Justia Kentucky Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals reversing the trial court’s grant of summary judgment against Plaintiffs in this insurance dispute, holding that summary judgment was improper.Plaintiffs sought chiropractic treatment for injuries sustained in an automobile accident. The bills were submitted to GEICO for payment under Plaintiffs’ basic reparations benefits (BRB). GEICO denied coverage and refused to pay for certain medical treatments Plaintiffs had already received. Plaintiffs then brought suit alleging that GEICO improperly denied coverage under their BRB based upon a medical records review and arguing that Ky. Rev. Stat. 304.39-270 requires an independent medical examination before GEICO can deny them BRB. In entering summary judgment against Plaintiffs, the trial court ruled that section 304.39-270 was permissive. The court of appeals reversed and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) section 304.39-270 fails to address when and how GEICO could deny BRB; and (2) because the trial court based its decision to grant summary judgment on the implications of section 304.39-270 rather than examining the remaining parts of the Motor Vehicle Reparations Act, Ky. Rev. Stat. 304.39-020(2), it was improper for the trial court to grant summary judgment without further review of the statutes. View "Government Employees Insurance Co. v. Sanders" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed Defendant’s first-degree robbery conviction and sentence, vacated his persistent felony offender (PFO) conviction and sentence, which was predicated upon the underlying first-degree robbery conviction, and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings, holding that the trial court erred when it failed to direct a verdict on the first-degree robbery charge.After a jury convicted Defendant of first-degree robbery Defendant pleaded guilty to the PFO charge. The Supreme Court reversed in part and vacated in part, holding (1) the trial court did not err by failing to dismiss the indictment for an alleged violation of Defendant’s right to a speedy trial; (2) the trial court erred when it denied Defendant’s motion for a directed verdict on the first-degree robbery charge; and (3) the trial court should have conducted further review of Defendant’s request to make opening and closing statements himself. View "Lang v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

At issue before the Supreme Court in this interlocutory appeal from the circuit court’s review of an agency ruling was whether Kentucky courts can undertake a statutorily created judicial review of an administrative agency’s final order when the appellant does not have a concrete injury.The Supreme Court adopted the United States Supreme Court’s test for standing as set forth in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-561 (1992), and held (1) the existence of a plaintiff’s standing is a constitutional requirement to prosecute any action in the Commonwealth courts; (2) Kentucky courts have the responsibility to ascertain, upon the court’s motion if the issue was not raised by a party opponent, whether a plaintiff has constitutional standing to pursue the case in court; and (3) in the instant case, the putative petitioner did not have the requisite constitutional standing to pursue her case in Kentucky courts. View "Commonwealth v. Sexton" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed Defendant’s convictions of two counts of murder and sentence of life without the possibility of parole for twenty-five years, holding that the trial court abused its discretion by proceeding with voir dire without Defendant present.On appeal, Defendant argued that the trial court improperly conducted voir dire when Defendant was unable to be present and that the court erred when it failed to grant immunity pursuant to Ky. Rev. Stat. 503.085(1). The Supreme court reversed, holding (1) Defendant was deprived of his constitutional right to be present at jury selection pertaining to thirty-one jurors that were questioned in his absence, and the error was not harmless; and (2) the trial court did not commit reversible error when it failed to grant immunity pursuant to Ky. Rev. Stat. 503.085. View "Truss v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

In this custody and support action, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals reversing and remanding Laura Smith’s award of attorney’s fees, holding that the trial court acted within its discretion when assessing attorney’s fees against Jimmy McGill after considering the parties’ financial resources.Jimmy filed a motion to become the primary residential custodian of his and Laura’s two youngest daughters. The family court denied the motion. Laura then moved for attorney’s fees. The trial court then ordered Jimmy to pay a portion of Laura’s attorney’s fees. The court of appeals reversed and remanded as to this issue, determining that no actual disparity existed between the parties’ income to justify an award of attorney’s fees to Laura pursuant to Ky. Rev. Stat. 403.220. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court followed the dictates of the statute and therefore did not err in its award of attorney’s fees. View "Smith v. McGill" on Justia Law

In this criminal case, the Supreme Court held that even though evidence of a previous conviction may be prohibited to allow a general attack on the witness’s credibility under Ky. R. Evid. 609(b), evidence of the witness’s lifetime parole status stemming from the conviction may be admissible to allow a more specific attack on the witness’s credibility by showing bias or motive to lie under the broader scope of Ky. R. Evid. 611.Defendant was convicted of fourth-degree assault. The court of appeals reversed, holding that evidence of a witness’s lifetime parole status was admissible under Rule 611 and that the trial court abused its discretion by excluding such evidence. At issue before the Supreme Court was whether a witness’s status as a parolee is admissible on cross-examination as impeachment evidence pursuant to Rule 611 despite a provision in Rule 609(b) that would render evidence of a more than thirty-year-old conviction upon which the witness’s parole was based as presumptively too remote in time. The Supreme Court answered in the affirmative, holding that the trial court abused its discretion by prohibiting Defendant from cross-examining the witness about his motive or bias but that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. View "Commonwealth v. Armstrong" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the opinion of the court of appeals upholding the circuit court’s dismissal of this action alleging that a child’s developmental delays were caused by a doctor’s negligence in the mother’s prenatal care and the child’s delivery. The Court held (1) the trial court erred in permitting Plaintiffs’ attorney to withdraw; (2) the mother did not engage in the unauthorized practice of law, and the trial court erred in striking the pleadings; (3) summary judgment was improper; and (4) “next friend” cannot proceed pro se on behalf of a real party in interest. View "Azmat v. Bauer" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals reversing the decision of the circuit court finding C.B.’s daughter to be a neglected child pursuant to the Kentucky Unified Juvenile Code and reinstated the orders of the circuit court, holding that substantial evidence supported the lower court’s finding of neglect.In reversing, the court of appeals found that the evidence supporting the circuit court’s orders was speculative and did not rise to the preponderance level and that the child could not be found to be neglected because C.B. had never exercised custodial control or supervision over the child. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the General Assembly drafted Ky. Rev. Stat. 600.020(1)(a) with the intention that a parent does not have to be exercising control or supervision in order to be found to have neglected or abused a child; and (2) the lower court’s finding of neglect was supported by substantial evidence. View "Cabinet for Health & Family Services v. C.B." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the trial court’s order denying Employer’s motion to compel enforcement of the arbitration agreement between the parties in this case, holding that the arbitration agreement between Employer and Employee was unenforceable as a matter of law.Employer conditioned Employee’s continued employment on her agreement to arbitrate any dispute that may arise between them. The Supreme Court held that the arbitration agreement was unenforceable as a matter of state statutory law because (1) Ky. Rev. Stat. 336.700(2) prohibits employers from conditioning employment on an existing employee’s or prospective employee’s agreement to “waive, arbitrate, or otherwise diminish any existing or future claim, right, or benefit to which the employee or person seeking employment would otherwise be entitled”; and (2) the Federal Arbitration Act does not mandate a contrary holding because it does not preempt section 336.700(2) in this case. View "Northern Kentucky Area Development District v. Snyder" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals granting a Ky. R. Civ. P. 65.09 motion filed by Respondent to compel arbitration, holding that the arbitration agreement between the parties was enforceable.The circuit court in this case issued an order invalidating the arbitration clause contained in the parties’ employment contract. Thereafter, Respondent a motion seeking interlocutory relief to compel arbitration. The court of appeals determined that even where the contract expressly allows Respondent to seek provisional injunctive remedies in a court pending arbitration but did not specifically provide the same right to Movant, the lack of reciprocal access to the courts for injunctive relief did not invalidate the arbitration agreement. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the arbitration agreement did not lack mutuality, was supported by adequate consideration, and was not unconscionable. View "Grimes v. GHSW Enterprises, LLC" on Justia Law