Justia Kentucky Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The case involves the estate of Penny Ann Simmons, who passed away on July 19, 2018. Dianna Lynn Davenport was appointed as the personal representative of Simmons' estate by the Spencer District Court on September 11, 2018, with the order entered by the Spencer County Clerk on September 21, 2018. Davenport filed a medical malpractice and wrongful death lawsuit against Kindred Hospitals on September 20, 2019. Kindred argued that the lawsuit was filed outside the one-year statute of limitations, which they claimed began when the judge signed the appointment order.The Jefferson Circuit Court granted Kindred's motion for summary judgment, ruling that the lawsuit was indeed filed outside the statute of limitations. The court found that the statute of limitations began when the judge signed the order of appointment, as per KRS 395.105. The Court of Appeals affirmed this decision, referencing its own precedent in Batts v. Illinois Central Railroad Company, but invited the Supreme Court of Kentucky to review the issue.The Supreme Court of Kentucky affirmed the lower courts' decisions. The court held that probate proceedings, including the appointment of a personal representative, are special statutory proceedings. Therefore, the procedural requirements of KRS 395.105, which state that the appointment is effective upon the judge's signing, prevail over the Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure. The court also clarified that the one-year limitation period for filing claims, as set forth in KRS 413.180(1), begins at the time of the appointment, which is when the judge signs the order. Thus, Davenport's lawsuit was filed outside the permissible time frame, and the summary judgment in favor of Kindred was affirmed. View "DAVENPORT KINDRED HOSPITALS LIMITED PARTNERSHIP" on Justia Law

The appellant was convicted of murder, abuse of a corpse, and being a first-degree persistent felony offender, resulting in a fifty-year prison sentence. The case involved the death of Amanda Berry, who had moved in with the appellant after meeting him through a pen pal program while she was incarcerated. Amanda struggled with substance use disorder and was living in a dilapidated house with the appellant. Neighbors testified about the couple's tumultuous relationship, frequent arguments, and instances of physical abuse by the appellant. Amanda was last seen in January 2020, and her body was found weeks later in the basement of the house she shared with the appellant.The Jefferson Circuit Court handled the initial trial. The appellant was absent from the trial and sentencing phases, having refused to attend despite being informed of his right to be present and the consequences of his absence. The trial court proceeded in his absence, finding that he had waived his right to be present. The appellant's defense included arguments that there was no direct evidence linking him to the murder and that the body found was not definitively identified as Amanda's. The jury found him guilty, and he was sentenced accordingly.The Supreme Court of Kentucky reviewed the case. The court affirmed the lower court's decision, holding that the appellant had waived his right to be present at trial through his conduct. The court also found no error in the trial court's denial of the appellant's motions for a mistrial and directed verdict, the admission of prior bad acts evidence, and hearsay statements under the state of mind exception. The court concluded that no cumulative error occurred, and the appellant's conviction and sentence were upheld. View "SLOSS V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY" on Justia Law

In this case, the plaintiff, Dakota Miller, was injured when a vehicle crashed into a business he was patronizing, located on property owned by T & J Land Co., LLC. Miller filed a lawsuit against T & J Land nearly two years after the incident, alleging negligence and seeking punitive damages. He claimed the property owner failed to protect patrons from such accidents.The Knox Circuit Court dismissed Miller's lawsuit, ruling it was untimely under the one-year statute of limitations for personal injury claims as per Kentucky Revised Statute (KRS) 413.140(1)(a). The Kentucky Court of Appeals reversed this decision, holding that the two-year statute of limitations under the Motor Vehicle Reparations Act (MVRA) applied, as Miller was a victim of a motor vehicle accident.The Supreme Court of Kentucky reviewed the case and reversed the Court of Appeals' decision. The Court held that the MVRA's two-year statute of limitations did not apply to Miller's premises liability claim against T & J Land. The Court reasoned that the MVRA is intended for claims involving the ownership, operation, maintenance, or use of motor vehicles, which was not the nature of Miller's claim. The Court emphasized that Miller's lawsuit was fundamentally about premises liability, not a motor vehicle accident, and thus fell under the one-year statute of limitations for personal injury claims.The Supreme Court of Kentucky reinstated the Knox Circuit Court's order of dismissal, concluding that Miller's claims were indeed time-barred under the applicable one-year statute of limitations. View "T & J LAND CO., LLC V. MILLER" on Justia Law

In this case, the Courier Journal requested multiple public records from the Shively Police Department (SPD) under the Open Records Act, following a fatal car crash involving a police chase. The requested records included dispatch reports, 911 calls, audio communications, dashcam and bodycam footage, and incident reports. SPD denied the request, citing the "law enforcement exemption" under KRS 61.878(1)(h), arguing that the records pertained to an ongoing criminal case and their release would harm the investigation.The Jefferson Circuit Court initially ruled in favor of SPD, granting summary judgment on the basis that the law enforcement exemption applied. The court found that SPD had met its burden of proof under the exemption, and thus, the records were exempt from disclosure. The Courier Journal appealed this decision to the Court of Appeals.The Court of Appeals reversed the circuit court's decision, holding that SPD had not sufficiently demonstrated that the records were exempt under the law enforcement exemption, the personal privacy exemption, or KRS 17.150(2). The appellate court vacated the summary judgment in favor of SPD and remanded the case for further proceedings, recommending an in camera review of the requested records.The Supreme Court of Kentucky affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision. The court held that SPD failed to provide a concrete risk of harm associated with the release of the records, as required by the law enforcement exemption. The court also clarified that KRS 17.150(2) governs the disclosure of records post-prosecution and does not override the harm requirement of the law enforcement exemption. Additionally, the court found that SPD did not adequately justify withholding the records under the personal privacy exemption. The case was remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "SHIVELY POLICE DEPARTMENT V. COURIER JOURNAL, INC." on Justia Law

On December 5, 2020, Covington Police Officer Kevin Igo received a letter alleging that Scott Bitter, a convicted felon, was involved in drug trafficking and had assaulted someone. Officer Igo and other officers went to Bitter's residence to investigate. They conducted a "knock and talk" without announcing themselves as police officers. When Bitter's companion, Susan Hornsby, opened the door, Officer Igo observed drug paraphernalia in plain view, including a scale, baggies, and pills. The officers then conducted a protective sweep of the apartment and later obtained a search warrant, which led to the discovery of drugs and a firearm.The Kenton Circuit Court denied Bitter's motion to suppress the evidence, which argued that the initial entry and subsequent search were unconstitutional. The court found that the officers' actions were lawful, as the drug paraphernalia was in plain view and the protective sweep was justified for officer safety. Bitter was convicted by a jury of two counts of trafficking in controlled substances and being a persistent felony offender, and he was sentenced to twenty years in prison.The Supreme Court of Kentucky reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that the trial court's findings were supported by substantial evidence and were not clearly erroneous. The court concluded that Officer Igo's observation of the drug paraphernalia from the doorway was lawful and that the protective sweep was reasonable under the circumstances. The search warrant obtained based on these observations was valid, and the evidence collected was admissible. The court affirmed Bitter's conviction and sentence. View "BITTER V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY" on Justia Law

Hunter Smith, a phlebotomist employed by Laboratory Corp of America (Labcorp), sustained a work-related back injury on January 27, 2021, when a shelving unit fell on his head. This incident led to acute lower back injuries requiring surgery. Despite the surgery, Smith continued to experience significant pain and other symptoms. Medical evaluations by Dr. Gregory Lanford and Dr. Jules Barefoot assessed a 24% permanent impairment rating, attributing 19% to the work injury and 5% to pre-existing conditions. Dr. Michael Best, however, disagreed, attributing all of Smith's back issues to pre-existing conditions and assessing a 10% impairment rating.The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) awarded Smith permanent partial disability (PPD) benefits, accepting Dr. Best's 10% impairment rating but attributing 5% to the work injury. The ALJ also awarded benefits for Smith's psychological condition based on a 20% impairment rating by Dr. Robert Sivley, despite Labcorp's contention that this rating was improperly based on a conditional impairment rating.Labcorp appealed to the Workers’ Compensation Board, arguing that the ALJ improperly relied on Dr. Sivley's rating and should have accepted Dr. Trivette's 0% rating. Smith cross-appealed, arguing that the ALJ misapplied the AMA Guides and should not have admitted Dr. Best's report. The Board affirmed the ALJ's decision, and both parties appealed to the Kentucky Court of Appeals, which also affirmed the Board's decision.The Supreme Court of Kentucky reviewed the case and affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision. The Court held that the ALJ's reliance on Dr. Sivley's impairment rating was justified and that the ALJ's decision was supported by substantial evidence. The Court found no compelling reason to disturb the ALJ's findings, as they were not clearly erroneous. View "LABORATORY CORP. OF AMERICA V. HUNTER SMITH" on Justia Law

Darrie Rushin was indicted on multiple charges, including first-degree burglary and first-degree sodomy. He pled guilty to amended charges and was sentenced to seven years in prison, followed by a five-year period of postincarceration supervision. After completing his initial sentence, Rushin was released but later reincarcerated for violating the terms of his supervision.Rushin requested the Department of Corrections (DOC) to review his sentence calculation, arguing he was wrongfully denied sentence credits that would reduce his reincarceration period. The DOC denied his request, and his subsequent administrative appeal was also denied. Rushin then filed a motion in his underlying criminal case seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. The trial court dismissed his claim on separation-of-powers grounds. On appeal, the Court of Appeals concluded the trial court improperly dismissed the petition but affirmed on other grounds, holding Rushin was not entitled to relief as a matter of law.The Supreme Court of Kentucky reviewed the case and held that inmates reincarcerated for violating postincarceration supervision terms are entitled to earn statutory sentence credits under KRS 197.045 during their reincarceration. The court reasoned that the initial term of imprisonment and the subsequent period of postincarceration supervision are parts of a single sentence. The court emphasized that statutory sentence credits apply to all inmates unless explicitly excluded by statute. Consequently, the decision of the Court of Appeals was reversed. View "RUSHIN V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY" on Justia Law

Dennis Keith Sims was convicted by a Casey County jury of two counts of first-degree sexual abuse involving his granddaughters, nine-year-old D.C. and seven-year-old Z.C. The incidents occurred while the girls stayed with Sims during their mother’s illness. Upon their return, D.C. exhibited behavioral changes and later disclosed inappropriate touching by Sims. Both girls provided testimony, with D.C. detailing multiple instances of abuse and Z.C. confirming inappropriate touching.The Casey Circuit Court sentenced Sims to twenty years in prison, following the jury's recommendation. Sims appealed, raising several issues. He argued that the trial court erred by not administering an oath to the prospective jurors before voir dire, violating his Sixth Amendment rights by allowing the girls to testify outside his presence, and admitting late-disclosed evidence. He also contended that the court improperly excluded certain testimony and that there was insufficient evidence to convict him regarding Z.C.The Supreme Court of Kentucky reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decisions. The court found no error in the trial court's failure to administer an oath to the venire, as no rule required it. The court also upheld the decision to allow the girls to testify outside Sims’s presence, citing sufficient evidence of their emotional distress. The court ruled that Sims was not deprived of effective counsel despite being separated from his attorney during the girls' testimony, as he had opportunities to consult with his lawyer. The court found no abuse of discretion in admitting the late-disclosed evidence and excluding hearsay testimony. Finally, the court held that there was sufficient evidence to support the conviction related to Z.C., given the testimonies and Sims’s own statements. View "SIMS V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY" on Justia Law

In January 2016, Kenneth McPeek Racing Stable, Inc. (McPeek) entered into an oral agreement with Nancy Polk, owner of Normandy Farm, LLC (Normandy), to train a horse named Daddy’s Lil’ Darling. McPeek was to receive monthly training fees, room and board fees, and 12% of the horse’s winnings. After Polk’s death in August 2018, her heirs decided to sell the horse, which fetched $3,500,000 at auction. McPeek claimed an additional 5% commission on the sale, asserting it was part of his oral agreement with Polk, although this term was not documented in writing.The Fayette Circuit Court granted summary judgment in favor of Normandy, citing KRS 230.357(11), which requires a signed writing for any compensation related to the sale of a horse. The court found that McPeek’s claim for a 5% commission was barred by this statute, as there was no written agreement. The court also dismissed McPeek’s quantum meruit claim, stating that he had already been compensated for his training services and that exceptional circumstances justifying equitable relief were not present.The Kentucky Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s decision, holding that KRS 230.357(11) only applied to buyers, sellers, and their agents in horse transactions. The court reasoned that McPeek’s commission was for training services, not for the sale of the horse, and thus the statute did not apply.The Supreme Court of Kentucky reversed the Court of Appeals, reinstating the trial court’s summary judgment. The Supreme Court held that KRS 230.357(11) applies broadly to any form of compensation connected with the sale of a horse, including McPeek’s claimed commission. The court emphasized that the statute’s plain language requires a signed writing for such compensation to be enforceable, and McPeek’s lack of a written agreement barred his claims. View "NORMANDY FARM, LLC V. KENNETH MCPEEK RACING STABLE, INC." on Justia Law

In 2002, a 208-acre estate in Jessamine County was divided into four parcels. In 2004, the owner of Parcel 2 planned residential development, including a bridge and road extension, which was approved by the Nicholasville Planning Commission (NPC). By 2017, LPW Redevelopment, LLC owned Parcels 2 and 3, sought a zone change, and submitted a development plan, which was approved. Boone Development, LLC purchased Parcel 3 in 2018 and began construction. The NPC required Boone to include the bridge and road extension in a letter of credit, which Boone disputed, leading to this litigation.The Jessamine Circuit Court ruled in favor of Boone, stating the NPC had not made a decision, necessitating a declaratory action. The NPC then issued a Notice of Decision affirming its requirements, which the Board of Adjustment upheld. Boone appealed, and the Jessamine Circuit Court affirmed the Board’s decision, finding the Board’s actions were within its legislative powers, provided due process, and were supported by substantial evidence.The Supreme Court of Kentucky reviewed the case, focusing on the constitutionality of the appeal bond requirement in KRS 100.3471. The Court found the statute unconstitutional, referencing its decision in Bluegrass Trust v. Lexington-Fayette Urban County Government. The Court also addressed the merits of the case, affirming the Jessamine Circuit Court’s decision that Boone was responsible for the bridge and road extension as per the development plan. The Court found no procedural due process violations and determined the Board’s decision was not arbitrary or unreasonable. The Court of Appeals’ dismissal for lack of jurisdiction was reversed, and the Jessamine Circuit Court’s judgment was affirmed. View "RAZ, INC. V. MERCER COUNTY FISCAL COURT" on Justia Law