Justia Kentucky Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction and sixty-five-year sentence for attempted murder, first-degree robbery, and other crimes, holding that the trial court did to err by denying two of Defendant's directed verdict motions and that there was no error in Defendant's sentencing phase.On appeal, Defendant argued that the trial court committed reversible error when it denied his directed verdict motions for first-degree robbery and first-degree wanton endangerment and that his sentencing phase was unfairly tainted by incorrect information regarding parole eligibility. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) this Court overrules precedent requiring defendants to comply with the "second rule" of preservation; (2) in order to preserve an alleged directed verdict issue for appeal, criminal defendants must move for a directed verdict at the close of the Commonwealth's evidence and renew the directed verdict motion at the close of all evidence; (3) the trial court did not err by denying Defendant's motions for directed verdict; (4) even though testimony by the Commonwealth's sole witness in the sentencing phase regarding first-degree wanton endangerment was clearly false, the error was not palpable; and (5) the Commonwealth's misstatement of parole eligibility during its closing argument did not constitute manifest injustice resulting in palpable error. View "Ray v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

In this lawsuit brought against Johnson & Johnson, Inc. and other entities (collectively, Defendants) alleging state tort claims due to injuries caused by a Class III medical device the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the trial court granting Defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings based on federal preemption of all claims, holding that, under Kentucky's notice pleading standards, the motion for judgment on the pleadings should have been denied.In their complaint, Plaintiffs asserted claims for, inter alia, strict liability negligence, and lack of informed consent. Defendants moved for judgment on the pleadings based on federal preemption of all claims. The trial court granted the motion and dismissed all of Plaintiffs' claims. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, under Kentucky's notice pleading standard, Plaintiffs' complaint sufficiently put Defendants on notice of parallel claims under Kentucky law that may not be preempted. View "Russell v. Johnson & Johnson Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the trial court denying Defendant's motion for DNA testing with respect to hair found at the residence of the victims whom Defendant was convicted of murdering, burglarizing, and robbing, holding that the trial court did not err.Defendant was convicted of murder and sentenced to death. This appeal concerned Defendant's motion seeking DNA testing of hair that was found in the victims' home. The trial court denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed after noting that Defendant's DNA arguments have been raised and rejected by both the Supreme Court and the federal courts, holding that no reasonable probability existed that the DNA testing and analysis would produce exculpatory evidence. View "Hodge v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court convicting Defendant of wanton murder and four counts of first-degree wanton endangerment, holding that the trial court did not err in denying Defendant's motion for a directed verdict.On appeal, Defendant argued that the trial court erroneously denied his motions for a directed verdict on the wanton murder and wanton endangerment charges because the evidence was insufficient to establish "aggravated wantonness" and to prove that his conduct caused the victim's death. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Commonwealth met its burden of persuasion, and therefore, the trial court did not err by denying Defendant's motion for a directed verdict of acquittal on the charges. View "Taylor v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the decision of the court of appeals reversing Defendant's conviction for being a convicted felon in possession of a handgun on the grounds that the trial court erred in denying Defendant's motion to suppress, holding that the court of appeals erred in concluding that the Commonwealth's reasonable suspicion argument was precluded.In his motion to suppress, Defendant argued that the traffic stop in the case was impermissibly prolonged beyond its original purpose and violated his Fourth Amendment rights. The trial court denied the motion without addressing whether the officers had independent reasonable suspicion to extend the stop. The court of appeals reversed, concluding (1) the officers deferred completion of the stop beyond its original purpose for a purpose totally unrelated to the original stop; and (2) the Commonwealth was precluded from arguing reasonable suspicion of criminal activity as a justification for the extension. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that the court of appeals (1) correctly held that Defendant's stop was impermissibly extended; but (2) erred in concluding that the Commonwealth's reasonable suspicion argument was precluded. The Court remanded the case to the trial court for additional factual findings and conclusions of law as to the officers' reasonable suspicion. View "Commonwealth v. Mitchell" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the circuit court's denial of Appellant's petition to declare his violent offender classification unconstitutional, holding that a defendant convicted of robbery in the first degree qualifies as a violent offender pursuant to Ky. Rev. Stat. 439.3401(1) regardless of whether the victim suffered serious physical injury or death and regardless of whether the trial court's judgment addresses the victim's status.Appellant was convicted of twelve counts of first-degree robbery and was classified as a violent offender. The circuit court did not state in its judgment that any of Appellant's victims suffered serious physical injury or death. Appellant filed a petition seeking to declare her violent offender classification unconstitutional. The lower courts denied the petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Benet v. Commonwealth, 253 S.W.3d 528 (Ky. 2008) correctly interprets the requirements of section 439.3401(1) for violent offender status; and (2) the portion of Pate v. Department of Corrections, 466 S.W.3d 480 (Ky. 2015), that is inconsistent with Benet is overruled. View "Lee v. Kentucky Department of Corrections" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals requiring Appellant to comply with a subpoena duces tecum issued to him by the Secretary of the Finance and Administration Cabinet (Secretary), holding that the subpoena powers of the Secretary extend to suspected violations of Kentucky's Model Procurement Code (KMPC) and that the Secretary has the power to subpoena non-government employees as part of an investigation into a possible violation of the KMPC.The Secretary issued a subpoena to Frank Lassiter seeking information to assist in an investigation into whether certain government contracts complied with the KMPC. Lassiter refused to comply with the subpoena, arguing that the Secretary's authority to issue subpoenas under Ky. Rev. Stat. Chapter 45 did not extend to investigations into potential KMPC violations and, regardless, did not allow him to subpoena non-government employees. The circuit court denied the Secretary's motion to compel Lassiter's compliance, finding that the Secretary subpoena power did not apply to investigations into possible violations of the KMPC. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Secretary's subpoena power applies to investigations into possible violations of the KMPC. View "Lassiter v. Landrum" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals and Workers' Compensation Board affirming the determination of the Chief Administrative Law Judge (CALJ) denying Appellant's motion to reopen his workers' compensation claim as time barred, holding that the CALJ correctly denied Appellant's motion to reopen as untimely.In 1996 and 1997, Appellant incurred work-related injuries to his right and left shoulders. Income benefits were paid for his right shoulder injury, but no mention of the left shoulder injury appeared in the settlement agreement. In 2018, Appellant moved to reopen the left shoulder claim, asserting that he was entitled to income benefits based on a recent surgery and resulting increased impairment. The CALJ denied the motion. The Board and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellant's motion was untimely. View "Slaughter v. Tube Turns" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court certified that sovereign immunity as to monetary damages was waived neither as to the KRFRA nor in conjunction with Ky. Rev. Stat. 446.070 in this case.Plaintiff was arrested while protesting and was booked and photographed by Metro Police. When photographing Plaintiff, Metro officers allegedly ordered Plaintiff to remove her headscarf. On that basis, Plaintiff alleged a state claim under KRFRA. The Supreme Court granted the United States District Court, Western District of Kentucky's request for certification of law as to whether the General Assembly waived sovereign immunity from suit in the Kentucky Religious Freedom Restoration Act (KRFRA) and whether the use of Ky. Rev. Stat. 446.070 to seek redress for violations of the underlying statute nonetheless entitled government Metro to immunity from suit. The Supreme Court held that KRFRA's absence of an explicit waiver of sovereign immunity and section 446.070's lack of authority to waive sovereign immunity was apparent from the language of both statutes. View "Ruplinger v. Louisville/Jefferson County Metro Government" on Justia Law

In this case related to the disbursement of Purdue Pharma funds, the Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals' grant of summary judgment for the Office of the Attorney General (OAG) and Dolt Thompson declaring that a contract was enforceable and a payment to Dolt, Thompson, Shepherd & Kinney, P.S.C. (Dolt Thompson) was proper, holding that the circuit court did not err.The then-attorney general filed a lawsuit against Purdue Pharma regarding the OxyContin epidemic. The OAG selected Dolt Thompson to assist in the Commonwealth's litigation against Purdue Pharma. After the OAG settled with Purdue Pharma it paid Dolt Thompson in part. The Legislature then passed a 2016 budget bill directing payment of attorney's fees and expenses in the Purdue Pharma case. The OAG filed a complaint seeking a declaration that the payment to Dolt Thompson was proper. The Finance Cabinet filed an action against Dolt Thompson. The circuit court consolidated the cases and entered summary judgment for the OAG and Dolt Thompson. The court of appeals reversed and ordered the circuit court to allow the Cabinet to conduct discovery. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Legislature acted within its authority in stating that the attorney's fees should be paid prior to any other disbursement of the Purdue Pharma funds. View "Dolt, Thompson, Shepherd & Conway, P.S.C." on Justia Law