Justia Kentucky Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

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The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part the judgment of the circuit court convicting Defendant of first-degree trafficking in a controlled substance and other offenses, holding that Defendant's conviction and sentence for tampering with physical evidence required reversal because the trial court erred in denying the motion for a directed verdict with respect to that charge.Specifically, the Court held (1) the trial court did not abuse its discretion by allowing certain testimony; (2) the trial court did not err in denying Defendant's motion for a directed verdict of acquittal on the first-degree trafficking in a controlled substance charge; but (3) the trial court erred in denying Defendant's motion for a directed verdict on the charge of tampering with physical evidence. View "McGuire v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
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The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals concluding that a promissory note executed by Ronny Stamper in April 1997 qualified as a negotiable instrument and, consequently, applying the six-year statute of limitations under Article 3 of Kentucky's Uniform Commercial Code, holding that the court of appeals properly considered Ky. Rev. Stat. 355.3-118 and that the note was a negotiable instrument under Ky. Rev. Stat. 355.3-104.Community Financial Services Bank brought this suit in January 2016 to enforce the promissory note at issue. Stamper argued that the action was untimely under the fifteen-year statute of limitations for written contracts. The trial court granted summary judgment for the Bank, concluding that the fifteen-year statute of limitations had not yet expired based on the maturity date listed on the promissory note. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the applicable statute of limitations was section 355.3-118 and, therefore, the action was time-barred. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Bank's attempt to enforce the promissory note was untimely under section 355.3-118. View "Community Financial Services Bank v. Stamper" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court convicting Defendant of leaving the scene of an accident and sentencing him to twenty years' imprisonment, holding that there was no prejudicial error in the proceedings below.On appeal, Defendant raised two claims of error, only one of which he preserved for appeal. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) there was no palpable error from the arresting officer's testimony referring to the field sobriety "tests" he administered and stating that Defendant "failed" them; and (2) the trial court did not err in denying Defendant's motion for a jury instruction on the lesser-included offense of assault in the fourth degree because such an instruction was unwarranted. View "Iraola-Lovaco v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
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In this case concerning discrimination against individuals because of their actual or imputed sexual orientation or gender identity the Supreme Court dismissed the matter, holding that the original party to bring this action before the Lexington Fayette Urban County Human Rights Commission lacked statutory standing to assert a claim against Hands On Originals.Hands On, a closely-held corporation, was a small business that prints promotional materials. Gay and Lesbian Services Organization (GLSO), a Kentucky not-for-profit corporation, represented and advocated for the lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer, questioning, intersex and allied community. When Hands On refused to print t-shirts promoting the Pride Festival, GLSO filed a complaint with the Commission. A determination of probable cause and charge of discrimination was filed declaring that Hands On had violated the Lexington Fayette Urban County Government public accommodation ordinance, section 2-33. The hearing commission granted summary judgment in favor of GLSO and the Commission. The circuit court reversed, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that GLSO cannot bring a claim under section 2-33 and therefore lacked statutory standing. View "Lexington-Fayette Urban County Human Rights Commission v. Hands-On Originals" on Justia Law

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In this wrongful death suit the Supreme Court overruled Chambers v. Ideal Pure Milk Co., 245 S.W.2d 589 (Ky. 1952), and its per se no proximate cause rule and adopted the majority rule that will allow juries to determine whether a pursuing officer's actions were a substantial factor in causing injury to a third party and apportion fault accordingly.Luiz Gonzalez was killed when a criminal suspect crashed into his vehicle during a high-speed chase initiated by Deputy Sheriff Jeremy Johnson. Johnson's vehicle was not involved in the collision. The estate of Gonzalez filed a wrongful death suit against Johnson and Sheriff Tony Hampton. The circuit court granted summary judgment for Johnson and Hampton based on Chambers. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) insofar as Chambers holds an officer cannot be the proximate or legal cause of damage inflicted on a third party by a fleeing suspect, Chambers is overruled; and (2) an officer can be the cause-in-fact and legal cause of damages inflicted upon a third party as a result of a negligent pursuit. View "Gonzalez v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Posted in: Personal Injury
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The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals reversing the judgment of the family court naming Terry Garvin and Donna Krieger K.R.K.'s de facto custodians and awarding them sole permanent custody, holding that the court of appeals erred in holding that individuals who are members of an unmarried couple cannot both be deemed as a child's de facto custodians.The family court named as K.R.K.'s de facto custodians Terry, K.R.K.'s maternal grandfather, and his long-term girlfriend, Donna, with whom he cohabited, and awarded them sole permanent custody. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the family court erred in naming more than one individual as K.R.K.'s de facto custodian. Specifically, the court held that because Terry and Donna were unmarried, they could not qualify as a single unit for purposes of Ky. Rev. Stat. 403.270. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that Terry and Donna were not precluded form being K.R.K.'s de facto custodians simply because they were an unmarried couple. View "Krieger v. Marvin" on Justia Law

Posted in: Family Law
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The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals reversing the circuit court's denial of Dr. Senad Cemerlic and ABG Pain Management's motion to set aside a default judgment and reinstated the trial court's denial of the motion to set aside the default judgment, holding the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion.VerraLab JA, LLC filed a complaint alleging that Cemerlic and ABG breached an agreement between the parties. VerraLab filed a motion for default judgment arguing that Cemerlic and ABG had failed to answer or file any other responsive pleading and that they had been served through the Secretary of State's office. The circuit court granted the default judgment. Cemerlic and ABG later moved to set aside the default judgment arguing that they had not been served. The circuit court denied the motion to set aside, concluding that Cemerlic chose to refuse a certified letter from the Secretary of State. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the affirmative action taken to avoid service of process fell short of good cause to have the default motion to set aside. View "VerraLab JA LLC v. Cemerlic" on Justia Law

Posted in: Civil Procedure
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The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals vacating and remanding the family court's decision determining that K.S.'s son was a neglected child and terminating K.S.'s parental rights, holding that the family court's decision was supported by clear and convincing evidence.In vacating the family court's judgment terminating the parental rights of K.S. the court of appeals concluded that the evidence was insufficient to prove the child was neglected because K.S. never had the opportunity to parent the child independently where the child had always been committed to the custody of the Cabinet for Health and Family Services. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the court of appeals erred to the extent it held there must be actual past or present abuse or neglect for a trial court to make a finding of abuse or neglect because proof of a potential threat of abuse or neglect is sufficient to support such a finding; and (2) the family court's decision to terminate K.S.'s parental rights was supported by the record. View "Commonwealth v. K.S." on Justia Law

Posted in: Family Law
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In this wrongful termination case, the Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the decision of the court of appeals reversing the circuit court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendants, holding that Ky. Rev. Stat. 342.197 constitutes a waiver of sovereign immunity against a governmental employer and that genuine issues of material fact existed precluding summary judgment on Defendant's retaliation claim against certain defendants but did not exist as to other defendants.Plaintiff filed suit against Rick Benningfield, Taylor County Jailer; Eddie Marcum, Taylor County Jailer; Taylor County Fiscal Court; and Eddie Rogers, Taylor County Judge Executive; James Jones, John Gaines, Tommy Corbin, Matt Pendleton, Ed Goran, and Richard Phillips, all magistrates. The court of appeals reversed the trial court's summary judgment in favor of Defendants, concluding, among other things, that genuine issues of material fact existed precluding summary judgment. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding (1) disputed issues of material fact existed as to the involvement of Taylor County Fiscal Court and Benningfield in his official capacity; (2) no material facts remained in dispute as to the involvement of Rogers, the Magistrates, or Marcum, and therefore, summary judgment was appropriate as to these individuals; and (3) Benningfield was entitled to qualified official immunity. View "Benningfield v. Fields" on Justia Law

Posted in: Personal Injury
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The Supreme Court affirmed the opinion of the court of appeals affirming a workers' compensation board opinion that affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded the order and opinion of the administrative law judge (ALJ) for further findings of fact concerning whether Appellant was, pursuant to Ky. Rev. Stat. 342.610(w), an up-the-ladder employer of Randy Medlin, holding that there was a factual error present in the original ALJ analysis.On appeal, Appellant argued that the portion of the ALJ's opinion and order finding that Appellant was not an up-the-ladder employer pursuant to Ky. Rev. Stat. 342.610(2) was based on substantial evidence and, accordingly, the Board erred in not affirming the ALJ's decision. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the ALJ's determination was based upon a misconstruction of Uninsured Employers' Fund v. Ritchie, No. 2012-SC-00746-WC, 2014 WL 1118201 (Ky. Mar. 20, 2014). View "Tryon Trucking, Inc. v. Medlin" on Justia Law