Justia Kentucky Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the judgment of the trial court dismissing Plaintiff’s claim against the heirs of the Decedent seeking to enforce a judgment lien against real property owned by the Decedent at his death, holding that Plaintiff’s tort claim, which accrued prior to the date of death, made Plaintiff a creditor of the Decedent and his Estate.Plaintiff filed a tort action against the Decedent, who subsequently died, and judgment was entered for Plaintiff. Plaintiff then filed a judgment lien against the Estate’s property. In a separate action, Bank filed a foreclosure action seeking to enforce its mortgages against the Decedent’s real property. Plaintiff sought to intervene in the foreclosure action. The trial court concluded that Plaintiff failed to state a claim because at the time of death, the Decedent’s real property immediately passed to his heirs at law, subject only to the claims of creditors, and that Plaintiff’s tort claim did not qualify him as a creditor. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Plaintiff became a creditor of the Decedent when the tort occurred, and the fact that the claim was reduced to judgment and a judgment lien filed postmortem had no impact on Plaintiff’s status as a creditor of the estate. View "Gregory v. Hardgrove" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Auto-Owners Insurance Company on Lee Comley’s complaint seeking payment from Auto-Owners for the loss to his property caused by water damage, holding that the lower courts erred in concluding that the damage-causing event was excluded by the policy.Comley had homeowner’s insurance through Auto-Owners. When water inundated the basement of Comley’s home from a public water main that broke at a railroad crossing near his home, Comley filed a claim for loss to his home and its contents. Auto-Owners denied the claim based upon the application of policy exclusions relating to water damage. The trial court ruled that the policy’s exclusions applied to deny Comley’s claim, and the court of appeals agreed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that none of the policy exclusions applied under the facts of this case to negate potential coverage, and therefore, summary judgment was improperly granted. View "Comley v. Auto-Owners Insurance Co." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the opinion of the court of appeals affirming the decision of the circuit court rendering a verdict in favor of Plaintiff on her tort action against Defendant, holding that the circuit court erred in giving jury instructions that failed to account for Plaintiff’s status and misstated the duty of care owed by Defendant.Plaintiff was Defendant’s mother and was injured while at Defendant’s house. Plaintiff slipped and fell on Defendant’s back deck, which was soapy and slick after Plaintiff mopped it. The jury rendered a verdict in favor of Plaintiff and apportioned 100 percent of the fault upon Defendant. The court of appeals affirmed. the Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court’s “ordinary care” instruction misstated the law of premises liability, and the error was not harmless because the instruction effectively removed the step of establishing the scope of the duty owed to Plaintiff as either a licensee or invitee and whether, based on her classification, Defendant breached her duty of care. View "Smith v. Smith" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals upholding the circuit court’s approval of Ray Thomas’s future periodic payments to DRB Capital, LLC in exchange for an immediate lump sum payment at a discounted rate after Thomas settled a workers’ compensation claim against his employer and its workers’ compensation insurer, holding that the underlying contracts’ anti-assignment clauses are enforceable and that the Kentucky Structured Settlement Protection Act (KSSPA) does not apply to workers’ compensation settlements.Less than six months after settling his claim, Thomas received the circuit court’s transfer approval. The circuit court approved the transfer pursuant to the KSSPA. The court of appeals upheld the circuit court’s approval. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that explicit anti-assignability clauses in the underlying contracts and statutory language limiting the KSSPA to tort settlements required reversal in this case. View "American General Life Insurance Co. v. DRB Capital, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court remanded this matter to the circuit court with directions to reinstate a default judgment granted to Bingham Greenebaum Doll, LLP and J. Richard Kiefer (collectively, Bingham) against Meredith Lawrence on its counterclaim to enforce a promissory note made by Lawrence in partial payment of attorney’s fees owed by Lawrence to Bingham, holding that the trial court erred in setting aside the default judgment and that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming that order.Specifically, the Court held that because Bingham’s counterclaim was a compulsory counterclaim to Lawrence’s action against Bingham for professional negligence and because the complaint called into question the validity of the promissory note at issue, Bingham’s counterclaim was justiciable even though it was filed three an a half months prior to the promissory note’s due date. View "Bingham Greenebaum Doll, LLP v. Lawrence" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals reversing the judgment of the trial court finding the two children in this case to be neglected children and the court’s order requiring in-home supervision by the children’s mother of all contact with them by their father, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion.Father had a history of criminal convictions for sexually abusing his underage half-brother and a failure to comply with conditions of probation. After Father married and had two children, the trial court adopted the recommendation of the Cabinet for Health and Family Services that Father have supervised contact with his sons, with whom he and Mother shared a home. Finding that Father still placed the children at risk of harm, the trial court concluded that the parents had neglected their children by creating or allowing to be created a risk of injury or sexual abuse. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that “a finding of neglect cannot be sustained solely on a child living with a biological parent who is a registered sex offender.” The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion finding that the parents neglected their two sons. View "Cabinet for Health & Family Services v. R.S." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the judgment of the circuit court ordering that the results of blood alcohol tests obtained by the police be suppressed, holding that no statutory violation occurred in this case.After Defendant was arrested, the arresting officer read the pertinent portion of the statutory implied consent warning to Defendant and asked him to submit to an intoxilyzer test. Defendant agreed to do so, and the result of the test was a .266 blood alcohol level. The district court denied Defendant’s motions to suppress his .266 intoxilyzer result and to dismiss his third offense DUI charge. The circuit court reversed, determining that Defendant had been denied his statutory right to obtain an independent blood test and that his due process right had been violated since the results of the independent test may have provided exculpatory evidence. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) because Defendant failed to argue that any additional assistance by the officer could have resulted in Defendant obtaining a blood test, no statutory violation occurred; and (2) Defendant received due process. View "Commonwealth v. Riker" on Justia Law

In this medical malpractice action, the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals reversing the judgment of the trial court in favor of Jewish Hospital Medical Center South and reinstated the circuit court's judgment, holding that because Jewish Hospital’s motion for directed verdict was procedurally infirm the trial court erred in granting the directed verdict, but the error was harmless.Plaintiff brought suit against Jewish Hospital and Dr. Charles Sherrard. Dr. Sherrard settled the claims against him, and the case against Jewish Hospital proceeded to trial. Jewish Hospital moved for directed verdict on standard care as to Dr. Sherrard. The judge granted the motion. After the jury was provided with an instruction that Dr. Sherrard had fallen below the standard of care the jury returned a verdict for Jewish Hospital. The Court of Appeals reversed, determining that the trial court’s grant of directed verdict was erroneous and that a trial court cannot granted a directed verdict of negligence against an empty-chair defendant. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) a directed verdict by a present defendant against an empty-chair defendant falls under the rule set forth in CertainTeed Corp. v. Dexter, 330 S.W.3d 64 (Ky. 2010); and (2) although the trial court erred in granting the directed verdict, the error was harmless. View "Jewish Hospital v. House" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the circuit court and held that third-place finisher Karen Faulkner was not entitled to appear on the November 6, 2018 ballot for the election for the District Court Judge of the 9th Division of the Jefferson District Court (District Court Judge).The order of the circuit court appealed from addressed which candidates were entitled to appear on the ballot of the November 2018 election for the District Court Judge. This case was initially brought as a declaratory judgment action by Karen Faulkner, a third-place primary election candidate. Faulkner asserted that, because the first-place vote-getter died, she should be deemed the second-place vote-getter and thus nominated for the general election. The Supreme Court held that Faulkner was not entitled to appear on the November 2018 ballot because Ky. Rev. Stat. Chapter 118A does not provide that the third-place primary election candidate ascends to a place on the general election ballot when either of the top two vote-getters dies after the primary election but before certification of the primary election results. View "Kentucky State Board of Elections v. Faulkner" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals applying provisions of the Kentucky Fairness in Construction Act (KFCA) to void an entire dispute resolution process contained in the parties’ sewer construction contract, reinstated the summary judgment entered in the trial court, and affirmed the Court of Appeals on all remaining issues.Plaintiff hired Defendant for its sewer project for approximately $2.3 million. The contract contained a provision detailing the process for dispute resolution (Article 13). When Defendant did not substantially complete the project by the scheduled deadline, Plaintiff brought this action. The Court of Appeals deemed the whole of Article 13 void and unenforceable. The Supreme Court held (1) the trial court correctly granted summary judgment in favor of Plaintiff on Defendant’s claim for extra work, and the court of appeals erred in applying certain portions of the KFCA to render null and void the entirety of Article 13; (2) the trial court correctly handled Plaintiff’s liquidated damages claim; and (3) the trial court did not err in denying Plaintiff’s motions for directed verdict and judgment notwithstanding the verdict on one of Plaintiff’s breach of contract claims. View "Louisville & Jefferson County Metropolitan Sewer District v. T&C Contracting, Inc." on Justia Law