Justia Kentucky Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court reversed the appellate court's opinion reversing Defendant's murder conviction and ordering a new trial, holding that there was not a reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have been different but for any of defense counsel's purported deficiencies.On appeal, the court of appeals reversed Defendant's conviction and remanded the case to the trial court for a new trial, concluding that Defendant's counsel was ineffective in representing Defendant during his murder trial. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that while defense counsel did make some mistakes at trial, those mistakes did not render his assistance ineffective. View "Commonwealth v. Ferguson" on Justia Law

In this declaratory judgment action the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the circuit court in favor of the Office of the Attorney General (OAG) on its action seeking to vindicate its right to contract with outside counsel on a contingency-fee basis, holding that the OAG is subject to the contracting-oversight requirements of the Model Procurement Code and that the Government Contract Review Committeee (Committee) of the Legislative Research Commission did not arbitrarily disapprove of the contingency-fee contract at issue in this case.The OAG contracted on a contingency-fee basis with a team of law firms to conduct investigation into and commence litigation on potential statutory violations arising out of the manufacture and distribution of prescription opioid products within the Commonwealth. The Committee recommended that William Landrum, the Secretary of the Finance and Administration Cabinet, disapprove and cancel the contract. Landrum did as the Committee recommended. The OAG then brought this declaratory judgment action. The circuit court granted the OAG all the relief it sought. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Committee and Landrum did not act inappropriately in disapproving and canceling the contract. View "Landrum v. Commonwealth ex rel. Beshear" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's convictions but reversed and remanded for a new penalty phase, holding that palpable error occurred when the Commonwealth gave the jury incorrect parole eligibility information.Defendant was convicted of first-degree burglary, second-degree assault, and second-degree wanton endangerment. Defendant was sentenced to thirty years in prison. The Supreme Court affirmed the convictions but reversed Defendant's sentence, holding that the trial court (1) did not commit palpable error by allowing certain hearsay testimony into evidence; (2) did not err by denying Defendant's requested instructions on second-degree burglary and first-degree criminal trespass; (3) did not err by providing instructions to the jury during deliberation; (4) committed palpable error by not correcting the Commonwealth's misstatement of Defendant's parole eligibility on the first-degree burglary charge; and (5) erred by limiting Defendant's testimony during the penalty phase. View "Beard v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the opinion of the court of appeals affirming the administrative law judge's (ALJ) award of permanent partial disability benefits based on Employee's treating doctor's impairment rating, holding (1) Employee met his burden of proving the extent of the injury attributable to his work injury; but (2) the court of appeals erred in holding that Ky. Rev. Stat. 342.730(4) was not retroactive.Specifically, the Court held (1) the ALJ relied upon substantial evidence in finding Employee's work injury to be the combination of the exacerbation of a dormant pre-existing condition and a new injury; and (2) while the court of appeals was correct in addressing the retroactivity of section 342.703(4), the court erred in holding that the statute was not retroactive. The Court remanded this matter to the ALJ for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Holcim v. Swinford" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the opinion of the court of appeals reversing in part the judgment of the circuit court in favor of the Contestants in this will-contest case, holding that the court of appeals erred by failing to apply the appropriate standard of appellate review of the trial court's denial of the will-proponent's directed-verdict motion.In reversing the circuit court's judgment in favor of the Contestants, the court of appeals found that the Contestants' evidence at trial was insufficient to support the jury's verdict. The Supreme Court reversed the opinion of the court of appeals and reinstated the jury's verdict on the will-contest issues but otherwise affirmed, holding that the court of appeals erred by failing to apply the appropriate standard of appellate review of the trial court's denial of the will proponent's directed verdict motion. View "Getty v. Getty" on Justia Law

In this workers' compensation enforcement action the Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the decision of the court of appeals dismissing in part and reversing in part the circuit court's order granting Appellant's third, fourth, and fifth motions for partial summary judgment, holding that the court of appeals erred in not dismissing Appellees' appeal from the portion of the circuit court's order granting summary judgment to Appellant on his third and fifth motions for partial summary judgment.Appellees, Appellant's employer and its workers' compensation insurance carrier, appealed the circuit court's order granting Appellant's third, fourth, and fifth motions for partial summary judgment. The court of appeals dismissed the appeal from the portion of the order granting Appellant's fourth motion for partial summary judgment as an appeal from an interlocutory order, but it refused to dismiss the remainder of the appeal. The Supreme Court held that the court of appeals should have dismissed the appeal from the portions of the circuit court's order granting summary judgment to Appellant on his third and fifth motions for partial summary judgment, along with his fourth partial summary judgment motion, as being an appeal from a nonfinal order. View "Hampton v. Intech Contracting, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the decision of the court of appeals granting in part and denying in part Appellant's petition for a writ to prohibit the trial court from compelling her husband's deposition testimony, thereby denying Appellant's writ petition in whole, holding that the trial court did not err in allowing the deposition to move forward.Appellant filed suit against Baptist Healthcare, Inc., her former employer, alleging, inter alia, gender discrimination. Baptist sought to depose Dr. Gregory Collins - Appellant's husband, treating physician, and employer - but Appellant objected to the deposition based on the husband-wife privilege. Baptist then filed a motion to compel Collins's testimony. The trial court granted in part and denied in part the motion, ordering that Baptist could depose Collins on three specified topics. The court of appeals granted Appellant's writ of prohibition as it related to Collins's testimony of Lucas's public manifestations of emotional health but denied the writ as it related to the other two topics. The Supreme Court held that the trial court's order appropriately limited Collins's deposition testimony and properly allowed the deposition to take place subject to additional objections or assertions of privilege. View "Lucas v. Honorable Judith E. McDonald-Burkman" on Justia Law

In a whistleblower action, the Supreme Court affirmed in part and remanded in part the order of the court of appeals denying the petition for a writ of prohibition/mandamus sought by the University of Louisville and Ruby Fenton, holding that remand was necessary in this case.Plaintiff filed this whistleblower action against the University after the University did not renew his faculty appointment. During discovery, Plaintiff served a subpoena upon Fenton seeking all written communications and notes reflecting communications between Fenton and any person associated with the University relating to faculty grievance proceedings initiated by Plaintiff. Fenton represented Plaintiff's supervisors during the grievance proceedings. The University and Fenton asserted that the communications were protected by the attorney-client privilege and the work-product privilege. The trial court permitted the discovery. Fenton and the University then filed this writ of prohibition/mandamus. The court of appeals denied the writ. The Supreme Court held (1) the lower courts did not err in determining the the attorney-client privilege was not applicable under these circumstances; but (2) the court of appeals did not rule upon the University and Fenton's request for protection of the subject communications based upon the work-product privilege. View "University of Louisville v. Honorable Audra Eckerle" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals upholding an Administrative Law Judge's (ALJ) award of six percent permanent partial disability benefits to Appellant because of a work-related injury, holding that substantial medical evidence supported the six percent permanent partial disability found by the ALJ.On appeal, Appellant argued that the ALJ erred by making insufficient findings to exclude a pre-existing condition in assessing his impairment rating. The Workers' Compensation Board concluded that remand was necessary for the ALJ to address Finley v. DBM Technologies, 217 S.W.3d 261 (Ky. App. 2007). The court of appeals disagreed, holding that the ALJ did not need to apply Finley and that the ALJ based her opinion on substantial medical evidence. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the ALJ did not err in limiting her discussion of Finley and that substantial evidence supported the ALJ's findings. View "Wetherby v. Amazon.com" on Justia Law

In this real property dispute, the Supreme Court affirmed the opinion of the court of appeals reversing a jury verdict and resulting judgment in favor of Defendants, holding that the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury in a way that allowed the jury to address a factual dispute to resolve it.The parties in this case owned adjoining farms. At issue was whether Plaintiffs' use of a road access across Defendants' land had ripened into a prescriptive easement. The jury found in favor of Defendants, which meant that Plaintiffs had no right to use the disputed road. The trial court entered judgment in conformity with the jury's verdict. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury in conformance with the rule in Ward v. Stewart, 435 S.W.2d (Ky. 1968). The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) when confronted with conflicting evidence on the issue of permissive versus prescriptive use of the road at issue, the trial court abused its discretion by failing to provide a burden-shifting Ward instruction; and (2) Ky. R. Evid. 801A(c)(2) did not apply to except certain testimony under the hearsay rule. View "Melton v. Cross" on Justia Law