Justia Kentucky Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the opinion of the court of appeals concluding that the sentence Defendant negotiated upon a plea of guilty and instituted by the trial court was illegal, and therefore his probation revocation was also illegal, holding that the court of appeals erred in concluding that an illegal probation mandated release of Defendant from custody.After Defendant entered into supervised probation according to his plea deal the Commonwealth sought to revoke his probation. Defendant responded that the sentence for probation after serving his prison term was illegal. After a hearing, the trial court concluded that it could not alter the sentence and revoked Defendant's probation based on the testimony of Defendant's probation officer. The court of appeals reversed, declaring the probation revocation unlawful. The Supreme Court remanded the case for resentencing, holding that the court of appeals (1) properly concluded that the simultaneous imposition of ten years' incarceration and ten years' probation subsequent to incarceration was illegal; and (2) with Defendant's underlying conviction and sentence of imprisonment being lawful, the remedy for an illegal order of probation is to remand for resentencing. View "Commonwealth v. Moreland" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the trial court convicting Defendant of one count of unlawful use of electronic means to induce a minor to engage in sexual or other prohibited activities and six counts of possession of matter portraying a sexual act by a minor, holding that the convictions for possessing child pornography videos must be reversed.The Supreme Court reversed Defendant's four conviction resulting from possessing four videos containing child pornography and otherwise affirmed, holding (1) the trial court abused its discretion under Ky. R. Evid. 403 when it failed to review the child pornography videos before the videos were admitted into evidence and played in full; and (2) there was sufficient evidence proving that Defendant knowingly possessed child pornographic images and videos on his computer, and therefore, the trial court did not err by denying a directed verdict on those charges. View "Carpenter v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed Defendant's convictions of rape in the first-degree, victim under twelve; sodomy in the first-degree, victim under twelve; sexual abuse in the first-degree, victim under twelve; and incest, holding that Juror A.R. should have been struck for cause.During voir dire, when the Commonwealth asked the venire if anyone was uncomfortable with pornography, Juror A.R. made a physical indication. During a colloquy, the trial court asked several times if Juror A.R. could be fair and impartial. After one final time of asking whether Juror A.R. could remain fair and impartial, Juror A.R. affirmed that she could. The Supreme Court reversed Defendant's convictions and remanded the case for further proceedings, holding that, under the circumstances of this case, the trial court's failure to strike Juror A.R. for cause was an abuse of discretion. View "Moulder v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed Defendant's convictions for arson and attempted arson and otherwise affirmed, holding that the trial court erred in failing to grant a directed verdict in Defendant's favor as to the counts for arson in the first degree and attempted arson.Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) hearsay statements regarding the victims' fear of Defendant were admissible under Ky. R. Evid. 803(3)'s state-of-mind exception; (2) the trial court did not err in permitting witnesses to invoke their Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination; (3) the trial court properly precluded Defendant from presenting an aaltperp defense; (4) the trial court properly admitted physical evidence; (5) Defendant was entitled to a directed verdict on the charges of first-degree arson and attempted first-degree arson; (6) Defendant was not entitled to a directed verdict on the charges for murder; (7) Defendant's burglary convictions did not violate double jeopardy protections; and (8) reversal was not required on grounds of cumulative error. View "Martin v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals reversing the decision of the circuit court concluding that the notice-prejudice rule adopted in Jones v. Bituminous Casualty Corp., 821 S.W.2d 798 (Ky. 1991), applied in the underlying case, holding that there was no error.At issue was whether the claims-made-and-reported management liability policy issued by Allied World Specialty Insurance Company to Kentucky State University (KSU) provided coverage when KSU did not comply with the policy's notice provisions. The circuit court granted summary judgment for KSU after applying the notice-prejudice rule. The court of appeals reversed, determining that the notice-prejudice rule did not apply. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the policy's notice provisions were clear and unambiguous and that Allied World was entitled to deny coverage to KSU because KSU did not comply with the notice requirements; and (2) generally, the notice-prejudice rule shall not apply to a claims-made-and-reported policy that contains unambiguous notice requirements as condition precedent to coverage. View "Ky. State University v. Darwin Nat'l Assurance Co." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals affirming the decision of the Workers' Compensation Board determining that Richard Lane's notice to his former employer, Tennco Energy, Inc., that he was asserting a subsequent claim against it was timely, holding that there was no error.In 2019, Lane filed a coal workers' pneumoconiosis (CWP) claim against Tennco Energy, Inc. An administrative law judge dismissed the claim after determining that Lane had failed to give timely notice of the claim pursuant to Ky. Rev. Stat. 341.316(2). The Board reversed, concluding that a prior CWP claim that Lane had previously settled against a former employer had no bearing on Lane's duty to notice Tennco when he asserted a subsequent claim against it. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that remand was required for additional findings of fact under this opinion. View "Tennco Energy, Inc. v. Lane" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeal denying a writ of prohibition against the circuit court, holding that S.I.A. Limited's argument that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction over it was unavailing.SIA, a foreign Gibraltar corporation, allegedly engaged in illegal gambling activities involving Kentucky residents. SIA later voluntarily dissolved. SIA subsequently filed a motion to dismiss, requesting that the circuit court apply the law of Gibraltar to determine that the case must be dismissed because SIA was no longer a legal entity capable of being sued. The circuit court denied the motion, and the court of appeals denied SIA's ensuing petition for a writ of prohibition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the law does not allow foreign corporations to use voluntary dissolution as a means to subsequently divest these Courts of such jurisdiction, and therefore, equity requires that this lawsuit continue. View "S.I.A. Ltd. v. Honorable Wingate" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals affirming the ruling of the Workers' Compensation Board affirming the denial of Francisco Rodarte's motion to reopen and reversing the ruling that Rodarte's shoulder claim was barred due to failure to join, holding that the court of appeals did not err.Rodarte sustained two work-related injuries while working for BlueLinx Corporation - a knee and ankle injury in 2016 and a shoulder injury in 2018. In Rodarte and BlueLinx ultimately entered into a settlement agreement for Rodarte's knee and ankle injuries. BlueLinx denied Rodarte's shoulder claim, however, concluding it was barred pursuant to Ky. Rev. Stat. 342.270 due to Rodarte's failure to join it to the 2016 claim. Rodarte moved to reopen the 2016 claim, which the chief administrative law judge denied. Thereafter, an administrative law judge dismissed the shoulder claim. The Board affirmed the denial of the motion to reopen and reversed the dismissal of the shoulder claim. The court of appeals affirmed the Board's ruling on the motion to reopen but reversed its determination that Rodarte's shoulder claim was not barred for failure to join. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court of appeals did not err in its rulings. View "Rodarte v. Bluelinx Corp." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court convicting Defendant of first-degree sexual abuse, incest, sodomy, and other offenses and sentencing him to a total of fifty years' imprisonment, holding that there was no error.Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) the tampering instruction did not yield a verdict that violated the unanimous jury requirement; (2) the trial court did not err in denying Defendant's renewed motion to sever the child pornography charges; (3) the trial court did not err in admitting evidence of adult messaging app communications; and (4) the Commonwealth's comments during closing arguments did not warrant reversal. View "Behrens v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals vacating the order of the circuit court granting summary judgment in favor of John and Beth Bruner and against Don and Cathy Cooper in this property dispute, holding that the circuit court did not err in granting Ky. R. Civ. P. 60.02 relief.The Coopers brought this action seeking to have a road that had been maintained by the fiscal court and used by the public and the Bruners, the Coopers' adjoining landowners, The circuit court ultimately concluded that the road was neither a public road nor an easement. Thereafter, the Bruners successfully sought relief from the court's orders regarding the road's classification under Rule 60.02. The circuit court subsequently granted summary judgment for the Bruners, finding that the road was a public road by prescription. The court of appeals vacated the summary judgment order. The Supreme Court reversed and reinstated the grant of summary judgment, holding that the circuit court did not err by granting the Bruners' motion for Rule 60.02 relief or by granting summary judgment in favor of the Bruners. View "Bruner v. Cooper" on Justia Law