Justia Kentucky Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the decision of the court of appeals reversing Defendant's conviction for being a convicted felon in possession of a handgun on the grounds that the trial court erred in denying Defendant's motion to suppress, holding that the court of appeals erred in concluding that the Commonwealth's reasonable suspicion argument was precluded.In his motion to suppress, Defendant argued that the traffic stop in the case was impermissibly prolonged beyond its original purpose and violated his Fourth Amendment rights. The trial court denied the motion without addressing whether the officers had independent reasonable suspicion to extend the stop. The court of appeals reversed, concluding (1) the officers deferred completion of the stop beyond its original purpose for a purpose totally unrelated to the original stop; and (2) the Commonwealth was precluded from arguing reasonable suspicion of criminal activity as a justification for the extension. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that the court of appeals (1) correctly held that Defendant's stop was impermissibly extended; but (2) erred in concluding that the Commonwealth's reasonable suspicion argument was precluded. The Court remanded the case to the trial court for additional factual findings and conclusions of law as to the officers' reasonable suspicion. View "Commonwealth v. Mitchell" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the circuit court's denial of Appellant's petition to declare his violent offender classification unconstitutional, holding that a defendant convicted of robbery in the first degree qualifies as a violent offender pursuant to Ky. Rev. Stat. 439.3401(1) regardless of whether the victim suffered serious physical injury or death and regardless of whether the trial court's judgment addresses the victim's status.Appellant was convicted of twelve counts of first-degree robbery and was classified as a violent offender. The circuit court did not state in its judgment that any of Appellant's victims suffered serious physical injury or death. Appellant filed a petition seeking to declare her violent offender classification unconstitutional. The lower courts denied the petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Benet v. Commonwealth, 253 S.W.3d 528 (Ky. 2008) correctly interprets the requirements of section 439.3401(1) for violent offender status; and (2) the portion of Pate v. Department of Corrections, 466 S.W.3d 480 (Ky. 2015), that is inconsistent with Benet is overruled. View "Lee v. Kentucky Department of Corrections" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals requiring Appellant to comply with a subpoena duces tecum issued to him by the Secretary of the Finance and Administration Cabinet (Secretary), holding that the subpoena powers of the Secretary extend to suspected violations of Kentucky's Model Procurement Code (KMPC) and that the Secretary has the power to subpoena non-government employees as part of an investigation into a possible violation of the KMPC.The Secretary issued a subpoena to Frank Lassiter seeking information to assist in an investigation into whether certain government contracts complied with the KMPC. Lassiter refused to comply with the subpoena, arguing that the Secretary's authority to issue subpoenas under Ky. Rev. Stat. Chapter 45 did not extend to investigations into potential KMPC violations and, regardless, did not allow him to subpoena non-government employees. The circuit court denied the Secretary's motion to compel Lassiter's compliance, finding that the Secretary subpoena power did not apply to investigations into possible violations of the KMPC. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Secretary's subpoena power applies to investigations into possible violations of the KMPC. View "Lassiter v. Landrum" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals and Workers' Compensation Board affirming the determination of the Chief Administrative Law Judge (CALJ) denying Appellant's motion to reopen his workers' compensation claim as time barred, holding that the CALJ correctly denied Appellant's motion to reopen as untimely.In 1996 and 1997, Appellant incurred work-related injuries to his right and left shoulders. Income benefits were paid for his right shoulder injury, but no mention of the left shoulder injury appeared in the settlement agreement. In 2018, Appellant moved to reopen the left shoulder claim, asserting that he was entitled to income benefits based on a recent surgery and resulting increased impairment. The CALJ denied the motion. The Board and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellant's motion was untimely. View "Slaughter v. Tube Turns" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court certified that sovereign immunity as to monetary damages was waived neither as to the KRFRA nor in conjunction with Ky. Rev. Stat. 446.070 in this case.Plaintiff was arrested while protesting and was booked and photographed by Metro Police. When photographing Plaintiff, Metro officers allegedly ordered Plaintiff to remove her headscarf. On that basis, Plaintiff alleged a state claim under KRFRA. The Supreme Court granted the United States District Court, Western District of Kentucky's request for certification of law as to whether the General Assembly waived sovereign immunity from suit in the Kentucky Religious Freedom Restoration Act (KRFRA) and whether the use of Ky. Rev. Stat. 446.070 to seek redress for violations of the underlying statute nonetheless entitled government Metro to immunity from suit. The Supreme Court held that KRFRA's absence of an explicit waiver of sovereign immunity and section 446.070's lack of authority to waive sovereign immunity was apparent from the language of both statutes. View "Ruplinger v. Louisville/Jefferson County Metro Government" on Justia Law

In this case related to the disbursement of Purdue Pharma funds, the Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals' grant of summary judgment for the Office of the Attorney General (OAG) and Dolt Thompson declaring that a contract was enforceable and a payment to Dolt, Thompson, Shepherd & Kinney, P.S.C. (Dolt Thompson) was proper, holding that the circuit court did not err.The then-attorney general filed a lawsuit against Purdue Pharma regarding the OxyContin epidemic. The OAG selected Dolt Thompson to assist in the Commonwealth's litigation against Purdue Pharma. After the OAG settled with Purdue Pharma it paid Dolt Thompson in part. The Legislature then passed a 2016 budget bill directing payment of attorney's fees and expenses in the Purdue Pharma case. The OAG filed a complaint seeking a declaration that the payment to Dolt Thompson was proper. The Finance Cabinet filed an action against Dolt Thompson. The circuit court consolidated the cases and entered summary judgment for the OAG and Dolt Thompson. The court of appeals reversed and ordered the circuit court to allow the Cabinet to conduct discovery. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Legislature acted within its authority in stating that the attorney's fees should be paid prior to any other disbursement of the Purdue Pharma funds. View "Dolt, Thompson, Shepherd & Conway, P.S.C." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals' opinion affirming the decision of the Workers' Compensation Board, holding that Karen Woodall, the surviving spouse of an employee who died as a result of a workplace accident, was entitled to a statutory income benefit and that the time limitation as to the lump-sum benefit does not violate the United States and Kentucky constitutional guarantees of equal protection or Kentucky's prohibition against special legislation.Ten years after a workplace injury, Steven Spillman died as a result of a surgery required by that injury. Woodall, Spillman's surviving spouse, sought income benefits under Ky. Rev. Stat. 342.750(1)(a), and Spillman's estate sought a lump-sum benefit under Ky. Rev. Stat. 342.750(6). The Board found that Woodall was eligible for the surviving spouse income benefits but that the Estate was not entitled to the lump-sum death benefit. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) section 342.750(1)(a) contains no temporal limitation on Woodall's receipt of income benefits; and (2) the time limitation as to the lump-sum benefit is constitutional. View "Calloway County Sheriff's Department v. Woodall" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed Defendant's conviction of second-degree manslaughter by complicity, holding that the trial court committed reversible error when it allowed the Commonwealth to present a thirty-five-minute video of a police interview with Defendant in which Defendant was shown handcuffed and wearing an inmate's orange jumpsuit.After Defendant was arrested, an Assistant Commonwealth's Attorney and the lead homicide detective met Defendant and his attorney at the jail. They recorded their questioning of him, and throughout the interview, Defendant was handcuffed and wore an orange jumpsuit. During trial, the court allowed the Commonwealth to display the video version of the recording to the jury. The court of appeals affirmed Defendant's conviction, concluding that any error in admitting the video was harmless. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, while the video was not "inherently prejudicial," the video prejudiced Defendant, and the Commonwealth did not satisfy its burden of demonstrating beyond a reasonable doubt that the video did not impact the verdict. View "Deal v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of murder and sentence of life imprisonment, holding that there was no prejudicial error in the proceedings below.Specifically, the Supreme Court held that the trial court (1) did not err by refusing to remove six jurors for cause; (2) did not abuse its discretion in refusing a change of venue; (3) did not abuse its discretion in allowing testimony regarding Defendant's lack of remorse; (4) did not abuse its discretion in disallowing two defense exhibits; (5) did not err in limiting the evidence of Defendant's drug use; (6) did not err in allowing victim impact testimony; (7) did not abuse its discretion in admitting a certain witness's testimony; and (8) did not err in declaring another witness unavailable and allowing her prior trial testimony to be played for the jury. View "Hubers v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals' decision reversing the circuit court's order dismissing Property Owners' appeal from the decision of the Kenton County Board of Adjustment granting approval of a conditional use application to allow the operation of a nursery school in a residential zone, holding that Kentucky law requires that a party must claim to be "injured or aggrieved" to perfect an appeal to circuit court under Ky. Rev. Stat. 100.347(1).After the Board unanimously granted the conditional use application Property Owners filed an appeal, alleging that the Board's action was improper because it did not meet certain statutory requirements and the requirements of the Kenton County Zoning Ordinance. The circuit court dismissed the appeal, concluding that Property Owners failed to allege that they were injured or aggrieved by the final action of the Board, and therefore, the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. The court of appeals reversed, interpreting the "injured or aggrieved" language to be a standing requirement rather than a jurisdiction requirement. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Property Owners failed to follow the appeal procedures in section 100.347(1) by not claiming in the complaint to be injured or aggrieved, and therefore, the circuit court appeals properly dismissed the action for lack of jurisdiction. View "Kenton County Board of Adjustment v. Meitzen" on Justia Law