Justia Kentucky Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court that the agreement furnished to Carol Greissman for signature did not violate Kentucky Rules of the Supreme Court 3.130, Rule 5.6 as a matter of law, holding that an obligatory Rule of Professional Conduct for attorneys carries public policy weight and that the agreement did not violate Rule 5.6.Greissman, an attorney, was terminated by Rawlings & Associates for refusing to sign an agreement providing for non-solicitation of Rawlings & Associates' customers or clients following the end of her employment. Greissman subsequently brought a wrongful termination claim. The circuit court granted summary judgment for Rawlings & Associates. The court of appeals upheld the circuit court's ultimate decision dismissing Greissman's complaint but concluded that Greissman's complaint should have been dismissed for failure to state a claim because the Rules of the Kentucky Supreme Court did not provide the public policy to support Greissman's wrongful termination claim. The Supreme Court affirmed on other grounds, holding (1) for purposes of wrongful termination actions, an obligatory Rule of Professional Conduct for attorneys carries equal public policy weight as any public policy set forth in statute or the Constitution; and (2) the agreement in this case did not violate Rule 5.6. View "Greissman v. Rawlings & Associates, PLLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the portion of the trial court’s judgment that contained Defendant’s first-degree murder conviction and affirmed the remainder of the judgment, holding that errors made by the trial court affected the propriety of Defendant’s murder conviction and mandated reversal of this conviction.Defendant was found guilty of first-degree murder, first-degree burglary, second-degree possession of a controlled instance, third-degree possession of a controlled substance, and possession of a controlled substance not in its original container, holding (1) the trial court erred by allowing certain testimony into evidence; (2) the trial court abused its discretion in the handling of the characterization of missing evidence in this case; (3) the trial court did not abused its discretion when it restricted the testimony of Defendant’s false confession expert witness; (4) the trial court erred when it refused to consider certain evidence in determining whether to suppress Defendant’s confession; (5) the trial court erred when it prevented Defendant from testifying about certain out of court statements; and (6) as to all of Defendant’s conviction excluding his first-degree murder conviction, the trial court’s errors were harmless, but as to the murder conviction, they were not harmless. View "Tigue v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals in this grandparent visitation case affirming the judgment of the trial court awarding limited grandparent visitation to Bruce Tipton, the paternal grandfather of the children, holding that the trial court properly considered and applied the best interest factors and applied the proper standard of proof.David and Darlene Morton, the maternal grandfather and step-grandmother of the two children in this case, were granted permanent custody of the children. The family court included a provision for Tipton to have supervised visitation at the Mortons’ discretion. Tipton later filed this petition to modify the grandparent visitation by asking for an established visitation schedule. Ultimately, the trial court granted visitation three times per year with restrictions. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that the trial court properly applied the preponderance of the evidence standard and appropriately considered the relevant factors set forth in Walker v. Blair, 382 S.W.3d 862, 871 (Ky. 2012). The Supreme court affirmed, holding that the trial court properly used the preponderance of the evidence burden of proof when assessing whether Tipton’s grandparent visitation was in the best interest of the children and did not abuse its discretion when granting the limited visitation. View "Morton v. Tipton" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the opinion of the court of appeals affirming the decision of the Workers’ Compensation Board (Board) affirming the administrative law judge’s (ALJ) denial of Appellant’s claim for benefits pursuant to Ky. Rev. Stat. 342, holding that the ALJ’s decision denying Appellant benefits was supported by substantial evidence.Appellant was injured while working as a bus driver for Transit Authority of River City (TARC). TARC denied Appellant’s claim for benefits pursuant to the special defense provided in Ky. Rev. Stat. 342.610(3). TARC argued that Appellant’s injuries was the result of Appellant acting as the aggressor in an altercation with a passenger and that Appellant acted outside the scope of his employment. The ALJ denied benefits pursuant to section 341.610(3). The Board and the court of appeals determined that there was substantial evidence supporting the ALJ’s determination to deny benefits. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the ALJ did not err in denying benefits. View "Trevino v. Transit Authority of River City" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court sentencing Defendant to twenty-five years for first-degree robbery, reckless homicide, and tampering with evidence, holding that there was no error in Defendant’s sentencing proceedings.Defendant was initially convicted for several convictions, including first-degree assault. Following the guilt phase of trial, Defendant waived jury sentencing and entered into a plea agreement as to sentencing. The trial court sentenced Defendant to twenty-five years in accordance with the agreement. On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the first-degree assault conviction. On remand, the trial court again sentenced Defendant to twenty-five years. The Supreme Court affirmed the new sentence, holding (1) by entering a plea agreement, Defendant waived his right to jury sentencing; (2) the plea agreement constituted a contract between Defendant and the Commonwealth, but there were no ambiguities; and (3) the reversal of the assault conviction affected neither Defendant’s total sentence nor his parole eligibility. View "Hammond v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

In this negligence action, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgments of the circuit court and court of appeals that Defendants were protected by the immunity doctrine, holding that Louisville Metro Housing Authority (LMHA) was a state agency entitled to the protection of governmental immunity and that LMHA’s employee performing discretionary acts was shielded by qualified official immunity.A three-year-old was shot and killed when his mother took him to visit Terrah Love at her apartment building and someone involved in a fued with Love came to the complex and began shooting. A stray bullet hit and killed the child. The mother sued LMHA, the owner and property management company of the apartments, and Juanita Mitchell, the property manager, for their failure to evict Love, alleging that they negligently caused the child’s death. The lower courts concluded that LMHA was shielded by governmental immunity and Mitchell was shielded by qualified official immunity. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that both defendants were entitled to immunity. View "Bryant v. Louisville Metro Housing Authority" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court convicting Defendant of first-degree sodomy, possession of a handgun by a convicted felon, and being a persistent felony offender in the first degree, holding that there was no prejudicial error in the proceedings below.Specifically, the Court held that the trial court (1) did not err by denying Defendant’s motion to suppress the handgun or the victim’s testimony; (2) did not err by applying the protection of the Rape Shield Law to exclude evidence that the victim had previously engaged in prostitution; (3) did not err by allowing evidence that the victim was seventeen at the time the crime was committed; (4) did not err by ruling that the admission of the victim’s age at the time of the offense did not open the door to evidence of the victim’s prior prostitution; (5) erred by refusing to allow Defendant to stipulate that he was a convicted felon, but the error was harmless; and (6) did not err by failing to sever Defendant’s possession of a handgun by a convicted felon charge for a separate trial. View "Ward v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

In this appeal from the decision of the court of appeals reversing Defendant’s conviction the Supreme Court exercised its discretion under Ky. R. Civ. P. 76.12(8)(a) and ordered the Commonwealth’s brief before this Court stricken and this appeal dismissed, holding that the Commonwealth failed to comply with section 76.12(4)(c)(iv) and (v).Defendant was found guilty of second-degree cruelty to animals. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the trial court erred when it failed to grant Defendant’s motion for directed verdict. The Commonwealth filed a petition for rehearing, which the court of appeals denied. The Commonwealth then requested discretionary review from the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court granted discretionary review, and the parties filed briefs. The Supreme Court struck the Commonwealth’s brief from the record and dismissed its appeal, holding (1) because the Commonwealth failed to provide any support for its factual assertions in both its statement of the case and argument sections of its brief, it failed to meet the substantial requirement of pinpoint citations to the record specific in section 76.12; and (2) the Commonwealth did not make a good faith effort to comply with the requirements of sections 76.12(4)(c)(iv) and (v). View "Commonwealth v. Roth" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals’ decision reversing the judgment of the circuit court in favor of Defendants, the doctors and hospital in this medical negligence litigation, holding that there was no error in the trial court’s challenged ruling.After the trial court initially entered a judgment in favor of Defendants, the court of appeals reversed and ordered a new trial, concluding that the trial court had erroneously decided a Daubert issue. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded to the court of appeals for consideration of another issue that had not been addressed. On remand, the court of appeals again reversed, holding that the trial court erred by limiting an expert’s testimony. The Supreme Court reversed and reinstated the judgment, holding (1) the trial court did not err in limiting the expert’s testimony; and (2) even if the trial court erred in limiting the testimony, that error was harmless. View "Oliphant v. Ries" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals to grant Dr. Robert Kleinfeld’s writ petition precluding the discovery of certain information, holding that the court of appeals did not properly apply the extraordinary writ petition standard.The case began as an insurance dispute. At issue was the insurer’s discovery request for information from Kleinfeld, individually and as corporate representative for Louisville Sports Injury Center, P.S.C. The trial court entered an order compelling LSIC, through Kleinfeld, to produce the requested discovery. Thereafter, LSIC, through Kleinfeld, filed a petition for a writ of prohibition seeking protection from the trial court’s order. The court of appeals granted the petition. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the court of appeals abused its discretion when it concluded that the extraordinarily high writ petition standard was met in this case because the court’s decision was unsupported by sound legal principles. View "Allstate Property & Casualty Insurance Co. v. Kleinfeld" on Justia Law