Justia Kentucky Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the court of appeals reversing the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Louisville & Jefferson County Metropolitan Sewer District (MSD) on Mark Hill's claims under the Whistleblower Act, Ky. Rev. Stat. 61.101 et seq., and the Kentucky Civil Rights Act (KCRA), Ky. Rev. Stat. 344.010 et seq., holding that Hill's KCRA claims were correctly dismissed but that MSD was not subject to the Whistleblower Act.With respect to Hill's Whistleblower claim, the trial court found that MSD was not to be considered an "employer" under the Whistleblower Act. The court also found that Hill failed to present any affirmative evidence in support of his KCRA claims. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court as to Hill's KCRA claims but reversed as to Hill's Whistleblower claim. The Supreme Court reversed as to the Whistleblower claim, holding that MSD was not an "employer" for purposes of the Whistleblower Act. View "Louisville & Jefferson County Metropolitan Sewer District" on Justia Law

In this case considering the Kentucky Horse Racing Commission's regulations as applied to historical horse racing the Supreme Court reversed the order of the circuit court determining that the Encore system constitutes a "pari-mutuel system of wagering," holding that the trial court misapplied the applicable regulation as a matter of law.The Commission, the Department of Revenue and several horse racing associations sought judicial approval for wagering on historical horse racing. The Family Foundation of Kentucky, Inc. was permitted to intervene and challenged both the validity of regulations and the premise that wagering on historical horse races was truly pari-mutuel wagering. The trial court concluded that the Encore system constituted a pari-mutuel system of wagering approved by the Commission. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Encore system does not create a wagering pool among patrons such that they are wagering among themselves, as required for pari-mutuel wagering. View "Family Trust Foundation of Kentucky, Inc. v. Kentucky Horse Racing Commission" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the opinion of the court of appeals affirming the trial court's summary judgment in favor of Insurer, holding that the trial court did not err in finding that Plaintiff did not qualify as an insured under the facts of this case.Plaintiff was riding his bicycle when he was struck by a truck. The driver of the truck was an underinsured motorist (UIM). Plaintiff filed claims for UIM coverage under the commercial insurance policy that covered vehicles owned by and used in the court of business at Plaintiff's law firm. Insurer denied the UIM claims under its commercial policy. Plaintiff then filed a motion for declaratory judgment asking the trial court to declare that Insurer was obligated to provide UIM benefits. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Insurer, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court correctly found there were no issues as to any material fact and that Insurer was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. View "Isaacs v. Sentinal Insurance Co. Ltd." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the ruling of the trial court granting summary judgment for Insurer on Plaintiff's action seeking a declaration that Insurer was obligated to prove underinsured motorist (UIM) benefits under the terms of a commercial policy, holding that Plaintiff was not covered under the terms of the commercial UIM policy in this case.Plaintiff was a member of an LLC that bought a commercial automobile insurance policy from Insurer. Insurer included UIM coverage for the LLC's vehicles. Plaintiff was walking through the parking lot of a store where she had just purchased items for the LLC and was struck by an automobile. The driver of the vehicle was an underinsured motorist. Plaintiff submitted a UIM claim to Insurer. After Insurer denied the claim Plaintiff filed this declaratory action. The trial court granted summary judgment for Insurer, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court correctly found there were no issues as to any material fact and that Insurer was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. View "Metzger v. Auto-Owners Insurance Co." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the opinion of the court of appeals affirming the decision of the Board of Trustees of the Kentucky Retirement Systems denying Edward Elder's application for disability retirement benefits, holding that the circuit court and the court of appeals misinterpreted this Court's holding in Kentucky Retirement Systems v. West, 413 S.W.3d 578 (Ky. 2013).Elder applied for disability retirement benefits due to a genetic disorder. Systems denied benefits because Elder submitted no pre-employment medical records. In affirming Systems' denial of benefits, the circuit court read West to require submission of pre-employment medical records to prove a disabling condition was asymptomatic and reasonably undiscoverable prior to hiring. The court of appeals affirmed the circuit court's reading of West and its denial of Elder's claim for disability retirement benefits. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case, holding that West imposed no requirement that a claimant submit pre-employment records to disprove the pre-existence of his genetic disorder. View "Elder v. Kentucky Retirement Systems" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that Ky. Rev. Stat. 189.390 subsections (3)-(5) do not violate the due process provisions of the United States and Kentucky Constitutions on the grounds that the speed limit statutes are unconstitutionally vague, holding that sections 189.390(3)-(5) are not unconstitutionally vague.Defendant was charged with speeding. Defendant moved the district court to find that section 189.390 was void for vagueness because a reasonable person could not read the statute and understand which speed limit applied on any given road in Kentucky. The district court found section 189.390(3)-(5) to be facially unconstitutional by failing to provide citizens with sufficiently definite notice of the applicable speed limits on Kentucky roads. The Commonwealth requested certification of the law regarding the constitutionality of section 189.390(3)-(5). The Supreme Court granted the request and held that the provisions of the statute are not void for vagueness and do not violate the state or federal Constitutions because section 189.390(3)-(5) provides citizens with fair notice of the proscribed conduct and does not encourage arbitrary enforcement. View "Commonwealth v. Curry" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court convicting Defendant of attempted murder and theft by unlawful taking of a firearm, holding that the trial court did not err in instructing the jury and denying Defendant's motion for directed verdict.A jury found Defendant guilty of attempted murder and theft by unlawful taking of a firearm. Consistent with the jury's recommendation, the trial court sentenced Defendant to a total sentence of twenty years. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court did not err by declining Defendant's request for a renunciation instruction; and (2) the trial court did not err by denying Defendant's motion for directed verdict on the charge of theft by unlawful taking of a firearm. View "Bowen v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Conrai Kaballah's conviction of criminal attempt-murder, first-degree assault, and other crimes and Ricardo Taylor's conviction of criminal attempt-murder, first-degree assault, and other crimes and both defendant's sentences of life imprisonment, holding that any errors were harmless.Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) both defendants should have been Mirandized prior to being interrogated shortly after the assault occurred; (2) the trial court erred by allowing a transcript commissioned by the Commonwealth of a phone call Taylor made from jail to be shown during closing arguments; and (3) both errors were harmless as a matter of law due to the overwhelming evidence against the defendants and the inconsequential nature of the evidence produced from the errors. View "Taylor v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the decision of the circuit court excluding from evidence a Root Cause Analysis (RCA) and granting a directed verdict in favor of Neurosurgical Institute of Kentucky, P.S.C., holding that any error committed by the trial court was harmless.Plaintiff, in his capacity as administrator of the decedent's estate and in his individual capacity, filed a medical negligence suit against Defendants, a private neurosurgery practice, a neurosurgical resident, a hospital, and other medical professionals. During discovery, the hospital filed a motion in liming to exclude the RCA report as a subsequent remedial measure under Ky. R. Evid. 407. The trial court granted the motion. After a trial, the court granted a directed verdict in favor of the defendants. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court erred in excluding the RCA under Rule 407, but the error was harmless; (2) the court of appeals' Rule 407 analysis was not improper, and the RCA was properly excluded under Ky. R. Evid. 403; and (3) the trial court did not err in excluding the RCA when offered for impeachment purposes. View "Thomas v. University Medical Center, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the circuit court sentencing Defendant to life in prison plus fifty years, holding that the violent offender statute is not applicable to youthful offenders for purposes of consideration of probation, even if they are sentenced after they have reached the age of majority.Defendant committed the crimes for which he was convicted when he was seventeen years old. The district court transferred the charges to circuit court for Defendant's prosecution as a youthful offender. Defendant was nineteen years old when he pleaded guilty pursuant to plea agreements to murder, first-degree robbery, and other crimes. Under the assumption that Defendant was ineligible for probation, the trial court imposed a life sentence with a fifty-year sentence to run consecutively. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment, holding (1) Kentucky's Juvenile Code and relevant caselaw support the conclusion that the violent offender statute is not applicable to youthful offenders for purposes of consideration of probation, even if they are sentenced after they reach the age of eighteen years and five months; and (2) the trial court erred in failing to consider probation or other forms of conditional discharge as possible alternatives. View "Thomas v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law