Justia Kentucky Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the judgment of the circuit court ordering that the results of blood alcohol tests obtained by the police be suppressed, holding that no statutory violation occurred in this case.After Defendant was arrested, the arresting officer read the pertinent portion of the statutory implied consent warning to Defendant and asked him to submit to an intoxilyzer test. Defendant agreed to do so, and the result of the test was a .266 blood alcohol level. The district court denied Defendant’s motions to suppress his .266 intoxilyzer result and to dismiss his third offense DUI charge. The circuit court reversed, determining that Defendant had been denied his statutory right to obtain an independent blood test and that his due process right had been violated since the results of the independent test may have provided exculpatory evidence. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) because Defendant failed to argue that any additional assistance by the officer could have resulted in Defendant obtaining a blood test, no statutory violation occurred; and (2) Defendant received due process. View "Commonwealth v. Riker" on Justia Law

In this medical malpractice action, the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals reversing the judgment of the trial court in favor of Jewish Hospital Medical Center South and reinstated the circuit court's judgment, holding that because Jewish Hospital’s motion for directed verdict was procedurally infirm the trial court erred in granting the directed verdict, but the error was harmless.Plaintiff brought suit against Jewish Hospital and Dr. Charles Sherrard. Dr. Sherrard settled the claims against him, and the case against Jewish Hospital proceeded to trial. Jewish Hospital moved for directed verdict on standard care as to Dr. Sherrard. The judge granted the motion. After the jury was provided with an instruction that Dr. Sherrard had fallen below the standard of care the jury returned a verdict for Jewish Hospital. The Court of Appeals reversed, determining that the trial court’s grant of directed verdict was erroneous and that a trial court cannot granted a directed verdict of negligence against an empty-chair defendant. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) a directed verdict by a present defendant against an empty-chair defendant falls under the rule set forth in CertainTeed Corp. v. Dexter, 330 S.W.3d 64 (Ky. 2010); and (2) although the trial court erred in granting the directed verdict, the error was harmless. View "Jewish Hospital v. House" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the circuit court and held that third-place finisher Karen Faulkner was not entitled to appear on the November 6, 2018 ballot for the election for the District Court Judge of the 9th Division of the Jefferson District Court (District Court Judge).The order of the circuit court appealed from addressed which candidates were entitled to appear on the ballot of the November 2018 election for the District Court Judge. This case was initially brought as a declaratory judgment action by Karen Faulkner, a third-place primary election candidate. Faulkner asserted that, because the first-place vote-getter died, she should be deemed the second-place vote-getter and thus nominated for the general election. The Supreme Court held that Faulkner was not entitled to appear on the November 2018 ballot because Ky. Rev. Stat. Chapter 118A does not provide that the third-place primary election candidate ascends to a place on the general election ballot when either of the top two vote-getters dies after the primary election but before certification of the primary election results. View "Kentucky State Board of Elections v. Faulkner" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals applying provisions of the Kentucky Fairness in Construction Act (KFCA) to void an entire dispute resolution process contained in the parties’ sewer construction contract, reinstated the summary judgment entered in the trial court, and affirmed the Court of Appeals on all remaining issues.Plaintiff hired Defendant for its sewer project for approximately $2.3 million. The contract contained a provision detailing the process for dispute resolution (Article 13). When Defendant did not substantially complete the project by the scheduled deadline, Plaintiff brought this action. The Court of Appeals deemed the whole of Article 13 void and unenforceable. The Supreme Court held (1) the trial court correctly granted summary judgment in favor of Plaintiff on Defendant’s claim for extra work, and the court of appeals erred in applying certain portions of the KFCA to render null and void the entirety of Article 13; (2) the trial court correctly handled Plaintiff’s liquidated damages claim; and (3) the trial court did not err in denying Plaintiff’s motions for directed verdict and judgment notwithstanding the verdict on one of Plaintiff’s breach of contract claims. View "Louisville & Jefferson County Metropolitan Sewer District v. T&C Contracting, Inc." on Justia Law

In this fraud and professional negligence case the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals that a $80 million punitive damage award was unreasonable and reinstated the trial court’s award, otherwise affirming the appellate court’s judgment, holding that the $80 million award was not grossly excessive and was constitutionally acceptable.Plaintiffs participated in a tax shelter marketed by Defendant, their accounting firm. After the IRS disallowed the tax shelter, Plaintiffs settled with the IRS, paying a total of $20 million for back taxes, interest and penalties and amounts paid to Defendant for fees. Plaintiffs then commenced this action to recoup the $20 million. The trial court found Defendant liable for fraud and gross professional negligence and awarded $20 million in compensatory damages and $80 million in punitive damages. The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment on liability and compensatory damages but reduced the punitive damage award to equal the compensatory damage award. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the Court of Appeals’ decision that Defendant was liable for fraudulent conduct and the compensatory damage award; but (2) reversed the remittitur and reinstated the trial court’s punitive damage award, holding that the facts supported an $80 million punitive damage assessment and that an award of that magnitude was constitutionally acceptable. View "Yung v. Grant Thornton, LLP" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court adopted the Exoneration Rule, the majority rule across the nation providing that a criminal defense attorney may not be sued for legal malpractice in a case resulting in the conviction of his or her client unless the client has been exonerated by direct appeal or upon post-conviction relief, and affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of Plaintiffs’ legal malpractice claim against Defendants.The trial court dismissed Plaintiffs’ legal malpractice action against Plaintiff’s defense attorneys. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that a criminal defendant who has been convicted at trial and whose conviction has not been overturned on appeal or through other post-conviction proceedings may not bring a legal malpractice action against his defense attorneys for alleged negligence occurring during the representation. The Court of Appeals’ opinion was based on the Exoneration Rule, which the court had previously applied. The Supreme Court granted discretionary review to consider the merits of the rule, adopted the rule, and affirmed, holding that because Plaintiff failed to allege that he had been exonerated of his convictions through post-conviction proceedings, the trial court did not err in dismissing his legal malpractice action without prejudice. View "Lawrence v. Bingham, Greenebaum, Doll, LLP" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant’s convictions of first-degree robbery, kidnapping, third-degree burglary, and of being a first-degree persistent felony offender and sentence of fifty years’ imprisonment, holding that none of Defendant’s claims on appeal had merit.Specifically, the Court held (1) the trial court did not abuse its discretion by excluding Defendant’s eyewitness expert testimony; (2) the trial court did not err in failing to prohibit law enforcement officers from presenting expert testimony regarding boot prints and infrared cameras; (3) the photo pack shown to the victim was not unduly suggestive; and (4) there was no error, let alone cumulative error warranting reversal. View "Welch v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals vacating Defendant’s sentence as a persistent felony offender (PFO) in the first degree to ten years’ imprisonment in connection with his conviction of third-degree assault on the grounds that Defendant’s second trial violated his rights against double jeopardy, holding that Defendant’s retrial was barred by the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Section 13 of the Kentucky Constitution.After a mistrial, the Commonwealth indicted Defendant as a PFO, first-degree. After a second trial, Defendant was convicted of one count of third-degree assault. The Court of Appeals vacated the conviction. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Defendant’s retrial was barred by both the United States and Kentucky Constitutions because jeopardy had clearly and unrefutably attached in Defendant’s case and there was no manifest necessity for a mistrial. View "Commonwealth v. Padgett" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court dismissing Plaintiff’s personal injury action, holding that the trial court and the Court of Appeals did not err in their respective analyses of the matter as to whether Plaintiff’s status as a trespasser was mitigated by the attractive nuisance option.Plaintiff, who was sixteen years old at the time, was injured while a trespasser on Defendant’s construction site. Plaintiff, through his parents as next friends and natural guardians, filed this action alleging negligence based on attractive nuisance. The trial court granted Defendants’ motions for summary judgment, noting Plaintiff’s age and his awareness of the dangers inherent in heavy construction equipment. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the doctrine of attractive nuisance was inapplicable to this situation, where Plaintiff, a minor trespasser, occupied the same position as an adult; and (2) the record contained no evidence that Defendants intentionally inflicted Plaintiff’s injuries by willful, wanton, or reckless conduct. View "Hayes v. D.C.I. Properties-D KY, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant’s conviction of first-degree assault, first-degree sexual abuse, and first-degree unlawful imprisonment and sentence of sixty years as a persistent felony offender, holding that any error in the proceedings below was harmless.Specifically, the Court held (1) Defendant’s right to a speedy trial was not violated; (2) the trial court did not err in failing to appoint Defendant substitute counsel; (3) the trial court did not commit reversible error in advising Defendant of the right to or appoint stand-by or hybrid counsel; (3) the trial court did not err in denying Defendant’s motion to suppress; (4) any error in the trial court’s decision to exclude evidence under the Rape Shield Law was harmless; and (5) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in advising Defendant of his right to recall a witness. View "Henderson v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law