Justia Kentucky Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals concluding that Appellee's aggregate sentence for three separate crimes could be separated into discrete parts and that, after completion of a portion of the sentence he received for a violent offense Appellee was entitled to work credit on the remaining portion of his sentence attributable to nonviolent crimes, holding that a violent offender's aggregate sentence cannot be separated into discrete violent and nonviolent components for the purposes of awarding work-time sentence credit.Appellee was an inmate serving an aggregate sentence for both violent and nonviolent offenses. Appellant initiated an administrative review of his sentence, arguing that because the sentence for his only violent offense had been served, he was entitled to work-time credit. The Department of Corrections denied the credit, concluding that Appellee's total combined sentence was not partition able by offense and, as a violent offender, Appellee was not allowed work-time credit under Ky. Rev. Stat. 197.047. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that Appellee was entitled to work-time credit on his nonviolent offense sentences. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the disallowance of work-time sentence credit to a violent offender in section 197.047 applies to the single, continuous sentence. View "Kentucky Department of Corrections v. Dixon" on Justia Law

In this custody dispute, the Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the decision of the court of appeals reversing the circuit court's finding that Appellant qualified as the child's de facto custodian under Ky. Rev. Stat. 403.270, holding that Appellant did not qualify as the child's de facto custodian and lacked standing to assert custodial rights.The circuit court granted temporary custody of the child to Appellant and Dixie Meinders. Later, it was discovered that Keith Middleton was the child's biological father. Keith moved to transfer custody and later filed a civil action seeking custody of the child. Appellant was granted custody. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that Appellant did not qualify for de facto custodian status. The Supreme Court held (1) the time period required for de facto custodian status under section 403.270 must be continuous, rather than aggregated; (2) any active participation by a parent in a custody proceeding evincing a desire to regain custody is sufficient to toll the requisite de facto custodian time period under section 403.270; (3) neither Appellant nor Dixie qualified as the child's de facto custodian, and both lacked standing to assert custodial rights; and (4) custody should be placed with Keith where the mother agreed that sole custody be placed with him. View "Meinders v. Middleton" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court finding Defendant guilty of multiple counts of sexual abuse and sodomy, holding that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in the proceedings below.On appeal, Defendant argued that the trial court erred when it allowed the government to present evidence under Ky. R. Evid. 404(b), when it did not allow the defense to present evidence under Ky. R. Evid. 412, and when it allowed Facebook messages into evidence because they were not properly authenticated. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding (1) the trial court did not err in admitting the Rule 404(b) evidence; (2) the trial court did not err when it excluded evidence that one of the alleged victims made prior allegations of sexual misconduct against another person; and (3) any error in the authentication of the Facebook messages was waived by Defendant. View "Leach v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the opinion of the court of appeals reversing the circuit court's order requiring the Energy and Environment Cabinet to pay the outstanding balance owed to the court-appointed receiver after the conclusion of litigation regarding Jeffrey Bowling's five wastewater treatment plans that were discharging untreated sewage into Kentucky waters, holding that Kentucky law does not support requiring the Cabinet to pay the outstanding balance owed to the receiver.Beginning in 2004, the Cabinet notified Bowling that his plants were improperly operated and maintained. Bowling failed to resolve the plant conditions, and the Cabinet filed a complaint against him seeking a temporary injunction and requesting that the trial court appoint a receiver. Almost nine years later at the conclusion of the litigation, the receiver was owed $27,005. The trial court assessed this amount against the Cabinet. The court of appeals reversed, ruling that only Bowling could be liable for the money owed to the receiver. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that no special circumstances existed to justify requiring the Cabinet to cure the receiver's deficiency. View "Baughman v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court convicting Appellant of four counts of first-degree sodomy and two counts of first-degree sexual abuse and accepting Appellant's Alford plea as to other severed counts and sentencing Appellant to thirty years' imprisonment, holding that there was no reversible error in the proceedings below.Specifically, the Court held (1) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence pursuant to Ky. R. Evid. 404(b); (2) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Appellant's motion for mistrial after a bystander gestured to a witness; and (3) the Commonwealth did not violate Moss. v. Commonwealth, 949 S.W.2d 579 (Ky. 1997) when questioning Appellant. View "Graham v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals in this case alleging tortious interference involving a parent corporation and its wholly-owned subsidiary, holding that a parent company has a qualified privilege to interfere with the contractual relations of its wholly-owned subsidiary unless it employs wrongful means or its interference is not in the economic interest of the subsidiary.Plaintiff brought suit against against CONSOL of Kentucky Inc. (CKI), the wholly-owned subsidiary of CONSOL Energy, Inc. (Energy), Energy, and others, alleging that Energy interfered with the contractual relation between Plaintiff and CKI. The jury found for Plaintiff. The court of appeals concluded that a parent company cannot tortiously interfere with a wholly-owned subsidiary unless it employs wrongful means when interfering and that Energy was entitled to interfere in this case. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Plaintiff adduced no proof as to the required element of wrongful means in a tortious interference claim involving a parent and its wholly-owned subsidiary. View "Sparkman v. Consol Energy, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court that the agreement furnished to Carol Greissman for signature did not violate Kentucky Rules of the Supreme Court 3.130, Rule 5.6 as a matter of law, holding that an obligatory Rule of Professional Conduct for attorneys carries public policy weight and that the agreement did not violate Rule 5.6.Greissman, an attorney, was terminated by Rawlings & Associates for refusing to sign an agreement providing for non-solicitation of Rawlings & Associates' customers or clients following the end of her employment. Greissman subsequently brought a wrongful termination claim. The circuit court granted summary judgment for Rawlings & Associates. The court of appeals upheld the circuit court's ultimate decision dismissing Greissman's complaint but concluded that Greissman's complaint should have been dismissed for failure to state a claim because the Rules of the Kentucky Supreme Court did not provide the public policy to support Greissman's wrongful termination claim. The Supreme Court affirmed on other grounds, holding (1) for purposes of wrongful termination actions, an obligatory Rule of Professional Conduct for attorneys carries equal public policy weight as any public policy set forth in statute or the Constitution; and (2) the agreement in this case did not violate Rule 5.6. View "Greissman v. Rawlings & Associates, PLLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the portion of the trial court’s judgment that contained Defendant’s first-degree murder conviction and affirmed the remainder of the judgment, holding that errors made by the trial court affected the propriety of Defendant’s murder conviction and mandated reversal of this conviction.Defendant was found guilty of first-degree murder, first-degree burglary, second-degree possession of a controlled instance, third-degree possession of a controlled substance, and possession of a controlled substance not in its original container, holding (1) the trial court erred by allowing certain testimony into evidence; (2) the trial court abused its discretion in the handling of the characterization of missing evidence in this case; (3) the trial court did not abused its discretion when it restricted the testimony of Defendant’s false confession expert witness; (4) the trial court erred when it refused to consider certain evidence in determining whether to suppress Defendant’s confession; (5) the trial court erred when it prevented Defendant from testifying about certain out of court statements; and (6) as to all of Defendant’s conviction excluding his first-degree murder conviction, the trial court’s errors were harmless, but as to the murder conviction, they were not harmless. View "Tigue v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals in this grandparent visitation case affirming the judgment of the trial court awarding limited grandparent visitation to Bruce Tipton, the paternal grandfather of the children, holding that the trial court properly considered and applied the best interest factors and applied the proper standard of proof.David and Darlene Morton, the maternal grandfather and step-grandmother of the two children in this case, were granted permanent custody of the children. The family court included a provision for Tipton to have supervised visitation at the Mortons’ discretion. Tipton later filed this petition to modify the grandparent visitation by asking for an established visitation schedule. Ultimately, the trial court granted visitation three times per year with restrictions. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that the trial court properly applied the preponderance of the evidence standard and appropriately considered the relevant factors set forth in Walker v. Blair, 382 S.W.3d 862, 871 (Ky. 2012). The Supreme court affirmed, holding that the trial court properly used the preponderance of the evidence burden of proof when assessing whether Tipton’s grandparent visitation was in the best interest of the children and did not abuse its discretion when granting the limited visitation. View "Morton v. Tipton" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the opinion of the court of appeals affirming the decision of the Workers’ Compensation Board (Board) affirming the administrative law judge’s (ALJ) denial of Appellant’s claim for benefits pursuant to Ky. Rev. Stat. 342, holding that the ALJ’s decision denying Appellant benefits was supported by substantial evidence.Appellant was injured while working as a bus driver for Transit Authority of River City (TARC). TARC denied Appellant’s claim for benefits pursuant to the special defense provided in Ky. Rev. Stat. 342.610(3). TARC argued that Appellant’s injuries was the result of Appellant acting as the aggressor in an altercation with a passenger and that Appellant acted outside the scope of his employment. The ALJ denied benefits pursuant to section 341.610(3). The Board and the court of appeals determined that there was substantial evidence supporting the ALJ’s determination to deny benefits. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the ALJ did not err in denying benefits. View "Trevino v. Transit Authority of River City" on Justia Law