Justia Kentucky Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the decision of the court of appeals granting in part and denying in part Appellant's petition for a writ to prohibit the trial court from compelling her husband's deposition testimony, thereby denying Appellant's writ petition in whole, holding that the trial court did not err in allowing the deposition to move forward.Appellant filed suit against Baptist Healthcare, Inc., her former employer, alleging, inter alia, gender discrimination. Baptist sought to depose Dr. Gregory Collins - Appellant's husband, treating physician, and employer - but Appellant objected to the deposition based on the husband-wife privilege. Baptist then filed a motion to compel Collins's testimony. The trial court granted in part and denied in part the motion, ordering that Baptist could depose Collins on three specified topics. The court of appeals granted Appellant's writ of prohibition as it related to Collins's testimony of Lucas's public manifestations of emotional health but denied the writ as it related to the other two topics. The Supreme Court held that the trial court's order appropriately limited Collins's deposition testimony and properly allowed the deposition to take place subject to additional objections or assertions of privilege. View "Lucas v. Honorable Judith E. McDonald-Burkman" on Justia Law

In a whistleblower action, the Supreme Court affirmed in part and remanded in part the order of the court of appeals denying the petition for a writ of prohibition/mandamus sought by the University of Louisville and Ruby Fenton, holding that remand was necessary in this case.Plaintiff filed this whistleblower action against the University after the University did not renew his faculty appointment. During discovery, Plaintiff served a subpoena upon Fenton seeking all written communications and notes reflecting communications between Fenton and any person associated with the University relating to faculty grievance proceedings initiated by Plaintiff. Fenton represented Plaintiff's supervisors during the grievance proceedings. The University and Fenton asserted that the communications were protected by the attorney-client privilege and the work-product privilege. The trial court permitted the discovery. Fenton and the University then filed this writ of prohibition/mandamus. The court of appeals denied the writ. The Supreme Court held (1) the lower courts did not err in determining the the attorney-client privilege was not applicable under these circumstances; but (2) the court of appeals did not rule upon the University and Fenton's request for protection of the subject communications based upon the work-product privilege. View "University of Louisville v. Honorable Audra Eckerle" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals upholding an Administrative Law Judge's (ALJ) award of six percent permanent partial disability benefits to Appellant because of a work-related injury, holding that substantial medical evidence supported the six percent permanent partial disability found by the ALJ.On appeal, Appellant argued that the ALJ erred by making insufficient findings to exclude a pre-existing condition in assessing his impairment rating. The Workers' Compensation Board concluded that remand was necessary for the ALJ to address Finley v. DBM Technologies, 217 S.W.3d 261 (Ky. App. 2007). The court of appeals disagreed, holding that the ALJ did not need to apply Finley and that the ALJ based her opinion on substantial medical evidence. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the ALJ did not err in limiting her discussion of Finley and that substantial evidence supported the ALJ's findings. View "Wetherby v. Amazon.com" on Justia Law

In this real property dispute, the Supreme Court affirmed the opinion of the court of appeals reversing a jury verdict and resulting judgment in favor of Defendants, holding that the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury in a way that allowed the jury to address a factual dispute to resolve it.The parties in this case owned adjoining farms. At issue was whether Plaintiffs' use of a road access across Defendants' land had ripened into a prescriptive easement. The jury found in favor of Defendants, which meant that Plaintiffs had no right to use the disputed road. The trial court entered judgment in conformity with the jury's verdict. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury in conformance with the rule in Ward v. Stewart, 435 S.W.2d (Ky. 1968). The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) when confronted with conflicting evidence on the issue of permissive versus prescriptive use of the road at issue, the trial court abused its discretion by failing to provide a burden-shifting Ward instruction; and (2) Ky. R. Evid. 801A(c)(2) did not apply to except certain testimony under the hearsay rule. View "Melton v. Cross" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court convicting Defendant of murder and sentencing him to thirty years in prison, holding that there was no error in the proceedings below.Specifically, the Court held (1) the trial court did not err by denying Defendant's motion to suppress a videotaped conversation between Defendant and family members that took place in an interrogation room shortly after Defendant was arrested; (2) the trial court did not err by denying Defendant's motions for a mistrial and a new trial; and (3) the trial court did not err by denying Defendant's motion to prohibit the introduction of crime scene and autopsy photographs. View "Easterling v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court convicting Defendant of murder and being a convicted felon in possession of a handgun and sentencing him to life imprisonment, holding that there was no error in the proceedings below.Specifically, the Court held, contrary to Defendant's arguments on appeal, that (1) the trial court did not err in denying Defendant's request for a first-degree manslaughter instruction under extreme emotional disturbance; (2) the trial court did not err in denying Defendant's motion to admonish the jury as to the use of threats; and (3) no discovery violation occurred regarding Defendant's prior convictions prior to the penalty phase. View "Posey v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court accepted certificate of a question of law from a federal district court and answered that Seven Counties Services, Inc.'s participation in and its contributions to the Kentucky Employees Retirement System (KERS) are based on a statutory obligation, rather than a contractual obligation.In 1979, the then-Governor designated Seven Counties, a non-profit provider of mental health services, a "department" for purposes of participating in KERS, a public pension system. Thereafter, Seven Counties paid into KERS to secure retirement benefits for its employees. In 2013, Seven Counties initiated bankruptcy proceedings primarily to reject its relationship with KERS as an executory contract. KERS countered that Seven Counties should be required to comply with its statutory obligations to contribute to KERS. The bankruptcy court determined that Seven Counties' relationship with KERS was contractual and, therefore, that Seven Counties could reject the contract in bankruptcy and leave the retirement system. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that the relationship between KERS and Seven Counties was statutory. View "Kentucky Employees Retirement System v. Seven Counties Services, Inc." on Justia Law

In this lawsuit between AllyAlign Health, Inc. and Signature Advantage, LLC the Supreme Court granted AllyAlign's motion for an order to compel arbitration of all claims, holding that a carve-out provision in the parties' contract for certain claims to be decided by a court did not negate the mandate of the Commercial Arbitration Rules and Arbitration Procedures of the American Arbitration Association (AAA's Rules) that the initial arbitrability of claims is to be determined by the arbitrator, not the courts.AllyAlign contracted with Signature Advantage for AllyAlign's services. The contract contained an arbitration provision incorporating the AAA's Rules. Signature Advantage later sued AllyAlign for breach of contract and other claims. AllyAlign moved to compel arbitration on all the claims based on the AAA's Rules that delegate to the arbitrator the initial decision about the arbitrability of claims arising between the parties. In response, Signature Advantage argued that the language of the carve-out provision exempted equitable claims from arbitration. The trial court granted in part the motion to compel arbitration but denied the motion for the claims it found to demand equitable relief. The Supreme Court compelled arbitration of all claims, holding that the trial court's order declining to refer all the claims of the complaint was erroneous. View "AllyAlign Health, Inc. v. Signature Advantage, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and dismissed in part the appeal brought by Judge Beth Lewis Maze from the denial of the Judicial Conduct Commission (JCC) denying Judge Maze's motions in JCC proceedings stemming from the JCC's five-count misconduct charge against Judge Maze, holding that the JCC did not err in denying Judge Maze's motion for a stay and that Judge Maze's other challenges were either moot or procedurally infirm.While the misconduct charges against Judge Maze were pending before the JCC, a grand jury charged Judge Maze with two counts of second-degree forgery and one count of tampering with public records. Thereafter, Judge Maze filed three motions in her JCC proceedings. The JCC denied relief on all of the motions. The Supreme Court affirmed the JCC's denial of Judge Maze's motion to stay, dismissed as moot Judge Maze's challenge to the JCC's denial of her motion for a continuance, and dismissed Judge Maze's challenge to the JCC's denial of Judge Maze's motion for an informal hearing, holding that the balance of the equities favored allowing the JCC to move ahead with its disciplinary proceedings. View "Maze v. Kentucky Judicial Conduct Commission" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated the decision of the court of appeals in this interlocutory appeal from the denial of a judicial statements privilege in litigation between two physicians, holding that the matter at issue was beyond the parameters of appellate interlocutory jurisdiction.Plaintiff alleged that Defendant engaged in a pattern of conduct intended to damage Plaintiff's reputation and lure her patients to Defendant's medical practice. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss asserting the protections of the judicial statements privilege for absolute immunity based on a previous medical malpractice action that both physicians were involved in. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss. The court of appeals concluded that Defendant was immune from some, but not all, of Plaintiff's claims. The Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals' decision, holding (1) the collateral order doctrine is a narrowly circumscribed exception to the final judgment rule; and (2) the judicial statements privilege is not a form of immunity, the denial of which allows for an interlocutory appeal under the collateral order doctrine. View "Maggard v. Kinney" on Justia Law