Justia Kentucky Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court upholding the validity of the Governor exercising its authority under Ky. Rev. Stat. 12.028 in issuing Executive Order (EO) 2017-364, holding that there was no statutory or constitutional infirmity with the Governor's use of the executive order to affect a temporary government reorganization on the facts before the Court.EO 2017-364 made several changes to various state education boards. The Attorney General filed suit challenging the validity of the executive order. The circuit court upheld the order. The Supreme Court granted discretionary review and affirmed, holding that EO 2017-364 does not constitute an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power, nor did the Governor's government reorganization constitute an unconstitutional infringement on the judiciary's power. View "Commonwealth ex rel. Beshear v. Bevin" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court accepted the United States District Court, Western District of Kentucky's request for certification of law on the following issue, holding that a pre-injury liability waiver signed by a parent on behalf of a minor child is unenforceable under the specific facts of this case.Mother purchased tickets at a for-profit trampoline park (Park) for her eleven-year-old daughter. Mother checked a box indicating that she had read the Park's waiver of liability. The daughter proceeded to participate in the Park's activities but was injured. Mother, as next friend of Daughter, sued the Park for the injury. The Park moved for summary judgment based on Mother's legal power to waive the rights of her daughter via the release. The district court then requested certification from the Supreme Court as to this novel issue of state law. The Supreme Court held (1) under the common law of this Commonwealth, absent special circumstances, a parent has no authority to enter into contracts on a child’s behalf; and (2) there is no relevant public policy to justify abrogating the common law to enforce an exculpatory agreement between a for-profit entity and a parent on behalf of her minor child. View "Miller v. House of Boom Kentucky, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the opinion of the court of appeals affirming the decision of the Workers' Compensation Board affirming the ALJ's determination that Appellant was not entitled to benefits pursuant to Ky. Rev. Stat. 342 in connection with his injury while working as a bus driver for Transit Authority of River City (TARC), holding that the ALJ's decision denying Appellant benefits was supported by substantial evidence.While operating a TARC bus Appellant was assaulted by a passenger, resulting in injuries. TARC denied Appellant's claim for benefits pursuant to the special defense provided in Ky. Rev. Stat. 342.610(3), asserting that Appellant was the aggressor in the altercation and that he acted outside of the scope of his employment. After reviewing the evidence, the ALJ denied Appellant benefits. The Board and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that there was substantial evidence supporting the ALJ's determination to deny benefits. View "Trevino v. Transit Authority of River City" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the circuit court dismissing this medical malpractice action, holding that summary judgment was improper.Plaintiff, as next friend of her child, brought this suit alleging that her child's developmental delays were caused by her obstetrician's negligence in her prenatal care and the child's delivery. Before trial, Defendant moved to strike Plaintiff's experts on the grounds that Plaintiff had engaged in the unauthorized practice of law. The trial court found that Plaintiff had engaged in the unauthorized practice of law and struck Plaintiff's expert witnesses. Thereafter, the court entered an order dismissing the case with prejudice. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Plaintiff did not engage in the unauthorized practice of law, and therefore, it was error for the trial court to strike the expert disclosures; and (2) Plaintiff presented expert witnesses sufficient to survive a motion for summary judgment. View "Azmat v. Bauer" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals concluding that Appellee's aggregate sentence for three separate crimes could be separated into discrete parts and that, after completion of a portion of the sentence he received for a violent offense Appellee was entitled to work credit on the remaining portion of his sentence attributable to nonviolent crimes, holding that a violent offender's aggregate sentence cannot be separated into discrete violent and nonviolent components for the purposes of awarding work-time sentence credit.Appellee was an inmate serving an aggregate sentence for both violent and nonviolent offenses. Appellant initiated an administrative review of his sentence, arguing that because the sentence for his only violent offense had been served, he was entitled to work-time credit. The Department of Corrections denied the credit, concluding that Appellee's total combined sentence was not partition able by offense and, as a violent offender, Appellee was not allowed work-time credit under Ky. Rev. Stat. 197.047. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that Appellee was entitled to work-time credit on his nonviolent offense sentences. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the disallowance of work-time sentence credit to a violent offender in section 197.047 applies to the single, continuous sentence. View "Kentucky Department of Corrections v. Dixon" on Justia Law

In this custody dispute, the Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the decision of the court of appeals reversing the circuit court's finding that Appellant qualified as the child's de facto custodian under Ky. Rev. Stat. 403.270, holding that Appellant did not qualify as the child's de facto custodian and lacked standing to assert custodial rights.The circuit court granted temporary custody of the child to Appellant and Dixie Meinders. Later, it was discovered that Keith Middleton was the child's biological father. Keith moved to transfer custody and later filed a civil action seeking custody of the child. Appellant was granted custody. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that Appellant did not qualify for de facto custodian status. The Supreme Court held (1) the time period required for de facto custodian status under section 403.270 must be continuous, rather than aggregated; (2) any active participation by a parent in a custody proceeding evincing a desire to regain custody is sufficient to toll the requisite de facto custodian time period under section 403.270; (3) neither Appellant nor Dixie qualified as the child's de facto custodian, and both lacked standing to assert custodial rights; and (4) custody should be placed with Keith where the mother agreed that sole custody be placed with him. View "Meinders v. Middleton" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court finding Defendant guilty of multiple counts of sexual abuse and sodomy, holding that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in the proceedings below.On appeal, Defendant argued that the trial court erred when it allowed the government to present evidence under Ky. R. Evid. 404(b), when it did not allow the defense to present evidence under Ky. R. Evid. 412, and when it allowed Facebook messages into evidence because they were not properly authenticated. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding (1) the trial court did not err in admitting the Rule 404(b) evidence; (2) the trial court did not err when it excluded evidence that one of the alleged victims made prior allegations of sexual misconduct against another person; and (3) any error in the authentication of the Facebook messages was waived by Defendant. View "Leach v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the opinion of the court of appeals reversing the circuit court's order requiring the Energy and Environment Cabinet to pay the outstanding balance owed to the court-appointed receiver after the conclusion of litigation regarding Jeffrey Bowling's five wastewater treatment plans that were discharging untreated sewage into Kentucky waters, holding that Kentucky law does not support requiring the Cabinet to pay the outstanding balance owed to the receiver.Beginning in 2004, the Cabinet notified Bowling that his plants were improperly operated and maintained. Bowling failed to resolve the plant conditions, and the Cabinet filed a complaint against him seeking a temporary injunction and requesting that the trial court appoint a receiver. Almost nine years later at the conclusion of the litigation, the receiver was owed $27,005. The trial court assessed this amount against the Cabinet. The court of appeals reversed, ruling that only Bowling could be liable for the money owed to the receiver. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that no special circumstances existed to justify requiring the Cabinet to cure the receiver's deficiency. View "Baughman v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court convicting Appellant of four counts of first-degree sodomy and two counts of first-degree sexual abuse and accepting Appellant's Alford plea as to other severed counts and sentencing Appellant to thirty years' imprisonment, holding that there was no reversible error in the proceedings below.Specifically, the Court held (1) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence pursuant to Ky. R. Evid. 404(b); (2) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Appellant's motion for mistrial after a bystander gestured to a witness; and (3) the Commonwealth did not violate Moss. v. Commonwealth, 949 S.W.2d 579 (Ky. 1997) when questioning Appellant. View "Graham v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals in this case alleging tortious interference involving a parent corporation and its wholly-owned subsidiary, holding that a parent company has a qualified privilege to interfere with the contractual relations of its wholly-owned subsidiary unless it employs wrongful means or its interference is not in the economic interest of the subsidiary.Plaintiff brought suit against against CONSOL of Kentucky Inc. (CKI), the wholly-owned subsidiary of CONSOL Energy, Inc. (Energy), Energy, and others, alleging that Energy interfered with the contractual relation between Plaintiff and CKI. The jury found for Plaintiff. The court of appeals concluded that a parent company cannot tortiously interfere with a wholly-owned subsidiary unless it employs wrongful means when interfering and that Energy was entitled to interfere in this case. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Plaintiff adduced no proof as to the required element of wrongful means in a tortious interference claim involving a parent and its wholly-owned subsidiary. View "Sparkman v. Consol Energy, Inc." on Justia Law