Justia Kentucky Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court reversed Defendant's conviction of several sex-related crimes, holding that the trial court erred by not striking one of the jurors for cause.A jury found Defendant guilty of three counts of first-degree sexual abuse, two counts of third-degree rape, four counts of third-degree sodomy, and other crimes. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the trial court did not err in denying Defendant's motion to dismiss the indictment or, in the alternative, to disqualify the Commonwealth Attorney's Office and Sheriff's Department; (2) the trial court's denial of Defendant's motion to remove Juror 277 for cause during jury selection was an error that mandated reversal; (3) there was no reversible error from the trial court's denial of Defendant's motion to suppress; and (4) the trial court did not err in refusing to admit a social worker's conclusions about the victim's credibility stemming from past allegations of sexual abuse. View "Ward v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part the judgment of the circuit court convicting Defendant of murder, assault in the first degree, tampering with physical evidence, fleeing or evading police in the second degree, and possession of a handgun by a minor, holding that insufficient evidence was presented that Defendant's flight "create[d] a substantial risk of[] physical injury to any person." See Ky. Rev. Stat. 520.095.Defendant was charged with, among other charges, fleeing or evading police in the first degree. At the close of the Commonwealth's case-in-chief, the trial court granted Defendant's motion for a directed verdict on the charge of fleeing or evading police in the first degree, amending the charge to fleeing or evading police in the second degree. Defendant was found guilty of this amended charge. The Supreme Court vacated the fleeing or evading police in the second degree conviction, holding that the trial court erred in finding sufficient evidence was presented to submit this amended charge to the jury. As to Defendant's remaining arguments on appeal, there was no other prejudicial error. View "Hunter v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

In this action seeking a declaration that the University of Kentucky is not an agency within the executive branch the Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's decision that sovereign immunity did not bar this action against the University but reversed the court's holding that the University is not within the executive branch.The University referred Plaintiff's delinquent UK HealthCare accounts to the Commonwealth, Department of Revenue for collection. The Department's collection efforts included imposition of a twenty-five percent collection fee and interest and garnishment of Plaintiff's paychecks, bank accounts, and tax refunds. Plaintiff petitioned for a declaration that the University was not an agency within the executive branch, as required by Ky. Rev. Stat. 45.237(1)(a), and therefore was not authorized to refer its accounts to the Department. The circuit court trial court granted Plaintiff's motion for declaratory judgment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the University is within the executive branch of the state government for purposes of Ky. Rev. Stat. 45.237 et seq.; and (2) sovereign immunity did not bar this declaratory judgment action. View "University of Kentucky v. Moore" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the opinion of the court of appeals insofar as it vacated the trial court's judgment convicting Defendant of tampering of physical evidence but reversed insofar as the court reversed Defendant's other convictions, holding that there was insufficient evidence to convict Defendant of tampering with physical evidence.Defendant, while in the presence of a police officer, dropped or tossed physical evidence of a possessory crime. Defendant was subsequently convicted of first-degree possession of a controlled substance, possession of drug paraphernalia, and tampering with physical evidence. The court of appeals reversed, holding that there was insufficient evidence to support all three crimes. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that the trial court (1) did not err in denying Defendant's motion for a directed verdict on the possession charges; but (2) erred in denying Defendant's motion for a directed verdict with respect to the tampering with physical evidence charge. View "Commonwealth v. James" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part the judgment of the circuit court convicting Defendant of first-degree trafficking in a controlled substance and other offenses, holding that Defendant's conviction and sentence for tampering with physical evidence required reversal because the trial court erred in denying the motion for a directed verdict with respect to that charge.Specifically, the Court held (1) the trial court did not abuse its discretion by allowing certain testimony; (2) the trial court did not err in denying Defendant's motion for a directed verdict of acquittal on the first-degree trafficking in a controlled substance charge; but (3) the trial court erred in denying Defendant's motion for a directed verdict on the charge of tampering with physical evidence. View "McGuire v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals concluding that a promissory note executed by Ronny Stamper in April 1997 qualified as a negotiable instrument and, consequently, applying the six-year statute of limitations under Article 3 of Kentucky's Uniform Commercial Code, holding that the court of appeals properly considered Ky. Rev. Stat. 355.3-118 and that the note was a negotiable instrument under Ky. Rev. Stat. 355.3-104.Community Financial Services Bank brought this suit in January 2016 to enforce the promissory note at issue. Stamper argued that the action was untimely under the fifteen-year statute of limitations for written contracts. The trial court granted summary judgment for the Bank, concluding that the fifteen-year statute of limitations had not yet expired based on the maturity date listed on the promissory note. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the applicable statute of limitations was section 355.3-118 and, therefore, the action was time-barred. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Bank's attempt to enforce the promissory note was untimely under section 355.3-118. View "Community Financial Services Bank v. Stamper" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court convicting Defendant of leaving the scene of an accident and sentencing him to twenty years' imprisonment, holding that there was no prejudicial error in the proceedings below.On appeal, Defendant raised two claims of error, only one of which he preserved for appeal. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) there was no palpable error from the arresting officer's testimony referring to the field sobriety "tests" he administered and stating that Defendant "failed" them; and (2) the trial court did not err in denying Defendant's motion for a jury instruction on the lesser-included offense of assault in the fourth degree because such an instruction was unwarranted. View "Iraola-Lovaco v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

In this case concerning discrimination against individuals because of their actual or imputed sexual orientation or gender identity the Supreme Court dismissed the matter, holding that the original party to bring this action before the Lexington Fayette Urban County Human Rights Commission lacked statutory standing to assert a claim against Hands On Originals.Hands On, a closely-held corporation, was a small business that prints promotional materials. Gay and Lesbian Services Organization (GLSO), a Kentucky not-for-profit corporation, represented and advocated for the lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer, questioning, intersex and allied community. When Hands On refused to print t-shirts promoting the Pride Festival, GLSO filed a complaint with the Commission. A determination of probable cause and charge of discrimination was filed declaring that Hands On had violated the Lexington Fayette Urban County Government public accommodation ordinance, section 2-33. The hearing commission granted summary judgment in favor of GLSO and the Commission. The circuit court reversed, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that GLSO cannot bring a claim under section 2-33 and therefore lacked statutory standing. View "Lexington-Fayette Urban County Human Rights Commission v. Hands-On Originals" on Justia Law

In this wrongful death suit the Supreme Court overruled Chambers v. Ideal Pure Milk Co., 245 S.W.2d 589 (Ky. 1952), and its per se no proximate cause rule and adopted the majority rule that will allow juries to determine whether a pursuing officer's actions were a substantial factor in causing injury to a third party and apportion fault accordingly.Luiz Gonzalez was killed when a criminal suspect crashed into his vehicle during a high-speed chase initiated by Deputy Sheriff Jeremy Johnson. Johnson's vehicle was not involved in the collision. The estate of Gonzalez filed a wrongful death suit against Johnson and Sheriff Tony Hampton. The circuit court granted summary judgment for Johnson and Hampton based on Chambers. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) insofar as Chambers holds an officer cannot be the proximate or legal cause of damage inflicted on a third party by a fleeing suspect, Chambers is overruled; and (2) an officer can be the cause-in-fact and legal cause of damages inflicted upon a third party as a result of a negligent pursuit. View "Gonzalez v. Johnson" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals reversing the judgment of the family court naming Terry Garvin and Donna Krieger K.R.K.'s de facto custodians and awarding them sole permanent custody, holding that the court of appeals erred in holding that individuals who are members of an unmarried couple cannot both be deemed as a child's de facto custodians.The family court named as K.R.K.'s de facto custodians Terry, K.R.K.'s maternal grandfather, and his long-term girlfriend, Donna, with whom he cohabited, and awarded them sole permanent custody. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the family court erred in naming more than one individual as K.R.K.'s de facto custodian. Specifically, the court held that because Terry and Donna were unmarried, they could not qualify as a single unit for purposes of Ky. Rev. Stat. 403.270. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that Terry and Donna were not precluded form being K.R.K.'s de facto custodians simply because they were an unmarried couple. View "Krieger v. Marvin" on Justia Law