability retirement decisions; (3) the hearing officer’s credibility determinations are not binding on the Board; and (4) substantial evidence supported the Board’s decision in this case, and the evidence in favor of Plaintiff was not so compelling that no reasonable person could have failed to be persuaded by it. View "Kentucky Retirement Systems v. Ashcraft" on Justia Law

At issue was various statutory amendments to the Kentucky Affordable Prepaid Tuition Fund (KAPT) contracts previously purchased by Appellants.The Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the trial court concluding that the 2014 statutory changes affecting the 2003 contracts for prepaid college tuition entered into by Maze and the Board did not alter Appellants’ contracts, concluding that Appellants had expressly agreed to be bound by amendments to the contracts imposed by future statutory and regulatory changes. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the KAPT contracts entered into by Appellants, and the underlying enabling statutes, did not authorize the contractual changes imposed by the retroactive application of the statutory amendments at issue in this case; and (2) the retroactive imposition of those amendments upon Appellants unlawfully impaired their contracts in violation of U.S. Const. art. I, 10 and Ky. Const. 19. View "Maze v. Board of Directors for the Commonwealth Postsecondary Education Prepaid Tuition Trust Fund" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed Defendant’s conviction of first-degree murder but affirmed his remaining convictions and sentences, holding that several errors on the trial court in this case affected the propriety of Defendant’s murder conviction and demanded reversal of this conviction.Specifically, the Supreme Court held that the trial court erred in excluding certain evidence and in admitting other evidence and inappropriately handled the characterization of missing evidence. The Court then found that these errors constituted harmless error as to all of Defendant’s convictions, with the exception of the first-degree murder conviction, but that the errors did affect the propriety of Defendant’s murder conviction. View "Tigue v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

At issue was whether the former Mayor of the City of Audubon Park and individual members of the City Council were personally liable for excess sanitation funds generated by a monthly assessment for the stated purpose of paying for sanitation services that was not devoted to trash collection and recycling but had been spent for other municipal purposes.The circuit court dismissed this action, brought by a taxpayer pursuant to section 180 of the Kentucky Constitution and Ky. Rev. Stat. 92.330 and 92.340, for failure to state a cause of action due to lack of injury to the City. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that Defendants were liable for the excess sanitation funds. The Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded, holding (1) the complaint stated a cause of action because the statutes prohibit the use of the sanitation tax revenue for other non-sanitation purposes; but (2) liability was not absolute if the individuals who acted on behalf of the City could establish that the tax revenue was spent for valid City obligations. View "Scalise v. Sewell-Scheuermann" on Justia Law